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Introduction
This thesis considers the problem of selling one or several units of a good in a
dynamic environment. The environment is dynamic because the pool of potential
buyers changes over time. It can grow if new buyers arrive, and it can shrink if
buyers leave. More generally, in Chapter 3, the willingness to pay of every buyer
in the pool may change over time. The allocation problem is dynamic, because the
point in time when a unit is sold is not exogenously given and may depend on the
available buyers and their characteristics.
Dynamic allocation problems are the rule rather than the exception. Dynamic
decisions have to be made, even in situations where a static selling mechanism, like
an auction with a reserve price, is used at a fixed date. The date at which the
auction takes place and the time at which it is announced determines the pool of
potential buyers. The reserve price, together with the valuations of the buyers,
determines whether the object is sold in the auction, or later in some subsequent
selling mechanism.
In dynamic allocation problems, it is crucial for the seller to know how the pool
of potential buyers evolves over time. There may be many constraints that withhold
some or all of this information from the seller. In Chapter 1, we will focus on two
particular constraints: First, information realizes over time. There is a fundamental
informational constraint that prevents the seller or any other person from looking
into the future. Second, there may be asymmetric information about the departure
of potential buyers.1
Without the first aspect, the problem would be essentially static. If agents could
look into the future, the same information would be available at all times. Decisions
today would not have to be based on expectations about the state of the world
tomorrow, because the actual state is already known today.
If we consider the allocation of a single object, the fundamental difference be-
tween the static and the dynamic model becomes apparent. In a static world, i.e. a
world with perfect foresight, the ex-post efficient allocation is trivially feasible. Al-
ready in the first period it is known at which point in the future the buyer with the
highest valuation will arrive. In a dynamic world, on the other hand, the decision
whether the object should be sold today or tomorrow, can at best be based on expec-
tations about the arrival of future buyers. This necessarily leads to inefficiencies. If
1Another interesting constraint is asymmetric information about the arrival of new buyers. The
analysis of this problem shares some similarities with the case of asymmetric information with
respect to departure times. The conclusion of Chapter 1 will briefly comment on this.
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the expected value of postponing the allocation is higher than the highest valuation
of the buyers that are available today, it may still be possible that tomorrow, the
state of the world turns out to be worse than expected, and the valuations of all new
buyers are lower than the valuations of the buyers that were available today. With
hindsight, it would have been more efficient in this case, to sell the object already
today. Without perfect foresight, however, inefficiencies of this kind are unavoid-
able. Evidently, this fundamental informational constraint applies to a seller who
maximizes revenue as well as to a seller who is interested in efficiency.
The second constraint—private information—turns out to be more stringent for
revenue maximization than for efficiency. Consider a simple example of two buyers
in an independent private values setting who arrive in two different time periods.
The seller has a single indivisible object that he can sell either in period one or
period two. If it is sold in the first period, it cannot be reallocated in the second
period (think of a consumption good). Buyer one arrives in the first period. He has
a privately known valuation for the object, and a deadline. The deadline determines
his willingness to wait. If the deadline is period one, then he will not be interested
in the object if it is offered to him in the second period. With deadline two, he is
indifferent about the time of the allocation. Buyer two arrives in the second period.
He has a privately known valuation which, by the lack of foresight, is not known to
anybody in the first period.
Regardless of whether the seller wants to maximize revenue or efficiency, if he
knew that the deadline were two, he would always postpone the allocation until
period two. Waiting creates an efficiency gain because both buyers are available in
the second period and the ex-post efficient allocation can be chosen. In the case of
revenue maximization, the seller can extract enough of the efficiency gain from the
buyers to make waiting worthwhile.
A difference between efficiency and revenue maximization arises, if we compare
the incentives for buyer one to reveal his deadline truthfully. It is well known
that the efficient allocation rule is implementable in quite general settings.2 In
particular, asymmetric information about the deadline does not pose a problem for
the implementability of the efficient allocation rule. The picture is different in the
case of revenue maximization. With asymmetric information about the valuation
and symmetric information about the deadline, we show that there is a class of
distributions for buyer one’s valuation and deadline, for which the seller demands
on average higher prices if the deadline is two. This destroys incentives to reveal
the deadline truthfully. As a consequence, the revenue-maximizing mechanism does
not fully separate buyers with different deadlines as is the case for the efficient
2In light of the informational constraint, the efficient allocation rule refers to the allocation rule
that maximizes the expected surplus under symmetric information, subject to the informational
constraint.
Parkes and Singh (2003) seem to be the first authors that have shown the implementability of the
efficient allocation rule. See also Athey and Segal (2007) and Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2010).
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allocation. In the example, the revenue-maximizing mechanism involves bunching
at the top of the type space. The mechanism separates different deadlines if the
valuation is sufficiently low, but for high valuations, buyer one receives the same
allocation and the makes the same expected payment regardless of his deadline.
The fundamental reason for the difference between revenue-maximization and
efficiency is that the deadline introduces multi-dimensional private information. In-
deed the analysis of the optimal mechanism, in the case where the incentive com-
patibility constraint for the deadline is binding, is formally equivalent to a static
mechanism design problem with multi-dimensional private information. Therefore,
the methods used in Chapter 1 will also be useful in static auction problems with
two dimensional private information (e.g. with buyers have privately known capacity
requirements or budget constraints).
The dynamic nature of the problem, however, is reflected in the conditions under
which the incentive constraint for the deadline is binding or slack. We analyze the
revenue maximizing mechanism for the case of symmetric information about the
deadline and show that there are two distinct effects that determine whether the
incentive constraint for the deadline is fulfilled even though it was not explicitly
imposed. The first effect which we call the static pricing effect can also be found in
static models with two-dimensional private information.3 The second effect, called
the dynamic pricing effect, is genuinely dynamic and has not been documented in
the literature so far. We will show that while different deadlines affect the nature
of competition with competing buyers, expected competition that buyer one faces is
independent of his deadline. If the deadline is two, buyer two has already arrived
when the deadline is reached. The seller can therefore use the realized valuation
of buyer two to decide whether buyer one gets the object and how much he has to
pay, rather than forming an expectation about buyer two’s valuation. Therefore,
competition is more dispersed for a later deadline. We show that non-linearities
in the hazard rate of the distribution of buyer one’s valuation, together with the
increased dispersion of competition, may lead to higher or lower payoffs for deadline
two. If the payoff increases in the deadline, buyer one has an incentive to reveal his
deadline truthfully. Conversely, if it decreases in the deadline, incentive compatibil-
ity is violated. In a static model, the second dimension of private information does
not determine the amount of information that the mechanism uses to determine the
allocation and payment. Therefore, different types do not lead to differences in the
dispersion of competition and the dynamic pricing effect does not occur.
Chapter 1 generalizes these observations and makes them precise. For reasons
of tractability, the analysis of the revenue-maximizing mechanism in the case of a
binding incentive constraint for the deadline is confined to the example introduced
above.
Chapter 2 contains a characterization of feasibility of asymmetric reduced form
auctions. This is a technical result that is needed to formulate revenue-maximization
3See Chapter 1 for references to this literature.
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problems in an auction context in terms of interim winning probabilities. The result
is applied in Chapter 1 to solve the two-dimensional mechanism design problem that
arises when the incentive constraint for the deadline is binding.
In Chapter 3, dynamic mechanism design is approached from a different angle,
which is new to the literature. We will consider the efficient allocation rule, which
is known to be implementable in quite general environments. We ask the question
whether in a private values setting, dynamic incentive provision conflicts with the
use of a simple payment rule. Inspired by standard static auctions, we require a
simple payment rule to fulfill the following properties:
(A) Only the winner of an object should have to make a payment.
(B) The payment of the winner should not exceed his valuation.
(C) The mechanism should never transfer money to any buyer.
Moreover, motivated by the dynamic model, we require that
(D) payments can be made online, i.e. all information that is needed to determine
the payment must be available at the time of allocation.
We argue in Chapter 3, that in a private values model, these properties are very
convenient for the practical implementation of a mechanism.
The question whether properties (A)–(D) can be fulfilled without violating in-
centives is not trivial in a dynamic model. So far, none of the mechanism proposed
to implement the efficient allocation rule satisfies all properties. In Chapter 3, a
partial answer is given. For the allocation of a single object in a quite general
dynamic model with independent private values, we demonstrate that the static
Vickrey auction, when generalized to implement the dynamically efficient allocation
rule, satisfies all properties (A)–(D).
In the standard static independent private values model, the payment rule of
the Vickrey auction can be interpreted in different ways. On the one hand, it a
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. Therefore, the payment of a buyer corresponds
to the externality that he imposes on the other buyers. On the other hand, it is a
second-price auction. The payment of the winning bidder corresponds to his critical
type, i.e. the lowest bid with which he could have won for a given profile of bids of
the other buyers.
If we apply the first principle to the dynamic framework we obtain the mecha-
nisms found in the existing literature. All of these violate at least one of the prop-
erties (A)–(C). If we apply the second principle, we get a mechanism (at least in
the case of one object), that is incentive compatible and satisfies all properties (A)–
(D). In contrast to the static model, however, the payments in the dynamic Vickrey
auction do not always correspond to the externality imposed on other buyers.
The definition of Vickrey-payments according to the second principle is not trivial
because the model has a multi-dimensional type-space. The critical type is not just
the lowest valuation that suffices to win as in the static case. In Chapter 3, we
show that for the efficient allocation of one object, there exists an order on the type
space that allows to define critical types. We argue that the same construction is
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also possible for quasi-efficient allocations rules. Therefore, the existence of simple
payment rules is not limited to the efficient allocation rule. If future research shows
that the revenue maximizing allocation rules is quasi-efficient, then it will also be
implementable by a simple payment rule. Whether a similar construction is possible
for the case of more than one object remains an open question.
CHAPTER 1
Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design with Deadlines
Summary. A dynamic mechanism design problem with multi-dimensional private
information is studied. One or several identical objects are sold to buyers who arrive
over a finite number of periods. In addition to his privately known valuation, each
buyer also has a privately known deadline for purchasing the object. The seller
wants to maximize revenue.
Depending on the type distribution, the incentive compatibility constraint for the
deadline may or may not be binding in the optimal mechanism. We identify a
static and a dynamic pricing effect that drive incentive compatibility and violations
thereof. Both effects are related to distinct properties of the type distribution and
sufficient conditions are given under which each effect leads to a binding or slack
incentive constraint for the deadline.
An optimal mechanism for the binding case is derived for the special case of one
object, two periods and two buyers. It can be implemented by a fixed price in
period one and an asymmetric auction in period two. The asymmetry prevails even
if the valuations of both buyers are identically distributed. In order to prevent buyer
one from buying in the first period when his deadline is two, the seller sets a reserve
price that is lower than in the classic (Myerson, 1981) optimal auction and gives
him a (non-linear) bonus. The bonus leads to robust bunching at the top of the
type-space. The optimal mechanism can be characterized in terms of generalized
virtual valuations which depend endogenously on the allocation rule.
1.1. Introduction
This chapter analyzes the problem of a seller, who wants to maximize revenue
in a dynamic environment. The seller has a finite number of identical units of a
good. Buyers have private values and unit demand, and arrive over a finite number
of periods. They are privately informed about their valuations, and each buyer has
a privately known deadline which determines the latest point in time at which he
still values buying a unit. To focus on the role of deadlines, we assume that the
seller observes new arrivals.
In many cases, buyers have deadlines that are imposed by third parties. Consider
for example a company that needs to buy a good from a seller in order to enter a
contractual relationship with a third party. The good could be a physical object, an
option contract, a license, a patent, etc. It is conceivable that the third party sets a
deadline after which the contractual relationship is no longer available. Therefore,
the object becomes worthless for the company if it is purchased after the deadline.
Other examples of dynamic allocation problems in which buyers can have deadlines
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are online auctions (think for example of buying a birthday present at eBay), the
sale of airline tickets, hotel reservations or the sale of houses and real estate.
So far, most of the literature on dynamic mechanism design has abstracted from
private information about deadlines, or more generally, from private information
about time preferences (see Section 1.1.3). This abstraction typically leads to mech-
anism design problems with one-dimensional private information which are tractable
under quite general assumptions about the dynamic arrival of new bidders and new
objects. In this chapter, we take a different direction and allow for private informa-
tion about the deadline.
We derive conditions under which, in the optimal mechanism, the incentive con-
straint for the deadline is slack or binding, respectively. In the case of a slack
incentive constraint, the seller’s problem can be solved by standard techniques. For
a special case that ensures tractability, we can solve the two-dimensional adverse se-
lection problem that arises in the binding case. In contrast to the slack case, buyers
with different types are not fully separated. We find robust bunching at the top of
the type-space.
1.1.1. Summary of Results. As a benchmark, consider the relaxed problem of
maximizing the seller’s revenue when deadlines are commonly known. With com-
monly known deadlines, the seller can fully separate buyers with different deadlines
at no cost. If valuations are not discounted, it is optimal to sell to a buyer only if
his deadline is reached. Classic mechanism design theory can be used to deal with
asymmetric information about valuations. Following Myerson (1981), buyers are
compared in terms of their virtual valuations.1 A buyer is awarded a unit if and
only if his virtual valuation is higher than the opportunity cost of the seller, i.e. the
highest virtual valuation among the other buyers or the option value of postponing
the allocation of the unit to future periods. This allocation rule defines a critical
virtual valuation which a buyer must overbid in order to get a unit of the good.
The critical virtual valuation can also be used to determine the payment of a
winning bidder. Since the virtual valuation is a function of the true valuation, we can
define the payment as the lowest valuation that suffices to overbid the critical virtual
valuation. The seller uses the inverse of the virtual valuation as a pricing rule that
maps critical virtual valuations to payments of the winning bidders. Together with
the optimal allocation rule, this payment rule defines a revenue-maximizing mecha-
nism that is incentive compatible in dominant strategies if deadlines are commonly
known.2
With privately known deadlines, the seller can try to implement the relaxed
solution by asking the buyers to report their deadlines. Buyers can therefore choose
1The virtual valuation of a buyer equals his true valuation, i.e. the price that the seller could charge
from the buyer in the absence of asymmetric information, minus the expected incentive costs of
selling to buyers with this valuation.
2We only require Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility in the seller’s maximization problem but
implementability in dominant strategies is automatically fulfilled for the relaxed solution.
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in which period they buy. The relaxed solution is incentive compatible if no buyer
has an incentive to buy earlier by misreporting his deadline. In principle, there could
be three reasons why a buyer might want to buy earlier.
First, he might expect the critical virtual valuation to be lower in earlier peri-
ods. We call this effect the competition effect because the critical virtual valuation
represents competition by other buyers. We show, however, that there is no com-
petition effect in this model. The expected value of the critical virtual valuation is
independent of the deadline.3
Second, the mapping between virtual valuations and true valuations could change
with the reported deadline so that the seller uses a different pricing rule for different
deadlines. This is called the static pricing effect.4 The effect depends on stochastic
dependencies between the deadline and the valuation of a buyer. For example, if
valuations tend to be higher for earlier deadlines, than pricing will be more aggressive
for earlier deadlines. This ensures incentive compatibility of the relaxed solution.
Finally, while expected competition is independent of the deadline, the distribu-
tion of the critical virtual valuation is less dispersed for earlier deadlines. Extending
our result of equal expectations, we show that the critical virtual valuation for a later
deadline is a mean preserving spread of the critical virtual valuation for an earlier
deadline.5 This can lead to different expected prices if the virtual valuation, and
therefore the pricing rule used by the seller, is non-linear. This is called the dynamic
pricing effect because the stochastic dominance results from the dynamic nature of
the model. For example, if virtual valuations are convex, then the pricing rule is
concave and more dispersed critical virtual valuations lead to lower expected prices.
Since the dispersion increases in the deadline, this ensures incentive compatibility
of the relaxed solution.
The static as well as the dynamic pricing effect can also work in the opposite
direction. If valuations tend to be lower for earlier deadlines and if the virtual
valuation is a concave function, then prices tend to be lower for earlier deadlines.
This induces misreports of the deadline and the relaxed solution is not incentive
compatible.
If the incentive constraint for the deadline is binding, the analysis of the optimal
mechanism has to be restricted to get a tractable model. We consider the case of
3In models of dynamic learning informational externalities can lead to a competition effect because
the report of a buyer conveys information about future buyers’ type distributions and arrival time
distributions. Therefore, competition is not independent of a buyer’s private information (Gershkov
and Moldovanu, 2009a,b).
4This effect can also arise in static models with a second dimension of private information such as
a capacity requirement or a budget constraint.
5This result is shown for the case of one object and many time periods, and for the case of many
objects and two time periods. I conjecture that the result extends to the case of many objects and
many time periods. If this true, all results about the incentive compatibility of the relaxed solution
carry over to the general case.
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two buyers who arrive in two different time periods and assume that the seller has
a single indivisible object.
In this case, the relaxed solution as well as the optimal mechanism have the
following common structure: If buyer one reports that his deadline is one, the object
is offered to him in the first period for a fixed price. If he declines the offer, the object
is offered to the second buyer in the second period for a fixed price. If buyer one
reports deadline two, then the seller conducts an auction that gathers both buyers
in the second period.
With private information about the deadline, buyer two has the outside option
of buying in the first period instead of participating in the auction, if his deadline is
two. The seller has two instruments to make this outside option unprofitable. First,
he can increase the price offered if buyer one reports deadline one. Second, he can
distort the auction format in the second period in favor of buyer one, so that his
expected payoff from the auction rises compared to the relaxed solution. We derive
the optimal mechanism and show that the seller always uses both instruments.
The distortion of the auction format leads to an asymmetric auction that favors
buyer one, even if both buyers have identically distributed valuations. More pre-
cisely, the optimal reserve price for buyer one is lower than in the relaxed solution,
winning probabilities are higher for all valuations above the reserve price, and there
is a non-trivial interval of valuations at the top of the type-space that win the auc-
tion with probability one. The expected price paid by buyers with these valuations
equals the fixed price offered in the first period. Therefore, there is bunching in the
valuation dimension as well as the deadline dimension. This is in contrast to the
relaxed solution which fully separates buyers with different types for a large class
of type distributions. We provide several examples of distributions for which the
relaxed solution is not incentive compatible.
Finally, we propose a generalized virtual valuation for buyer one that allows
to describe the optimal auction in the same way as the classic optimal auction
(Myerson, 1981). A buyer wins if and only if his (generalized) virtual valuation is
non-negative and higher than that of his opponent. In contrast to the classic model,
the generalized virtual valuation has a parameter that depends endogenously on the
allocation rule. This parameter determines the magnitude of the distortion compared
to the relaxed solution (where the parameter vanishes). A simple procedure to
compute the optimal distortion is provided. Using the generalized virtual valuation
function, it is straight forward to define an ascending clock auction that implements
the optimal mechanism in the second period.
1.1.2. Methods. In the auction problem, we have to deal with a type-dependent
participation constraint for buyer one because he can choose to buy in the first pe-
riod. The participation constraint is defined in terms of the interim expected utility.
Therefore, Myerson’s (1981) classic approach to solve the optimal auction problem
by point-wise maximization is not applicable. Instead, the feasibility constraint,
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i.e. the condition that the object be allocated only once, is formulated in terms of
interim winning probabilities. We use the characterization of feasibility of asym-
metric reduced form allocation rules from Chapter 2 to solve the resulting control
problem.6
If the interim winning probability of buyer one is absolutely continuous, the fea-
sibility constraint can be substituted into the objective function. We get a standard
control problem in which the winning probability is a state variable and its deriva-
tive is the control. (See Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) for an early application of this
method). To allow for jumps in the winning probability, the control problem is first
solved under the assumption that the winning probability is Lipschitz continuous
(and hence absolutely continuous). The Lipschitz solutions converge to an optimal
solution of the general problem if the Lipschitz constant approaches infinity. This
method was pioneered by Reid (1968) and seems to be new to the mechanism design
literature. It may be useful in other auction models where continuity of the winning
probability is not guaranteed.7
Reid also provides a method to show that Myerson’s ironing procedure can be
applied to ensure monotonicity of the winning probability. This is important in the
present context because the usual hazard rate assumption on the type distribution,
which ensures a non-decreasing virtual valuation, does not guarantee monotonicity
of the generalized virtual valuation.8
1.1.3. Related Literature. The literature on dynamic revenue maximization
emerged from the literature on dynamic pricing and revenue management. For
a survey, see for example Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003). McAfee and te Velde
(2007) survey airline pricing. This literature typically assumes stochastic demand
and abstracts from strategic buyers. If buyers are short-lived and only one buyer is
present at the same time, this is a reasonable assumption and the optimal mecha-
nism is a sequence of posted prices (Das Varma and Vettas, 2001). Gallien (2006)
shows that a sequence of posted prices is the optimal strategy-proof mechanism for
the sale of an inventory of identical objects to long-lived buyers with a commonly
known discount factor. He gives conditions on the arrival time distribution that
ensure that buyers are served only upon arrival, providing some justification for
this assumption in the revenue management literature. More recently, Gershkov
6The characterization is a generalization of Border (1991) who studies symmetric allocation rules.
Matthews (1984) conjectured the result proven by Border (see also Chen, 1986). For an early
application of a special case of the result see Maskin and Riley (1984).
7Recently, Hellwig (2008) has derived a version of Pontriyagin’s maximum principle that allows
for a monotonicity constraint on the control variable without requiring absolute continuity. This
is not applicable here, however, as we have to deal with the non-standard feasibility constraint.
8Except for Myerson’s (1981) paper, which does not use control theory, there does not seem to be a
full-fledged solution technique for the (valuation-)bunching case. Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) and
earlier Mussa and Rosen (1978) derive necessary conditions for bunches, but do not give precise
conditions on the location of bunches.
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and Moldovanu (2008) derived the revenue maximizing policy for an inventory of
heterogeneous but commonly ranked objects.
Another strand of literature considers discrete time models in which several buy-
ers can arrive simultaneously. Vulcano, van Ryzin, and Maglaras (2002) show that
a sequence of auctions with appropriately chosen reserve prices maximizes revenue
if bidders are short-lived. Said (2008) considers a model with stochastic arrival and
exit of bidders that have unit demand and a commonly known discount factor. A
random number of perishable objects is available in each period. The optimal allo-
cation rule awards the objects to the bidders with the highest virtual valuations. It
can be implemented by a sequence of open auctions with suitable reserve prices.
Several papers have shown the implementability of the efficient allocation rule
in dynamic settings (Parkes and Singh (2003), Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2010),
Athey and Segal (2007)). Said (2008) also considers the efficient allocation rule for
the model described above and shows that the mechanism derived in Bergemann
and Va¨lima¨ki (2010) can be implemented by a sequence of open auctions. Chapter
3 of this thesis shows that the efficient allocation of a single object with stochasti-
cally arriving long-lived bidders with privately known time preferences only requires
transfers between the seller and the winning bidder.
Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2008) consider a very general dynamic mechanism
design model with a fixed set of agents who receive one-dimensional private infor-
mation in every period. For a special case, the revenue-maximizing allocation rule
can be described in terms of virtual surplus in this model.
While general multi-dimensional mechanism design models are very complex to
analyze (see e.g. Armstrong (1996), Rochet and Chone´ (1998) and Jehiel, Moldovanu,
and Stacchetti (1999)), several authors have analyzed two-dimensional models with
additional structure on the second dimension of private information (the deadline
in the present case). Firstly, in these models, agents only have feasible deviations
in one direction of the second dimension (i.e. report earlier deadlines but not later
deadlines). Secondly, the second parameter does not enter directly in the expected
utility of an agent (i.e. the true deadline is immaterial as long as the agent receives
the object before the deadline.) See Beaudry, Blackorby, and Szalay (2009) for an
analysis of optimal taxation; Blackorby and Szalay (2008) and Szalay (2009) for
regulation; Iyengar and Kumar (2008) for a static auction model with capacitated
bidders; Dizdar, Gershkov, and Moldovanu (2009) for a dynamic model with capac-
itated bidders; and Che and Gale (2000) and Malakhov and Vohra (2005) for static
models with budget constrained buyers.
Closest to this chapter is Pai and Vohra (2008b), who consider a slightly more
general dynamic allocation problem with buyers who have privately known deadlines.
They show that the relaxed solution is incentive compatible if the virtual valuation
is “sufficiently monotone” in the deadline. This roughly corresponds to the static
pricing effect we find in this chapter. Their condition, however, cannot be applied
directly to the primitives of the model (i.e. the type distribution).
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Szalay (2009) is the only other paper that derives the optimal mechanism for the
binding case. All other papers make assumptions that guarantee that the relaxed so-
lution is incentive compatible. Jullien (2000) studies a principal-agent problem with
type dependent participation constraints. The analysis of the auction model in the
present chapter, however, requires different solution techniques than the models of
Szalay (2009) and Jullien (2000) because of the (non-standard) feasibility constraint
and the possibility of discontinuities in the optimal solution.
Organization of the Chapter. Section 1.2 describes the model. Section 1.3
presents a characterization of incentive compatibility. Section 1.4 states the sellers
problem. Section 1.5 presents the relaxed solution, conditions for incentive com-
patibility and for violations thereof. Section 1.6 informally presents the general
solution for the specialized model described above. Section 1.7 concludes and dis-
cusses limitations of the model and possible generalizations. The formal derivation
of the results from Section 1.6 is developed in Appendix 1.A. Some other proofs are
relegated to Appendix 1.B.
1.2. The Model
A seller wants to maximize the revenue from selling K ∈ N identical units of a
good within T ∈ N time periods. The seller’s valuation is normalized to zero. In
each period, a random number of buyers Nt ∈ N0 arrives. To avoid measurability
problems, we assume that there exists a finite upper bound N¯ ∈ N such that Nt < N¯
for all t. The set of buyers who arrive in period t is denoted It and we write
I≤t =
⋃t
τ=1 Iτ and N≤t = |I≤t|.
Each buyer is interested in buying at most one unit. A buyer i ∈ It is character-
ized by his arrival time ai = t, his valuation vi ∈ [0, v], where v > 0, and his deadline
di ∈ {t, . . . , T}. The object cannot be sold to a buyer before his arrival time.
Utility is quasi-linear. If buyer i has to make a total payment of yi and gets
(at least) one object in periods ai, . . . , di, then his payoff is vi − yi. If he only gets
units in periods di + 1, . . . , T , or if he does not get any unit, then his payoff is −yi.
Buyers are risk-neutral and maximize expected payoff. Neither the buyers nor the
seller discount future payoffs.9
The number of arrivals in different periods are independently distributed. νt,n
denotes the probability that n buyers arrive in period t. Deadline and valuation
are jointly distributed for each buyer but independent for different buyers. Buyers
with the same arrival period are ex-ante identical. For given arrival time a, the
probability that the deadline of a buyer equals d is denoted ρa,d. Conditional on the
deadline, the valuation has distribution function Fa(v|d) and density fa(v|d).
9If only payments are discounted and all agents have a common discount factor, the results do not
change. See also Section 1.7 for a discussion of discounting.
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Information realizes over time. In period t, the numbers of future buyers Nt+1,
. . . , NT , and the types of buyers with ai > t, are not known to anybody. In par-
ticular, the decision to sell a unit in period t cannot be based on this information.
Upon arrival, each buyer privately observes his own valuation and his own deadline.
In order to focus on the incentive issues of private information about deadlines, we
assume that the seller observes the arrivals of all buyers.10 The distributions νt,n,
ρa,d and Fa(.|d) are commonly known from the first period on.
We assume that for all a and all d ≥ a, fa(v|d) is continuous in v and strictly
positive for all v ∈ [0, v], continuously differentiable in v for v ∈ (0, v), and that
f ′1(.|d) can be extended continuously to [0, v].
Assumption 1.2.1. For all a ∈ {1, . . . T} and all d ∈ {a, . . . T}, the virtual valua-
tion Ja(v|d) := v −
1−Fa(v|d)
fa(v|d)
is strictly increasing in v.
To avoid additional technicalities, Assumption 1.2.1 is maintained throughout
the chapter. The zero of Ja(.|d) is denoted v
0
a|d and v
0
T if a = d = T .
1.2.1. Allocation Rule. In the most general formulation, a state st = (Ht, ξ<t)
consist of the history of buyers’ types Ht = ((ai, vi, di))i∈I≤t, and the past allocation
decisions ξ<t = (ξ1, . . . , ξt−1), where ξτ ∈ {0, 1}
N≤τ . ξτ,i = 1 means that buyer i gets
a unit in period τ . For a given history, the number of available units is denoted
kt = K −
∑t−1
τ=1
∑
i∈I≤τ
ξτ,i.
Definition 1.2.2. (i) The set of feasible allocations in state st = (Ht, ξ<t) is
defined as
Φt(st) =

ξt ∈ {0, 1}N≤t
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈I≤t
ξt,i ≤ kt

 , (F)
and the set of allocations at the deadline in state st is defined as
Φ˜t(st) = {ξt ∈ Φt(st)|∀i ∈ I≤t : ξt,i = 0 if di 6= t} .
(ii) Let xt(ξt|st) denote the probability that allocation ξt is chosen in state st. An
allocation rule x = (x1, . . . , xT ) assigns a probability distribution over {0, 1}
N≤t
to each state st = (Ht, ξ<t), such that xt(ξt|st) = 0 if ξt /∈ Φt(st).
(iii) An allocation rule x allocates only at the deadline if xt(ξt|st) = 0 for ξt /∈ Φ˜t(st).
(iv) An allocation rule is symmetric if for all t, all states st, all ξt ∈ Φ(st), and all
i, j ∈ I≤t, such that ai = aj , xt(ξt|st) = xt(σi,j(ξt)|σ˜i,j(st)).
11
(v) A payment rule y = (y1, . . . , yT ) assigns to each state st = (Ht, ξ<t) and each
ξt ∈ {0, 1}
N≤t, a payment yt,i(st, ξt) ∈ R for each i ∈ I≤t. A payment rule
is symmetric if for all t, all st, all ξt and all i, j ∈ I≤t, such that ai = aj ,
yt(st,ξt) = σi,j(yt(σ˜i,j(st), σi,j(ξt)))
10See section 1.7 for a discussion of private information about arrival times.
11σi,j is the permutation that interchanges the i
th and the jth element of its argument and σ˜i,j(st) =
(σi,j(Ht), (σi,j(ξ1), . . . , σi,j(ξt−1))).
1.2. THE MODEL 15
1.2.2. Mechanisms. The seller’s goal is to design a mechanism that has a Bayes-
Nash-Equilibrium which maximizes his expected revenue. We assume that the seller
can commit ex-ante to a mechanism. In general, a mechanism can be any game
form with T stages, such that only buyers from I≤t are active in stage t. We assume
that the mechanism designer can choose to conceal any information about the first
t stages from the buyers that arrive in stages t+ 1, . . . , T .12
By the revelation principle, the seller can restrict attention to incentive compati-
ble and individually rational direct mechanisms in which no information is revealed.
Furthermore, since buyers who arrive in the same period are ex-ante identical, we
can restrict attention to symmetric allocation and payment rules. In the following,
we will dispense with the “symmetric” qualifier.
Definition 1.2.3. A direct mechanism consists of message spaces S1 = [0, v] ×
{1, . . . , T}, . . . , ST = [0, v] × {T}, a symmetric allocation rule x, and a symmetric
payment rule y.
The (reported) state in period t can be constructed from the reports until period
t, which yield Ht, and the past allocations ξ<t.
The interim winning probability for period t of a buyer i ∈ Ia who reports (v
′, d′),
if all other buyers (past, current and future) report their types truthfully, is given
by
qta(v
′, d′) = Prob{ξt,i = 1|(ai, vi, di) = (a, v
′, d′)}.
The interim expected payment is given by
pa(v
′, d′) = E
[
T∑
τ=a
yτ,i(sτ , ξτ)
∣∣∣∣∣(ai, vi, di) = (a, v′, d′)
]
,
where we aggregate payments from different periods. (q, p) is called the reduced form
of (x, y). Explicit expressions can be found in Appendix 1.C. The interim expected
utility from participating in a mechanism (x, y), with true type (v, d) and report
(v′, d′) is given by
Ua(v, d, v
′, d′) =
[
d∑
τ=a
qτa(v
′, d′)
]
v − pa(v
′, d′). (1.2.1)
The expected utility from truth-telling is abbreviated Ua(v, d) := Ua(v, d, v, d).
Definition 1.2.4. (i) A direct mechanism (x, y) is (Bayesian) incentive compat-
ible if for all a ∈ {1, . . . , T}, all v, v′ ∈ [0, v], and all d, d′ ∈ {a, . . . , T},
Ua(v, d) ≥ Ua(v, d, v
′, d′). (IC)
12This assumption yields an upper bound on the revenue that can be achieved. We will see that
this bound can also be achieved if buyers observe all information from past and current stages.
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(ii) A direct mechanism (x, y) is individually rational if for all a ∈ {1, . . . , T}, all
v, v′ ∈ [0, v], and all d ∈ {a, . . . , T},
Ua(v, d) ≥ 0. (IR)
1.3. Characterization of Incentive Compatibility
Since valuations are not discounted, the seller can restrict attention to direct
mechanisms that allocate only at the deadline.
Lemma 1.3.1. Let (x, y) be a direct mechanism that satisfies (IC) and (IR). Then,
there exists an allocation rule xˆ that allocates only at the deadline, such that the
direct mechanism (xˆ, y) also satisfies (IC) and (IR). (x, y) and (xˆ, y) yield the same
expected revenue.
Proof. See Appendix 1.B. 
In the rest of the chapter, only mechanisms that allocate only at the deadline are
considered and we write qa(v, d) instead of q
d
a(v, d). Furthermore, with an allocation
rule that allocates only at the deadline, the buyers who were assigned units in the
past have deadlines di < t. Therefore, their identities are not relevant for current
and future allocation decisions and we sometimes replace ξ<t by kt in the state to
simplify notation.
For the class of mechanisms that allocate only at the deadline, the two-dimensio-
nal incentive compatibility constraint (IC) is equivalent to two one-dimensional con-
straints.
Theorem 1.3.2. Let (x, y) be a direct mechanism with reduced form (q, p), that
allocates only at the deadline.
(i) (x, y) is incentive compatible if and only if for all a ∈ {1, . . . , T}, all d ∈
{a, . . . , T}, and all v, v′ ∈ [0, v] :
v > v′ ⇒ qa(v, d) ≥ qa(v
′, d), (M)
Ua(v, d) = Ua(0, d) +
ˆ v
0
qa(s, d)ds, (PE)
Ua(v, d) ≤ Ua(v, d+ 1), if d < T, (ICD
d)
and Ua(0, d) = Ua(0, d+ 1), if d < T. (ICD
u)
(ii) Suppose K = 1, T = 2 and ν1,1 = 1. If for all v1 ∈ [0, v]:
x1 ( 1 | (H1 = (1, v1, 1), k1 = 1) ) ∈ {0, 1},
then (ICDd) holds for any v, if it is fulfilled for v = 0 and v = v.
Part (i) is the characterization of incentive compatibility for the general model.
The condition that qa(v, d) be non-decreasing, together with the payoff equivalence
formula (PE), is the standard characterization of one-dimensional incentive compat-
ibility for the valuation (Myerson, 1981).
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(ICDd) rules out that underreporting the deadline is profitable. Together with
(M) and (PE), this also rules out simultaneous misreports of an earlier deadline
d′ < d and a valuation v′ 6= v. For mechanisms that allocate only at the deadline,
the constraint takes this simple form because the utility of a buyer who under-reports
his deadline is independent of his true deadline (cf. (1.2.1)):
d′ ≤ d ⇒ Ua(v, d, v
′, d′) = Ua(v, d
′, v′, d′).
Incentive compatibility for the valuation implies that Ua(v, d
′, v′, d′), and therefore
also Ua(v, d, v
′, d′), is maximized by v′ = v. For v′ = v, (ICDd) rules out a downward
deviation in the deadline. Therefore, simultaneous deviations in the deadline and
the valuation are also ruled out. Necessity of (ICDd) is obvious.
The downward incentive compatibility constraint for the deadline is similar to a
type dependent participation constraint. A buyer with arrival time a and deadline
d has the “outside option” to report d′ ∈ {a, . . . , d − 1}. He only “participates”
voluntarily with d′ = d if his payoff with d′ = d exceeds the payoff of his best
outside option.
Finally, (ICDu) rules out upward deviations in the deadline. A deviation to the
outside option of reporting d′ > d can only be profitable if the mechanism pays a
subsidy for a report d′, i.e. if pa(v, d
′) < 0. (PE) implies that subsidies are non-
increasing in the valuation. Therefore, the highest subsidy (if any) is paid for (0, d′).
By (PE), v = 0 is also the valuation for which over-reporting the deadline is most
tempting. Hence, to rule out upward deviations in the deadline, it suffices that
Ua(0, d) = −pa(0, d) ≥ −pa(0, d
′) = Ua(0, d
′). Together with (ICDd) for v = 0, this
is equivalent to (ICDu).13 Again, necessity is obvious.
Part (ii) of the theorem concerns the case of one unit and two periods. Further-
more, it is assumed that in period one, exactly one buyer arrives with probability
one. The theorem states that the downward constraint for the deadline has to be
checked only for the highest type if the allocation rule does not use lotteries in the
first period. This result is very useful. It implies that the point where the constraint
is binding is independent of the solution. The result is true because q1(v, 1) jumps
from zero to one at v = v − U1(v, 1) if the allocation is deterministic and N1 = 1.
Therefore, the utility schedule for d = 1 is the lowest schedule that is consistent
with U1(0, 1), U1(v, 1) and (PE). If U1(0, 1) = U1(0, 2) and U1(v, 1) ≤ U1(v, 2), then
U1(v, 2) must necessarily be greater than U1(v, 2) for all v ∈ [0, v].
13Here, we use that the lower bound of the support of fa is zero. If fa has support [v, v] with v > 0,
then the upward incentive compatibility constraint for the deadline would be qa(v, d)v−pa(v, d) ≥
−pa(v, d + 1). In this case, a subsidy could be used to separate buyers with different deadlines.
One can show, however, that this instrument would not be used in the optimal mechanism unless
the allocation rule is sufficiently distorted. The reason is that the cost of a subsidy is of first order
whereas the cost of distorting the allocation rule is of second order.
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1.4. The Seller’s Problem
By the revelation principle and Lemma 1.3.1, the seller’s problem is to choose
an incentive compatible and individually rational direct mechanism that allocates
only at the deadline, to maximize
T∑
a=1
E[Na]E[pa(v, d)] =
T∑
a=1
[(
N¯∑
Na=1
Na νa,Na
)
T∑
d=a
ρa,d
ˆ v
0
pa(v, d)fa(v|d)dv
]
.
Using (PE) to substitute the payment rule, integrating by parts and setting
Ua(0, d) = 0 for all a ∈ {0, . . . , T} and all d ∈ {a, . . . , T}, the objective of the seller
becomes
T∑
a=1
[(
N¯∑
Na=1
Na νa,Na
)
T∑
d=a
ρa,d
ˆ v
0
qa(v, d)Ja(v|d)fa(v|d)dv
]
.
If we substitute q1(v, d), this can be rearranged to
14
Es1

 ∑
ξ1∈Φ˜1(s1)
x1(ξ1|s1)

∑
i∈I1
ξ1,iJai(vi|1) + Es2

 ∑
ξ2∈Φ˜2(s2)
x2(ξ2|s2)

∑
i∈I≤2
ξ2,iJai(vi|2)+
. . . EsT

 ∑
ξT∈Φ˜T (sT )
xT (ξT |sT )
∑
i∈I≤T
ξT,iJai(vi|T )
∣∣∣∣∣∣sT−1, ξT−1

 . . .


∣∣∣∣∣∣s1, ξ1





 ,
where Est denotes the expectation with respect to st. It is more convenient to
formulate the seller’s problem as a recursive dynamic program R:
VT (sT ) := max
xT
∑
ξT∈Φ˜T (sT )
xT (ξT |sT )

∑
i∈I≤T
ξT,iJai(vi|T )

 , (R)
∀t < T : Vt(st) := max
xt
∑
ξt∈Φ˜t(st)
xt(ξt|st)

∑
i∈I≤t
ξt,iJai(vi|t) + Est+1 [Vt+1(st+1)|st, ξt]

 ,
where the reduced form of the optimal policy must satisfy (M) and (ICDd) with
Ua(v, d) given by (PE) and Ua(0, d) ≡ 0.
1.5. The Relaxed Solution
In order to derive conditions under which the constraint (ICDd) is binding, we
first solve R subject to (M) only. This is the relaxed problem and corresponds to
the case where deadlines are observed by the seller.
As in the classic optimal auction problem, Assumption 1.2.1 guarantees that at
the optimal policy for the relaxed problem, (M) is slack (Myerson, 1981). Therefore,
we can ignore (M) in the derivation of the relaxed solution.
14Here, we use the assumption that Nt ≤ N¯ for all t. See McAfee and McMillan (1987) for a
similar derivation with a stochastic number of bidders in a static model.
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For a given state st, define c
t
(1) ≥ . . . ≥ c
t
(K) as the K highest virtual valuations
among the buyers i ∈ I≤t with deadlines di = t. Let i
t
(1), . . . , i
t
(K) denote the identities
of buyers with these virtual valuations, i.e. for all k = 1, . . . , K: dit
(k)
= t and
Ja
it
(k)
(vit
(k)
|t) = ct(k).
15 Furthermore, define ∆t+1(st, k) = Est+1[Vt+1(st+1)|st, kt+1 =
k] − Est+1[Vt+1(st+1)|st, kt+1 = k − 1]. ∆t+1(st, k) is the marginal option value of
retaining the kth unit in period t. Note that the marginal option values are non-
increasing in k. k∗t+1, the optimal number of units that are retained for period t+1,
is determined by the following conditions:16
ct(kt−k∗t+1) > ∆t+1(st, k
∗
t+1 + 1) if k
∗
t+1 < kt,
and ct(kt−k∗t+1+1) ≤ ∆t+1(st, k
∗
t+1) if k
∗
t+1 > 0.
The set of winning buyers is given by
W ∗t (st) :=
{
it(1), . . . , i
t
(kt−k∗t+1)
}
.
The optimal policy for the relaxed problem is deterministic and given by
xrlxt (ξt|st) =
{
1 if ξt,i = 1 ⇔ i ∈W
∗
t (st),
0 otherwise.
A buyer’s type determines whether the buyer is in the set of winning bidders at
his deadline, but it can also influence the number of units that are available at the
deadline. Let k∗a,d(Hd,−i, (a, v, d), ka) be the number of units that are available in pe-
riod d if buyer i arrives in period a with type (a, v, d) and ka units are available in the
arrival period. Buyer i gets a unit if i ∈W ∗d ((Hd,−i, (a, v, d)), k
∗
a,d(Hd,−i, (a, v, d), ka)).
Therefore, we define the critical virtual valuation of buyer i in state sd for given ka
as
ζ ia,d(Hd, ka) := inf
{
ζ
∣∣i ∈ W ∗d ((Hd,−i, (a, J−1a (ζ |d), d)), k∗a,d(Hd,−i, (a, J−1a (ζ |d), d), ka))} .
With this definition, i gets a unit only if Jai(vi|di) ≥ ζ
i
a,d(Hd, ka).
17
The relaxed solution can be implemented by the following payment rule:
yrlxi (st, ξt) =
{
0, if ξt,i = 0,
J−1ai (ζ
i
ai,di
(Hdi , ka)|t), if ξt,i = 1.
With this payment rule, the payment of a losing buyer is zero and each winner pays
the lowest valuation with which he could have obtained a unit for given ka and a
given history of buyer arrivals in until period d. Thus, truth-telling is a weakly
15We assume that ties are broken in favor of buyers who arrive earlier, and randomly if there is a tie
between two buyers with the same arrival time. Other tie-breaking rules yield the same expected
revenue.
16Here we assume that ties are broken in favor of a later allocation. Again, other tie-breaking rules
yield the same expected revenue.
17The converse is not necessarily true. If Jai(vi|di) = ζ
i
a,d(Hd, ka), the tie-breaking rule determines
whether i ∈ W ∗d ((Hd,−i, (a, v, d)), k
∗
a,d(Hd,−i, (a, v, d), ka)).
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dominant strategy if the deadline is known to the sellers, and buyers only report
their valuations.
Now we turn to the question whether the relaxed solution is incentive compatible
if the deadline is privately known. By (PE), expected payoffs are determined by the
allocation rule except for the constant Ua(0, d). (ICD
u) implies that Ua(0, d) =
Ua(0, d
′) for all a ≤ d′ ≤ d. Therefore, the constants Ua(0, d) cannot be used to
separate buyers with different deadlines. It suffices to check whether the expected
payoffs for the payment rule yrlx defined above satisfy (ICDd).
In order to compare expected payoffs for different deadlines, we make the follow-
ing crucial observation:
Lemma 1.5.1. Suppose that K = 1 or T ≤ 2. Let a < T . For all states sa, all i ∈ Ia
with deadline d > a, and for all d′ ∈ {a, . . . , d− 1},
EHd′
[
ζ ia,d′(Hd′, ka)
∣∣sa] = EHd [ζ ia,d(Hd, ka)∣∣sa]
and
[
ζ ia,d′(Hd′, ka)
∣∣sa] ≻SSD [ζ ia,d(Hd, ka)∣∣sa] ,
where ≻SSD denotes second-order stochastic dominance.
Proof. See Appendix 1.B. 
The following example illustrates the lemma. Suppose that T = 2, K = 1,
ν1,2 = 1 and ν2,1 = 1. Let the sets of new buyers in period one and two be I1 = {1, 2}
and I2 = {3}, respectively. In this case, the critical virtual valuations of buyer one
for d1 = 1 and d1 = 2 are given by
ζ11,1(H1, 1) =
{
max {J1(v2|1), Ev3 [max {0, J2(v3|2)}]} , if d2 = 1,
Ev3 [max {0, J1(v2|2), J2(v3|2)}] , if d2 = 2,
ζ11,2(H2, 1) =
{
max {z(J1(v2|1)), J2(v3|2)} , if d2 = 1,
max {0, J1(v2|2), J2(v3|2)} , if d2 = 2,
where z(J1(v2|1)) = min {z ≥ 0 |Ev3 [max {z, J2(v3|2)}] ≥ J1(v2|1)} .
If d1 = 2 and d2 = 1, then the object is retained in period one if and only if buyer
1’s virtual valuation is greater or equal than z(J1(v2|1)). In other words, buyer one
must have a virtual valuation J1(v1|2) ≥ z(J1(v2|1)) to overbid buyer two in the first
period. Since max {J1(v2|1), E [max {0, J2(v3|2)}]} = E [max {z(J1(v2|1)), J2(v3|2)}],
we have that ζ11,1(H1, k1) = Ev3 [ζ
1
1,2(H2, k1)|s1] as stated in the lemma.
Buyer one faces competition by both buyers, no matter whether his deadline is
d1 = 1 or d1 = 2. In both cases, he competes directly with buyer two. Competition
with buyer 3 is direct if d1 = 2 and indirect, through the option value of retaining
the object, if d1 = 1. A later deadline has two effects, first it lowers the virtual
valuation needed to overbid buyer two, because z(J1(v2|1)) < J1(v2|1) if v2 < v
and J1(v2|2) < Ev3 [max {J1(v2|2), J2(v3|2)}]. Second, a higher virtual valuation
is needed to overbid buyer three whenever J2(v3|2) > Ev3 [max {0, J2(v3|2)}]. The
lemma shows that the two effects cancel in expectation. If we interpret the critical
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virtual valuation as a measure of competition by other buyers, this shows that
expected competition is independent of the reported deadline. Hence, differences in
expected payoffs for different deadlines are not caused by a competition effect.
In this example, second order stochastic dominance is obvious because condi-
tional on s1, ζ
1
1 (s1) is constant and therefore dominates ζ
1
2 (s2) which has the same
expectation.
The following theorem gives sufficient conditions under which the static and the
dynamic pricing effects lead to incentive compatibility of the relaxed solution and
violations of incentive compatibility, respectively.
Theorem 1.5.2. Suppose that K = 1 or that T ≤ 2. Then, in the relaxed solution,
(i) (ICDd) is violated for type (a, v, d) if there exits d′ ∈ {a, . . . , d− 1}, such that
(a) Ja(v|d
′) ≥ Ja(v|d) for all v ∈ [v
0
a|d
′, v], and
(b) Ja(v|d) or Ja(v|d
′) is strictly concave as a function of v.
If Ja(v|d
′) > Ja(v|d) for all v ∈ [v
0
a|d, v), strict concavity can be replaced by
weak concavity.
(ii) (ICDd) is satisfied for type (a, v, d) if for all d′ ∈ {a, . . . , d− 1},
(a) Ja(v|d
′) ≤ Ja(v|d) for all v ∈ [v
0
a|d, v], and
(b) Ja(v|d) or Ja(v|d
′) is weakly convex as a function of v.
Proof. See Appendix 1.B. 
Conditions (a) in both parts of the theorem correspond to the static pricing effect.
By the definition of the virtual valuation, these conditions can also be formulated
as monotonicity conditions on the conditional hazard rate of the type distribution.
Conditions (b) correspond to the dynamic pricing effect.
Let us consider a buyer with the highest possible valuation v = v. Such a buyer
wins with probability one, regardless of his deadline. Therefore, his expected payoff
only depends on the expected price he has to pay. The static pricing effect is caused
by dependencies between deadlines and valuations. If Ja(v|d) ≤ Ja(v|d
′) for d > d′,
then v tends to be higher for the later deadline. This leads to more aggressive
pricing for the later deadline (J−1a (v|d) > J
−1
a (v|d)). Therefore, the buyer would
like to pretend to have the earlier deadline in order to avoid higher prices—incentive
compatibility is violated.
Note that this effect does not depend on the stochastic dominance result in
Lemma 1.5.1. Indeed, it can also be found in static models where the second di-
mension of private information (e.g. a capacity requirement) is correlated with the
valuation.
The dynamic pricing effect is caused by stochastic dominance of the critical vir-
tual valuations, which arises because later allocation decisions are based on more
information than earlier decisions. Therefore, the effect is genuinely dynamic. More-
over, it does not depend on correlations and also occurs if the deadline and the
valuation are independently distributed. Suppose that the virtual valuation is con-
cave. Then the pricing rule J−1a (ζ |d) used by the seller is convex and expected prices
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density (support: [0, 1]) J(v) J ′′(v)
2v 1
2
3v2−1
v
− 1
v3
< 0
1− k + 2kv (k ∈ (0, 1]) 2v−2kv+3kv
2−1
1−k+2kv
− 2k(1+k)
2
(1−k+2kv)3
< 0
(k + 1)vk (k > 0) vk+2v−v
−k
k+1
−v−2−kk < 0
12(v − 1
2
)2 2
3
v2(4v−3)
(2v−1)2
− 4
(2v−1)4
< 0
3
2
− 6(v − 1
2
)2 8v
2−v−1
6v
− 1
3v3
< 0
2− 2v 3v
2
− 1
2
0
1 (uniform) 2v − 1 0
(1 + k)(1− v)k (k+2)v−1
k+1
0
1− k + 2kv (k ∈ [−1, 0)) 2v−2kv+3kv−1
1−k+2kv
− 2k(1+k)
2
(1−k+2kv)3
> 0
Table 1. Distributions with strictly concave, linear,
and strictly convex virtual valuations.
are higher if the distribution of the critical virtual valuation is more dispersed. By
Lemma 1.5.1 this is the case for higher deadlines. Therefore, the buyer prefers to
report the lower deadline to avoid higher prices. Again, incentive compatibility is
violated.
Both effects work in the opposite direction if the virtual valuation is increasing
in the deadline, and convex in the valuation, respectively. To show incentive com-
patibility of the relaxed solution, however, (ICDd) also has to be checked for v < v.
Details are given in the proof.
Table 1 shows densities and virtual valuations for several distributions. For the
first group, the virtual valuation is strictly concave wherever it is non-negative. For
the second group, it is linear and for the third group it is convex. If valuation and
deadline of a buyer are independently distributed, the relaxed solution violates in-
centive compatibility for all distributions in the first group and satisfies incentive
compatibility for all other examples. An example for a violation of incentive com-
patibility for the dependent case is f1(v|1) = 2 − 2v and f1(v|2) = 1. In this case,
the virtual valuation is linear for both distributions but strictly decreasing in the
deadline. If we exchange f1(v|1) and f1(v|2), incentive compatibility is satisfied for
buyers with types (1, v, 2). Other examples are easily constructed.
Remark: Lemma 1.5.1 conditions on the state in the arrival period. Therefore, the
incentive compatibility result of Theorem 1.5.2 also holds if buyers can condition
their reports on the state at their arrival time. In other words, under the conditions of
part (ii) of the theorem, the relaxed solution is periodic ex-post incentive compatible.
This shows that the optimal solution does not rely on the seller’s ability to conceal
information from earlier periods.
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1.6. The General Solution
In cases where the relaxed solution is not incentive compatible, the analysis is
significantly more complex. For tractability, we solve the general problem for the
case of two periods (T = 2), one object (K = 1) and assume deterministic arrival of
one buyer in each period (ν1,1 = ν2,1 = 1). Furthermore, we will make an assumption
that ensures that the optimal mechanism does not use lotteries in the first period
(Assumption 1.6.1 below). For this case, we solve R subject to (M), (ICDd) and
(PE). Assumption 1.2.1 guarantees that in the optimal solution, (M) is slack for
buyer two. For buyer one, however, this assumption is not sufficient to guarantee
monotonicity of the optimal solution. In Section 1.6.4, we show how the mechanism
has to be ironed if (M) is binding at the optimal solution.
In the following section, we will simplify the notation and decompose the seller’s
problem into two subproblems; one for d1 = 1 and one for d1 = 2. These problems
are only linked by the incentive compatibility constraint for the deadline (ICDd). In
Section 1.6.2, we impose an assumption that rules out lotteries and solve the revenue
maximization problem for d1 = 1. Section 1.6.3 deals with the problem for d1 = 2
in the regular case where the monotonicity constraint is slack. Section 1.6.4 gives
the general solution that also applies to the irregular case of a binding monotonicity
constraint. The reader may want to skip section 1.6.4 at the first read. Finally, we
combine the solutions to a solution for the general problem.
1.6.1. Decomposition of the seller’s problem. Since N1 = N2 = 1 we write d,
ρ, f2(v2), and F2(v2) instead of d1, ρ1,1, f2(v2|2), and F2(v2|2), respectively. Slightly
abusing notation, we write winning probabilities as
x1(v1, 1) = x1 ( ξ1 = (1) | s1 = ((1, v1, 1), 1) ) ,
x1(v1, 2, v2) = x1 ( ξ2 = (1, 0) | s2 = (((1, v1, 2), (2, v2, 2)), 1) ) ,
and x2(v1, d, v2) = x2 ( ξ2 = (0, 1) | s2 = (((1, v1, d), (2, v2, 2)), 1) ) .
x1(v1, 1) is the probability that buyer one gets the object if his deadline is one.
xi(v1, d, v2) is the probability that buyer i gets the object for a given type-profile
and conditional on the event that the object has not been allocated in period one.
Note that x is feasible if and only if for all v1, v2 ∈ [0, v], d ∈ {1, 2}, and i ∈ {1, 2},
x1(v1, 1), xi(v1, d, v2) ∈ [0, 1] and x1(v1, 2, v2) + x2(v1, 2, v2) ≤ 1. (F)
The feasibility constraint for d = 1 is fulfilled automatically because x2(v1, 1, v2) is
the winning probability of buyer two conditional on the event that the object has
not been allocated in the first period.
Interim winning probabilities of buyer one are given by:
q1(v1, 1) = x1(v1, 1),
and q1(v1, 2) =
ˆ v
0
x1(v1, 2, v2)f2(v2)dv2.
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Furthermore, we define the interim winning probability of buyer two, conditional on
the deadline of buyer one and the event that the object has not been allocated in
period one as:
q2(v2, d) =
ˆ v
0
x2(v1, d, v2)f1(v1|d)dv1.
Hence, we have
q2(v2) = ρ
(ˆ v
0
(1− x1(v1, 1))f1(v1|1)d1
)
q2(v2, 1) + (1− ρ)q2(v2, 2).
With these definitions, R subject to (ICDd), (PE) and (M) for buyer one can be
rewritten as the maximization problem P:
max
q
ρ
ˆ v
0
[
q1(v1, 1)J1(v1|1) + (1− q1(v1, 1))
ˆ v
0
q2(v2, 1)J2(v2)f2(v2)dv2
]
f1(v1|1)dv1
+ (1− ρ)
ˆ v
0
q1(v, 2) J1(v|2) f1(v|2) + q2(v, 2) J2(v) f2(v) dv (P)
such that q is the reduced form of a feasible allocation rule and subject to
∀d ∈ {1, 2}, ∀v, v′ ∈ [0, v] : v > v′ ⇒ q1(v, d) ≥ q1(v
′, d) (M1)
∀d ∈ {1, 2}, ∀v ∈ [0, v] : U1(v, d) =
ˆ v
0
q1(s, d)ds, (PE1)
∀v ∈ [0, v] : U1(v, 1) ≤ U1(v, 2). (ICD
d
1)
Except for the incentive constraint for the deadline (ICDd1), the expected revenue
for d = 1 (first line in the objective) and d = 2 (second line) can be maximized
independently. In order to decompose the seller’s problem, we introduce a function
U : [0, v]→ [0, v] that separates U1(., 1) from U1(., 2):
∀v ∈ [0, v] : U1(v, 1) ≤ U(v) ≤ U2(v, 2). (ICD
d
U)
Using U as a parameter, the maximization problem can be rewritten as P ′:
max
U
ρ π1[U ] + (1− ρ) π2[U ] (P
′)
π1[U ] is defined as the maximal expected revenue that can be achieved if the
deadline is one and the expected payoff of the first buyer is constrained by U1(v, 1) ≤
U(v) for all v ∈ [0, v]. This maximization problem is called P1:
π1[U ] := max
qi(.,1)
ˆ v
0
[
q1(v1, 1)J1(v1|1) + (P1)
(1− q1(v1, 1))
ˆ v
0
q2(v2, 1)J2(v2)f2(v2)dv2
]
f1(v1|1)dv1
s.t. qi(v, 1) ∈ [0, 1], (PE1), (M1) and (ICD
d
U)
π2[U ] is defined as the maximal expected revenue that can be achieved if the
deadline is two and the utility of the first buyer is constrained by U1(v, 2) ≥ U(v)
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for all v ∈ [0, v]. This maximization problem is called P2:
π2(U) := max
qi(.,2)
ˆ v
0
q1(v, 2)J1(v|2)f1(v|2) + q2(v, 2)J2(v)f2(v)dv (P2)
s.t. (F),(PE1), (M1) and (ICD
d
U).
If P1 and P2 are solved for the same U , we get a solution for P. Therefore, P
can be reformulated as a problem of choosing U optimally as in P ′.
1.6.2. Solution to P1. If (ICD
d
U) is ignored, P1 is equivalent to the problem of
finding the optimal selling strategy for a sequence of short-lived buyers. The optimal
solution is a sequence of fixed prices (Riley and Zeckhauser, 1983). Optimal prices
are determined working backwards in time. If the object was not sold in the first
period, the optimal price in the second period is r2 = v
0
2. This implies an option
value of postponing the allocation of V opt2 :=
´ v
v02
J2(v2)f2(v2)dv2 = v
0
2(1 − F2(v
0
2)).
Consequently, the optimal price in the first period, r1, is given by J1(r1|1) = V
opt
2 .
This is the relaxed solution of P1.
If constraint (ICDdU) is imposed, the optimal solution to P1 may involve lotter-
ies.18 To rule out this possibility we make
Assumption 1.6.1. J1(v|1)f1(v|1) is strictly increasing for all v ∈ [v
0
1|1, v].
Theorem 1.3.2 implies that if the allocation rule is deterministic in the first
period, (ICDdU) reduces to U1(v, 1) ≤ U¯ , where we define U¯ := U(v). We will
therefore treat π1 as a function of U¯ and write π1(U¯) instead of π1[U ] in this case.
The optimal fixed price in period one is now given by the lowest price that satisfies
J1(r1|1) ≥ V
opt
2 and v − r1 ≤ U¯ . The optimal fixed price in period two, r2, is not
affected by constraint (ICDdU).
Theorem 1.6.2. Suppose f1 satisfies Assumption 1.6.1. Then
(i) the optimal solution of P1 does not use lotteries in the first period and is given
by
q1(v1, 1) =
{
0, if J1(v1|1) < max{V
opt
2 , J1(v − U¯ |1)},
1, otherwise,
q2(v2, 1) =
{
0, if J2(v2) < 0,
1, otherwise.
(ii) π1(U¯) is continuously differentiable for U¯ ∈ (0, v) and strictly concave in U¯ for
U¯ < v − J−11 (V
opt
2 ).
18The no-haggling result of Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) is a consequence of a special structure
of the feasible set of the maximization problem. Manelli and Vincent (2007) show that the set of
extremal points of the feasible set, which contains the maximizers, is equal to the set of deterministic
allocation rules. Due to the additional constraint (ICDdU), the set of extremal points changes.
Rather than trying to extend the results of Manelli and Vincent here, we use Assumption 1.6.1 as
a sufficient condition for a deterministic mechanism.
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Proof. See Appendix 1.B. 
To understand the role of Assumption 1.6.1, note that in the constraint U(v) ≥´ v
0
q1(s, 1)ds, winning probabilities are not weighted in the integral because incentive
compatibility constraints are independent of the buyer’s own distribution function.
In the objective, however, q1(v1, 1) is weighted by (J1(v1|1)−V
opt
2 )f1(v1|1). Increas-
ing the winning probability q1(v1, 1) for valuations in [v, v + ε] and decreasing it by
the same amount on [v′, v′+ε], with v′+ε ≤ v, decreases U1(v1, 1) for v1 ∈ [v
′, v+ε]
and leaves U1(v1, 1) unchanged otherwise. Hence, such a change in q1 does not de-
stroy incentive compatibility. On the other hand, this shift of winning probability
from low to high types increases the seller’s revenue if (J1(v1) − V
opt
2 )f1(v1) is in-
creasing. Assumption 1.6.1 guarantees that (J1(v1|1) − V
opt
2 )f1(v1|1) is increasing
whenever J1(v1|1)− V
opt
2 ≥ 0. Therefore, the winning probability must jump from
zero to one at some point and the allocation is deterministic.
If Assumption 1.6.1 does not hold, raising the winning probability for a lower
valuation may be more profitable than for a higher valuation because it is sufficiently
more likely that buyer one has the low valuation. For this to be the case, the de-
crease in the density must outweigh the increase in expected revenue, i.e. the virtual
valuation. Finally, note that Assumption 1.6.1 is a sufficient condition. Presumably,
a necessary and sufficient condition cannot be stated as a local condition.
1.6.3. Solution to P2 – The Regular Case. In this section, we solve P2, im-
posing (ICDdU) only for v = v. By Theorems 1.3.2 and 1.6.2, this is sufficient for
the general problem if Assumption 1.6.1 is fulfilled. In the derivation of the optimal
solution of P2, however, Assumption 1.6.1 is not used. Therefore, the results of
this and the following section also apply if the mechanism designer is exogenously
restricted to set a fixed price in the first period.
To state the optimal solution, we define the generalized virtual valuation of buyer
one:
JpU1 (v) := J1(v|1) +
pU
f1(v|1)
.
The parameter pU determines the magnitude of the distortion of the allocation rule
away from Myerson’s (1981) solution for P2 without (ICD
d
U). (pU is the multiplier
of constraint (ICDdU) in the underlying control problem.) Suppose we already know
the optimal pU . Then, the optimal allocation rule is given by
x1(v1, 2, v2) =
{
0, if JpU1 (v1) < max{0, J2(v2)}
1, otherwise,
x2(v1, 2, v2) =
{
0, if J2(v2) ≤ max{0, J
pU
1 (v1)}
1, otherwise.
(1.6.1)
For every U¯ ∈ [0, v), let p∗
U¯
be the lowest value pU ≥ 0, such that the reduced form
of (1.6.1) satisfies
´ v
0
q1(v, 2)dv ≥ U¯ .
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one wins
W1: buyer
W2: buyer
two wins
0
0
v
v02
v1
v
v2
J1(v1|2) = J2(v2)
v01α β
(J1(v1|2)− J2(v2))f1(v1|2) = −pU
Figure 1.6.1. Optimal allocation rule
Theorem 1.6.3. Fix U¯ and suppose J
p∗
U¯
1 (v1) is strictly increasing in v1. Then
(i) the reduced form of (1.6.1) for pU = p
∗
U¯
is an optimal solution of P2 subject to
(M1), (PE1), and (ICD
d
U) for v = v.
(ii) p∗U = −π
′
2(U¯).
(iii) π2 is weakly concave.
Proof. Theorem 1.6.3 is a special case of Theorem 1.6.5 below. 
If the relaxed solution is incentive compatible, pU is zero and valuations (v1, v2)
tie if J1(v1|2) = J2(v2) as in Myerson’s solution. If the relaxed solution is not
incentive compatible, pU is strictly positive and valuations tie if J
pU
1 (v1) = J2(v2),
which is equivalent to
(J1(v1|2)− J2(v2))f1(v1|2) = −pU . (1.6.2)
Figure 1.6.1 sketches both cases for identically distributed valuations (f1(.|2) = f2).
The solid line is the Myerson-line at which valuations tie in the relaxed solution.
The dashed line is the distorted Myerson-line at which valuations tie in the general
solution. Note that for pU > 0, valuations tie in an area where the (standard) virtual
valuation of buyer one is strictly smaller than the virtual valuation of buyer two.
To understand condition (1.6.2), consider the effect on π2 of an increase of q1(., 2).
Fix any (v1, v2) on the distorted Myerson-line, such that 0 ≤ J
pU
1 (v1) ≤ v. In the
figure, this corresponds to α ≤ v1 ≤ β. In order to increase q1(v1, 2), the allocation
has to be changed from buyer two to buyer one at (v1, v2). This leads to a marginal
change of π2 by J1(v1|2)−J2(v2) < 0 per mass of type profiles for which the allocation
is changed. This mass of type profiles is proportional to f1(v1|2). Hence, the left-
hand side of (1.6.2) quantifies the marginal cost of increasing q1(v1, 2).
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The marginal cost of increasing q1(v1, 2) must be independent of v1. The reason
is that winning probabilities are not weighted in the constraint
´ v
0
q1(s, 2)ds ≥ U¯ .
If the marginal cost of changing q1(v1, 2) varied with v1, we could increase q1(v1, 2)
where the marginal cost is small and decrease it where the marginal cost is big. If
we chose this variation such that U1(v, 2) =
´ v
0
q1(s, 2)ds were not changed, we could
increase the objective function without violating the constraints—a contradiction.
Hence, the marginal cost of increasing q1(., 2) must be constant and equal to pU for
all v1 ∈ [α, β]. As the utility of the highest type is given by U1(v, 2) =
´ v
0
q1(s, 2)ds,
pU can also be interpreted as the marginal cost of the constraint U1(v, 2) ≥ U¯ .
Furthermore, note that the distortion is increasing in pU , and that by Assumption
1.2.1, the marginal cost of a distortion is increasing in the distance from the Myerson
solution (the LHS of (1.6.2) is decreasing in v2). Therefore, it is optimal to choose
the lowest pU such that (ICD
d
U) is satisfied, and the cost of distortions is convex,
which implies concavity of π2 in U¯ .
(1.6.2) also implies that the distortion of the Myerson-line is bigger for types
with lower densities. This is intuitive because the expected cost of a distortion is
lower for types that are less frequent. But this also means that an increasing density
can lead to non-monotonicities of the winning-probability.
1.6.4. Solution to P2 – The Irregular Case. Theorem 1.6.3 requires that J
p∗
U
1 is
strictly increasing because otherwise, the winning probability of buyer one would be
decreasing. This is a condition on an endogenous object and Assumption 1.2.1 does
not guarantee monotonicity of JpU1 for all values of pU . A decreasing density f1(v|2)
together with Assumption 1.2.1 would be sufficient, but this is quite restrictive and
rules out most of the examples of concave virtual valuations in Table 1. To give
a complete solution without further assumptions, we show that Myerson’s ironing
procedure can be used to deal with non-monotonicities of JpU1 .
Definition 1.6.4 (Ironing; Myerson, 1981). (i) For every t ∈ [0, 1], define
MpU1 (t) := J1(F
−1
1 (t|2)|2) +
pU
f1(F
−1
1 (t|2)|2)
,
as the generalized virtual valuation at the t-quantile of F1(.|2).
(ii) Integrate this function:
HpU (t) :=
ˆ t
0
MpU1 (s)ds.
(iii) Take the convex hull (i.e. the greatest convex function G such that G(t) ≤
HpU (t) for all t):
H¯pU (t) := convHpU (t).
(iv) Since H¯pU is convex, it is almost everywhere differentiable and any selection
M¯pU1 (t) from the sub-gradient is non-decreasing.
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(v) Reverse the change of variables made in (i) to obtain the ironed generalized
virtual valuation
J¯pU1 (v1) := M¯
pU
1 (F1(v1|2)).
In the irregular case, the optimal allocation rule depends on two parameters, pU
and x01, and has the following structure:
x¯1(v1, 2, v2) =


1, if J¯pU1 (v1) > 0 and J¯
pU
1 (v1) ≥ J2(v2)
x01, if J¯
pU
1 (v1) = 0 and J2(v2) ≤ 0,
0, otherwise,
x¯2(v1, 2, v2) =
{
0, if J2(v2) ≤ max{0, J¯
pU
1 (v1)},
1, otherwise.
, (1.6.3)
The parameters are determined as follows. First, let p∗U be the minimal value pU ≥ 0
such that the reduced form of (1.6.3) with x01 = 1 satisfies
´ v
0
q1(v, 2)dv ≥ U¯ . Second,
if p∗U > 0, select x
0∗
1 ∈ [0, 1] such that
´ v
0
q1(v, 2)dv = U¯ , otherwise set x
0∗
1 = 1.
The additional parameter x01 is only needed if J¯
pU
1 (v1) = 0 on an interval [v
0
1, v¯
0
1]
with v01 < v¯
0
1. In this case,
´ v¯01
v01
JpU1 (v)dv = 0 and hence, U1(v, 2) can be varied at
constant marginal cost pU by changing the winning probability for all valuations in
the interval [v01, v¯
0
1]. Therefore, the same value of pU defines the ironed generalized
virtual valuation for different values U¯ in a non-empty interval [a, b]. x01 is varied to
achieve different values of U1(v, 2) ∈ [a, b].
The allocation rule in (1.6.3) excludes buyer one if his valuation is smaller than
v01. With a valuation in [v
0
1, v¯
0
1], he can win against buyer two if v2 ≤ v
0
2, but he gets
the object only with probability x01.
19 To summarize, we have
Theorem 1.6.5. (i) The reduced form of (1.6.3) for p∗U and x
0∗
1 is an optimal
solution of P2 subject to (M1), (PE1), and (ICD
d
U
) for v = v.
(ii) For almost every U¯ , π′2(U¯) = −p
∗
U
(iii) π2 is weakly concave in U¯ and strictly concave if pU > 0 and J¯
pU
1 (v) = 0 has a
unique solution.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A. 
Note that if JpU1 is increasing, J¯
pU
1 equals J
pU
1 . Therefore, Theorem 1.6.3 is a
special case of Theorem 1.6.5.
1.6.5. Global Solution and Discussion. Under Assumption 1.6.1, P ′ reduces to
the problem of choosing U¯ optimally. The first order necessary condition is
ρ π′1(U¯) = −(1− ρ) π
′
2(U¯).
19It is also possible to construct a deterministic allocation rule with the same reduced form. Choose
vˆ2 such that x
0
1 =
F2(vˆ2)
F2(v02)
. For v1 ∈ [v01, v¯
0
1 ], set x1(v1, 2, v2) = 1 if v2 ≤ vˆ2 and x1(v1, 2, v2) = 0
otherwise. This construction, however, has the disadvantage that the allocation decision for buyer
one depends on truthful reports of buyer two in cases when he can never win the object.
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By Theorem 1.6.5, π2 is concave and by Theorem 1.6.2 and Assumption 1.6.1, π1 is
concave. Therefore, the first-order condition is also a sufficient. To determine the
optimal distortion, it suffices to compute the unique solution pU ≥ 0 of
pU =
ρ
1− ρ
π′1(U¯),
and U¯ ≤
ˆ v
0
qpU1 (v, 2)dv1, with equality if pU > 0,
where qpU is the reduced form of (1.6.1) for given value of pU .
20 An explicit form
of the solution is not available. However, for given pU , U1(v, 2) =
´ v
0
qpU1 (v, 2)dv1 is
easy to calculate and an explicit expression for π′1 is given in the proof of Theorem
1.6.2. Hence, it is easy to compute the optimal pU numerically. If Assumption 1.6.1
is violated, π1 may fail to be concave and it may be necessary to compute all local
maxima to find the global solution.
We will now discuss several properties of the general solution.
Monotonicity of q2. q2(v2, 1), defined by the fixed price r2, and q2(v2, 2), defined
by the reduced form of (1.6.3), are non-decreasing. This follows from Assumption
1.2.1. Therefore, q2(v2) is also non-decreasing and the optimal solutions of P1 and
P2 together fulfill all constraints of P. We have derived an optimal solution of P.
Distortions in Both Periods. By Theorem 1.6.2, π1(U¯) is continuously differentiable.
Therefore, pU > 0 implies that the allocation for d = 1 is distorted. Hence, in all
cases where the relaxed solution is not incentive compatible, the general solution
involves a distortion for both deadlines. The relative magnitude of the distortion
depends on ρ. If d = 1 is relatively unlikely (ρ small), then the distortion of the
fixed price is bigger and the auction is closer to Myerson’s solution. The reason is
that distortions are more costly at the deadline which occurs more frequently.
Distortions. In the first period, the fixed price is max{U¯ − v, J−11 (V
opt
2 |1)}. It is
distorted upwards compared to the relaxed solution to make the fixed price less
attractive.
To analyze the distortions in the auction in period two, note that
∀v1 ∈ [0, v] : J
pU
1 (v1) = J1(v1|2) +
pU
f1(v1|2)
> J1(v1|2),
if the relaxed solution is not incentive compatible (pU > 0). Therefore, the reserve
price for buyer one is smaller than in the relaxed solution. Secondly, for all valuations
above the reserve price, the winning probability is higher than in the relaxed solution
because v1 ties with a higher valuation v2. Finally, in contrast to the relaxed solution,
the winning probability of bidder two is strictly smaller than one for all v2 ∈ [0, v].
The reason is that for every pU > 0, there is a non-empty interval (c, v] such that
20We only discuss the global solution for the regular case. The irregular case is similar.
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JpU1 (v1) > v for all valuations v1 ∈ (c, v]. Buyer two cannot win against buyer one
with valuation v1 > c.
Bunching. We find that for the optimal allocation rule, there is bunching at the
top of the type-space if the incentive compatibility constraint for the deadline is
binding. The bunching region has full dimension. The optimal mechanism does not
separate different types of buyer one if their valuations are very high (v1 > c). In
the auction, these types win with probability one and have to make an expected
payment equal to the fixed price in the first period. Therefore, we have bunching of
valuations as well as deadlines. This finding is robust: a (small) bunch occurs even
if the allocation is only slightly distorted.
Dominant Strategies and Indirect Implementation. There are several ways to imple-
ment the optimal auction in period two. For example, it can be implemented by a
generalized Vickrey auction. In this auction, the winning bidder pays the valuation
for which his (generalized) virtual valuation ties with the (generalized) virtual valu-
ation of the losing bidder. For buyer two, this mechanism is incentive compatible in
dominant strategies.21 Hence, the optimal mechanism does not rely on the seller’s
ability to conceal information about period one.
As in the standard auction model, there is also an open format that corresponds
to this direct mechanism. Consider the following ascending clock auction. The
auctioneer has a clock that runs from zero to v. For each bidder i, the auctioneer’s
clock value ca is translated into a bidder-specific clock value ci. For bidder one, this
is c1 = (J
pU
1 )
−1 (ca|2). For bidder two, this is c2 = J
−1
2 (ca). The auctioneer raises ca
continuously and bidders can drop out at any time. If bidder i drops out, the clock
stops immediately. Bidder j 6= i wins the object and has to make a payment equal to
his bidder-specific clock-value cj . Given the informational assumptions made in this
chapter, this auction is strategically equivalent to the generalized Vickrey auction. It
has the advantage that the winning bidder does not have to reveal his true valuation
to the auctioneer.
1.7. Conclusion
We have analyzed a dynamic mechanism design model, in which a seller wants
to maximize the revenue from selling one or multiple identical units of a good to
buyers that arrive over time, within a finite time horizon. The main innovation of
the model is that buyers are privately informed about their deadlines for buying a
unit of the good.
First, we have studied the case of full separation in which the additional incentive
compatibility constraint for the deadline is slack in the seller-optimal mechanism. We
found sufficient conditions for the incentive compatibility of the relaxed solution and
21If the auction is considered in isolation, it is also a dominant strategy for buyer one, to bid
his true valuation. In the dynamic context, however, it is not a dominant strategy to report the
deadline truthfully.
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sufficient conditions for the incentive compatibility constraint to be violated. Both
conditions exploit (a) a static pricing effect that depends on stochastic dependencies
between the deadline and the valuation of a buyer, and (b) a dynamic pricing effect
that depends on non-linearities in the virtual valuation function of a buyer. While
the former effect can also be found in static models with two-dimensional private
information, the latter effect is due to the dynamic nature of the allocation problem.
The critical virtual valuation that buyer has to overbid in order to get a unit is
a martingale with respect to the information about all buyer’s types. Therefore,
critical virtual valuations for later periods are mean preserving spreads of critical
virtual valuations for earlier periods. This leads to lower (higher) payoffs for later
deadlines in the case of concave (convex) virtual valuations and destroys (guarantees)
incentive compatibility.
Second, we have studied the case of bunching. If the relaxed solution is not
incentive compatible, the incentive constraint for the deadline is binding in the
optimal mechanism. Therefore, we had to solve a mechanism design problem with
two dimensional private information. The fact that that the second dimension is a
deadline puts some structure on the model. The two dimensional problem is similar
to a standard one-dimensional mechanism design problem with a type-dependent
outside option. We solve this model for the case of two time periods, one object
and deterministic arrival of one buyer in each period. We show that the optimal
mechanism has a very similar structure as the relaxed solution, but the allocation
rule is distorted in favor of buyers with later deadlines and earlier arrival. This
provides incentives to report the deadline truthfully. The optimal mechanism can
be described in terms of a generalized virtual valuation.
Several assumptions have been made to ensure tractability or to simplify the
exposition.
Discounting. Throughout the chapter, we have abstracted from discounting. This
assumption can be relaxed. If only payments are discounted and buyers and the
seller use a common discount factor, the analysis is almost identical. On the other
hand, if the whole payoff is discounted, Lemma 1.3.1 may not be valid. For example,
it may be optimal to allocate a unit in the first period even if the deadline of the
winner is two, because the waiting cost due to discounting is too high. In this case,
it is more complicated to rule out upward deviations in the deadline.
Which modelling assumption is more pertinent depends on the application. In
the example given in the introduction, the value of the object for the buyer is the
present discounted value of the revenue stream from the contractual relationship
with the third party. This could for example be a production contract. If production
starts after the deadline and is independent of the time at which the firm obtains
the object (as long as it gets it before the deadline), it seems reasonable that the
firm only discounts payments. Similar arguments apply in any situation where the
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buyer plans to use the object at a fixed time after the deadline as in the case of
flight tickets of hotel reservations.
Stochastic Exit. We have implicitly assumed that buyers are available until their
deadline. In some situations, however, buyers may find other opportunities to pur-
chase a similar object if the seller does not sell in the period of arrival. Therefore,
stochastic exit, random participation or competition with other sellers would be
interesting extensions for future research.
Incentive Compatibility of the Relaxed Solution with Many Objects. The proof of the
martingale property of the critical virtual valuation uses a property of the optimal
allocation rule that was shown in Chapter 3 for the case of a single object. With
one object, there is a unique bidder in each period that has a positive probability of
winning. This greatly simplifies the analysis because in each state, the type of only
one buyer is relevant for the allocation rule and buyers who are irrelevant in period t
will not be recalled in the future. Unfortunately, a generalization of this property to
the case of many objects is not available. I conjecture, however, that the martingale
property of the critical virtual valuation generalizes to the case of many objects. If
this conjecture is true, then the dynamic as well as the static pricing effect, and
the absence of a competition effect will carry over to the case of multiple objects
and more than two time periods. Therefore the sufficient conditions for incentive
compatibility of the relaxed solution will also apply to the more general model.
Privately Known Arrival Times. The arrival time has similar properties as the dead-
line. Misreports are feasible only in one direction and it does not directly enter the
utility functions because units cannot be allocated before the arrival. Therefore, the
analysis of a model with privately known arrival times will be similar as the analysis
in the present chapter. Incentive compatibility of the relaxed solution, however, is
guaranteed for the arrival time under weaker conditions than incentive compatibility
for the deadline. As in the case of deadlines, there is a static pricing effect if the
valuation depends stochastically on the arrival time (Pai and Vohra, 2008b). The
dynamic pricing effect, however, does not arise with arrival times because the arrival
time does not influence the time of the allocation. Furthermore, independent of the
type distribution there is an additional effect, that relaxes the incentive compati-
bility constraint for the arrival time. By delaying the report of his arrival, a buyer
runs the risk that units are allocated to buyers that he could have overbid if he had
reported his arrival truthfully. Therefore, an adverse static pricing effect does not
automatically destroy incentive compatibility.
Generalizing the Bunching Case: More Bidders. Introducing more bidders who ar-
rive in the second period is straight forward. The assumption that there is only one
bidder in the first period is more important. It was used to show that the object is
offered to buyer one for a fixed price if he reports deadline one. We have shown that
in this case, misreporting deadline one instead of deadline two is most profitable for
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the buyer with the highest valuation. Hence, we know exactly where the incentive
compatibility constraint for the deadline binds. If more than one buyer arrives in
the first period, a fixed price is no longer optimal and the incentive compatibility
constraint for the deadline may bind for interior types. The exact points where it
binds arise endogenously in the optimal solution.
Generalizing the Bunching Case: Number of Periods. Increasing the number of pe-
riods introduces several complications. Consider for example a model with three
periods. Suppose that in each period a single bidder arrives, whose deadline can
be any period after his arrival. Now, from period two onwards, there is more than
one bidder who participates in the mechanism. This introduces similar problems
as the introduction of more bidders in the first period discussed in the preceding
paragraph. Additional complications will arise because buyers from different pe-
riods will have to be treated asymmetrically. In the third period, the mechanism
designer has to design an optimal auction with three different bidders, two of which
have type-dependent participation constraints. In the case of two periods and two
bidders, the feasibility constraint could be used to eliminate the winning probability
of one bidder (see Appendix 1.A). A generalization of this approach to three bidders
is not obvious.
1.A. Proof of Theorem 1.6.5
It will be convenient to make the changes of variables t1 = F1(v1|2) and t2 =
F2(v2). Defining v1(t1) := F
−1
1 (t1|2) and v2(t2 := F
−1
2 (t2), we have
ti ∼ U [0, 1] for i = 1, 2,
v′1(t1) =
1
f1(v1(t1)|2)
,
and v′2(t2) =
1
f2(v2(t2))
,
Furthermore, for i = 1, 2 we introduce
qi(t) = qi(vi(t), 2),
U(t) = U1(v1(t), 2),
M1(t) = J1(v1(t)|2) = v1(t)− (1− t)v
′
1(t)
M2(t) = J2(v2(t)) = v2(t)− (1− t)v
′
2(t)
t01 = F1(v
0
1 |2 |2).
and t02 = F2(v
0
2).
The objective of the seller becomes
R[q1, q2] :=
ˆ 1
0
q1(t)M1(t) + q2(t)M2(t)dt. (1.A.1)
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In order to employ control theory, we have to formulate the feasibility constraint
in terms of q. Border (1991) provides a characterization of feasibility for symmet-
ric reduced form allocation rules. The following Theorem generalizes the result to
asymmetric allocation rules.
Theorem 1.A.1 (Chapter 2). For i = 1, 2, let qi : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be nondecreasing.
(q1, q2) is the reduced form of a feasible allocation rule if and only if for all t1, t2 ∈
[0, 1], ˆ 1
t1
q1(t)dt+
ˆ 1
t2
q2(t)dt ≤ 1− t1t2.
Now we can restate P2 as P
′
2:
π2(U¯) = sup
(q1,q2)
R[q1, q2] (P
′
2)
subject to
∀t ∈ [0, 1] : qi(t) ∈ [0, 1], (1.A.2)
∀t > t′, qi(t) ≥ qi(t
′), (1.A.3)
∀t1, t2 ∈ [0, 1] :
ˆ 1
t1
q1(θ)dθ +
ˆ 1
t2
q2(θ)dθ ≤ 1− t1t2, (1.A.4)
∀t ∈ [0, 1] : U(t) =
ˆ t
0
q1(θ)v
′
1(θ)dθ, (1.A.5)
and U(1) ≥ U¯ . (1.A.6)
Using qi(Fi(vi|2)) = qi(vi, 2), a solution to P2 can be derived easily from a solution
to P ′2.
A direct solution of P ′2 is difficult because (1.A.4) is not a standard constraint.
Instead, we can use (1.A.4) to eliminate q2 from the objective function. For q1 :
[0, 1]→ [0, 1] non-decreasing, define the inverse as
q−11 (t) :=
{
1 if q1(1) < t,
inf{θ ∈ [0, 1] | q1(θ) ≥ t} otherwise.
Lemma 1.A.2. Let q1 : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be non-decreasing. Then an optimal solution
to
sup
q2
ˆ 1
0
q2(t)M2(t)dt subject to (1.A.2)–(1.A.4),
is given by
q∗2(t) =
{
q−11 (t) if t ≥ t
0
2,
0 otherwise.
The solution is unique for almost every t.
36 1. OPTIMAL DYNAMIC MECHANISM DESIGN WITH DEADLINES
Proof. (1.A.4) can be rewritten as
∀t2 ∈ [0, 1] :
ˆ 1
t2
q2(θ)dθ ≤ min
t1∈[0,1]
[
1− t1t2 −
ˆ 1
t1
q1(θ)dθ
]
.
On the right-hand side we minimize a convex function. Therefore, the first order
condition is sufficient for a minimum and we have t2 ∈ [q1(t
−
1 ), q1(t
+
1 )] for all t2 ∈
[q1(0), q1(1)], t1 = 0 if t2 < q1(0) and t1 = 1 if t2 > q(1). Hence t1 = q
−1
1 (t2) is a
minimizer for all t2. Substituting this into (1.A.4) yields
∀t2 ∈ [0, 1] :
ˆ 1
t2
q2(θ)dθ ≤ 1− q
−1
1 (t2)t2 −
ˆ 1
q−11 (t2)
q1(θ)dθ. (1.A.7)
q∗2 fulfills this constraint with equality for all t2 ∈ [0, 1].
Now consider an alternative solution q˜2 that differs from q
∗
2 on a set of positive
measure. If q˜2(t) > 0 for some t < t
0
2, than it is not a maximizer. So suppose
q˜2(t) = 0 for t < t
0
2. By (1.A.7) we must have
´ 1
t
q˜2(θ)dθ ≤
´ 1
t
q∗2(θ)dθ for all
t ∈ [0, 1]. Since q˜ 6= q∗, on a set of positive measure,
´ 1
a
q˜2(θ)dθ <
´ 1
a
q∗2(θ)dθ for
some a ∈ [t02, 1]. Let Q(t) be the concave hull of
t 7−→
{´ 1
t
q˜2(θ)dθ, if t 6= a,´ 1
a
q∗2(θ)dθ, if t = a,
and define qˆ2(t) = −
dQ(t)
dt
for almost every t. By definition, Q(t) =
´ 1
t
qˆ2(θ)dθ ≤´ 1
t
q∗2(θ)dθ. Hence qˆ2 is a solution. Furthermore, there are a, a¯ such that
qˆ2(t) =


q˜2(t), if t /∈ [a, a¯],´ 1
a
q˜2(θ)dθ−
´ 1
a
q∗2(θ)dθ
a−a
, if t ∈ [a, a),´ 1
a
q∗2(θ)dθ−
´ 1
a
q˜2(θ)dθ
a¯−a
, if t ∈ (a, a¯].
Hence qˆ2(t) < q˜2(t) for t ∈ (a, a), qˆ2(t) > q˜2(t) for t ∈ (a, a¯) and qˆ2(t) = q˜2(t)
otherwise. Furthermore,ˆ a
a
qˆ2(θ)− q˜2(θ)dθ =
ˆ a¯
a
q˜2(θ)− qˆ2(θ)dθ.
This implies that we have constructed qˆ2 from q˜2 by shifting winning probability from
types in [a, a] to types in [a, a]. By Assumption 1.2.1, this increases the objective
function. Hence q˜2 cannot be optimal. 
Using Lemma 1.A.2, (1.A.1) becomesˆ 1
0
q1(t)M1(t)dt+
ˆ 1
t02
q−11 (t)M2(t)dt. (1.A.8)
If q1 is absolutely continuous, substituting s = q1(t) in the second integral yieldsˆ 1
0
q1(t)M1(t) + tq
′
1(t)M˜2(q1(t))dt+
ˆ 1
q(1)
M˜2(t)dt, (1.A.9)
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where we define M˜2(t) := max{0,M2(t)}.
22
Monotonicity implies some regularity of q1. In particular q1 = q
C
1 + q
J
1 where q
C
1
is a continuous function and qJ1 is a pure jump function. This leaves two problems
unresolved. Firstly, we have to deal with jumps and secondly, absolute continuity
of qC1 is not guaranteed.
23
These problems can be circumvented by solving the maximization problem under
the restriction that q1 be Lipschitz continuous with global Lipschitz constant K,
q1 ∈ L
K := {q : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] | ∀t, t′ ∈ [0, 1] : |q(t)− q(t′)| ≤ K|t− t′|}.
We define the maximization problem PK2 as P
′
2 subject to the additional constraint
q1 ∈ L
K . It will be shown that optimal solutions of PK2 converge to the optimal
solution of P ′2 as K →∞. Using Lipschitz functions is convenient to show existence
because LK is sequentially compact.
Theorem 1.A.3. (a) An optimal solution of P ′2 exists.
(b) For every K > 0, an optimal solution of PK2 exists.
Proof. (i) Let (qn1 , q
n
2 )n∈N be a sequence of solutions of P
′
2 such that R[q
n
1 , q
n
2 ]
→ π2(U¯) for n → ∞. By Helly’s Theorem, for i = 1, 2 there exists a sub-
sequence
(
q
nj
i
)
j∈N
and a non-decreasing function qi : [0, 1] → [0, 1], such that
q
nj
i → qi almost everywhere. If we consider the qi as elements of L2([0, 1]), the
set of winning probabilities that satisfy (1.A.4) is weakly-compact (cf. Lemma
2.3.5 in Chapter 2 and Lemma 5.4 in Border (1991)). Therefore, after tak-
ing subsequences again, q
nj
i ⇀ qi and qi is feasible. As Mi ∈ L2([0, 1]) and
v′1 ∈ L2([0, 1]), weak convergence of q
nj
i implies that q1 fulfills (1.A.5)–(1.A.6),
and R[q1, q2] = π2(U¯). Therefore (q1, q2) is an optimal solution.
(ii) Let (qn1 , q
n
2 )n∈N be a sequence of solutions of P
K
2 such that R[q
n
1 , q
n
2 ]→ π
K
2 (U¯).
After taking subsequences we can assume that this sequence converges to a
solution satisfying (1.A.2)–(1.A.6) as in (i). Let q1 be the limit of q
n
1 . Since
qni ∈ L
K , for all s, t ∈ [0, 1], |q1(t)− q1(s)| = limn→∞ |q
n
1 (t)− q
n
1 (s)| ≤ K|t− s|.
Hence q1 ∈ L
K .

The next step is to show that Lipschitz solutions converge to the general solution
if K tends to infinity. The proof is based on Reid (1968).
Lemma 1.A.4. Let (qn1 , q
n
2 )n∈N a sequence of optimal solutions of P
Kn
2 where Kn →
∞ as n → ∞. Then, there exists a solution (q1, q2) of P
′
2 and a subsequence
(q
nj
1 , q
nj
2 )j∈N such that q
nj
i (t)
j→∞
−→ qi(t) for almost every t and R[q1, q2] = π2(U¯).
22If q is not absolutely continuous, the substitution yields
´ 1
0
q1(t)M1(t)dt +
´ 1
0
tM˜2(t)dq1(t) +´ 1
q(1)
M˜2(t)dt. In the second integral, q1 is interpreted as a measure that does not admit a density.
This is not useful if we want to apply optimal control theory.
23For example, the Cantor function is non-decreasing and continuous but it cannot be described
as the integral of a function. Hence it is not absolutely continuous.
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Proof. After taking a subsequence, we can assume that (qn1 , q
n
2 ) converges a.e. to a
solution (qˆ1, qˆ2) of P
′
2 (see proof of Theorem 1.A.3). To show optimality of (qˆ1, qˆ2),
let (q1, q2) be an optimal solution of P
′
2. We can extend q1 to R by setting q1(t) = 0
if t < 0 and q1(t) = 1 if t > 1. Define qd,1 : R→ [0, 1] as
qd,1(t) :=
1
2d
ˆ t+d
t−d
q1(s)ds.
By the Lebesgue differentiation theorem qd,1(t)→ q1(t) for almost every t ∈ [0, 1] as
d → 0. Since q1 is non-decreasing and q1(t) ∈ [0, 1], qd,1 also has these properties.
Furthermore qd,1 ∈ L
1
2d :
∀t > t′ : 0 ≤ qd,1(t)− qd,1(t
′) =
1
2d
(ˆ t+d
t−d
q1(s)ds−
ˆ t′+d
t′−d
q1(s)ds
)
=
1
2d
(ˆ t+d
t′+d
q1(s)ds−
ˆ t−d
t′−d
q1(s)ds
)
≤
1
2d
ˆ t+d
t′+d
q1(s)ds
≤
1
2d
(t− t′)
Since qd,1 may violate
´ 1
0
qd,1(t)v
′
1(t)dt ≥ U¯ , we define q˜d,1 := λd + (1− λd)qd,1 and
q˜d,2(t) :=
{
q˜−1d,1(t), if M2(t) ≥ 0,
0, otherwise,
where λd := max
{
0,
U¯−
´ 1
0 qd,1(t)v
′
1(t)dt
v−
´ 1
0
qd,1(t)v
′
1(t)dt
}
. For every d, (q˜d,1, q˜d,2) is a solution of P
1
2d
2 .
λd converges to zero as d→ 0. By Lemma 1.A.2, q2(t) = q
−1
1 (t) for a.e. t such that
M2(t) ≥ 0 and q2(t) = 0 otherwise. Hence, for i = 1, 2, q˜d,i → qi almost everywhere
as d → 0. By the dominated convergence theorem, R[q˜d,1, q˜d,2] → R[q1, q2] and
R[qn1 , q
n
2 ]→ R[qˆ1, qˆ2]. Define dn =
1
2Kn
. Then, R[q˜dn,1, q˜dn,2] ≤ R[q
n
1 , q
n
2 ] and we have
R[qn1 , q
n
2 ]→ R[q1, q2] and hence R[qˆ1, qˆ2] = R[q1, q2]. 
1.A.1. Solution on the class LK. Using Lemma 1.A.2, we rewrite PK2 as a control
problem. The state variables are the expected utility of bidder one, denoted U(t),
and the winning probability, denoted q(t), (in the control problem we write q instead
of q1). As q is absolutely continuous, we can use u(t) = q
′(t) as a control variable.
The objective is defined as
Rc[U, q, u] :=
ˆ 1
0
q(t)M1(t) + tu(t)M˜2(q(t))dt+
ˆ 1
q(1)
M˜2(t)dt.
where u is a measurable control
u : [0, 1]→ [0, K]. (1.A.10)
1.A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1.6.5 39
The evolution of the state variables is governed by
U ′(t) = q(t)v′1(t), (1.A.11)
q′(t) = u(t). (1.A.12)
We impose the state constraint
∀t ∈ [0, 1] : q(t) ≤ 1. (1.A.13)
Furthermore, we impose the following constraints on the start- and endpoints:
U(0) = 0, (1.A.14)
q(0) ≥ 0, (1.A.15)
(1) ≥ U¯ , (1.A.16)
To summarize, we have the following control problem:
max
(U,q,u)
Rc[U, q, u], subject to (1.A.10)–(1.A.16). (P
K
C )
(1.A.11) is (1.A.5) in differential form. (1.A.10) and (1.A.12) ensure that q ∈ LK
and non-decreasing. (1.A.10), (1.A.12) and (1.A.15) imply q(t) ≥ 0 for all t. Hence,
we can dispense with a second state constraint.
The Pontryagin maximum principle yields the following necessary conditions for
an optimum.
Theorem 1.A.5 (Clarke (1983), pp. 210-212). Let (U, q, u) be a solution of PKC .
If (U, q, u) is optimal, there exists ω ∈ {0, 1}, an absolutely continuous function
p : [0, 1] → R2, the components of which we denote by (pU , pq), and a non-negative
measure µ on [0, 1], such that the following conditions hold:
(i) For almost every t ∈ [0, 1],
p′U(t) = 0, (1.A.17)
p′q(t) = −ω
[
M1(t) + tu(t)M˜
′
2(q(t))
]
− pUv
′
1(t). (1.A.18)
(ii) For almost every t ∈ [0, 1], u(t) maximizes[
ωtM˜2(q(t)) + pq(t) + µ[0, t)
]
u.
(iii) µ is supported on {q(t) = 1},
(iv) p satisfies the transversality conditions
pq(0) ≤ 0, (with equality if q(0) > 0, )
pU(1) ≥ 0, (with equality if U(1) > U, )
pq(1) = −ωM˜2(q(1))− µ[0, 1].
(v) ω + ‖p‖+ ‖µ‖ > 0.
Note that (1.A.17) implies that pU is constant. First, we show that trivial solu-
tions do not occur.
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Lemma 1.A.6 (Non-triviality). If U¯ < v, ω = 1.
Proof. Suppose that ω = 0. By (1.A.18), p′q(t) = −pUv
′
1(t). By the transversality
conditions, pU ≥ 0. pU = 0 implies, p
′
q(t) = 0 and pq(t) = pq(0) for all t. pU > 0
implies, p′q(t) < 0 and pq(t) < 0 for all t > 0.
Suppose pU > 0. By, the transversality condition this implies U(1) = U¯ . By
(ii), u(t) maximizes (pq(t) + µ[0, t))u. If q(0) < 1, µ[0, t) = 0 for t close to zero and
hence u(t) = 0. As µ[0, t) cannot become positive we must have q(t) = q(0) < 1 for
all t and consequently µ[0, 1] = 0. The transversality condition therefore requires
pq(1) = 0, a contradiction. If, however, q(0) = 1 we would have U(1) = v > U¯ .
Again a contradiction.
Now suppose that pU = 0. If q(1) < 1, µ[0, 1] = 0 and by the transversality
conditions, p(t) = 0 for all t. This implies ω + ‖p‖ + ‖µ‖ = 0, in contradiction to
(v). Hence, q(1) = 1. Since pq(t) = pq(1), we have pq(t) = −µ[0, 1]. To fulfil (v) we
must have µ[0, 1] > 0. u(t) maximizes (µ[0, t)−µ[0, 1])u. This implies that u(t) = 0
if q(t) < 1. Hence, we must have q(t) = 1 for all t ∈ [0, 1]. This implies U(1) = v
which cannot be optimal if U¯ < v. 
Defining MpU1 (t) :=M1(t) + pUv
′
1(t), we can rewrite (1.A.18) as
−p′q(t) = M
pU
1 (t) + tu(t)M˜
′
2(q(t)), for a. e. t ∈ [0, 1]. (1.A.19)
Condition (ii) implies that for almost every t ∈ [0, 1],
u(t) = K if tM˜2(q(t)) + pq(t) > 0, (1.A.20)
u(t) ∈ [0, K] if tM˜2(q(t)) + pq(t) + µ[0, t) = 0, (1.A.21)
u(t) = 0 if tM˜2(q(t)) + pq(t) + µ[0, t) < 0. (1.A.22)
In (1.A.20), µ[0, t) was omitted because q(t) < 1 if u(t) = K. Integrating (1.A.19)
yields for s, t ∈ [0, 1]:
pq(t) = pq(s)−
ˆ t
s
MpU1 (θ) + θu(θ)M˜
′
2(q(θ))dθ
= pq(s)−
ˆ t
s
MpU1 (θ)− M˜2(q(θ))dθ − tM˜2(q(t)) + sM˜2(q(s)). (1.A.23)
If we substitute (1.A.23) in (1.A.20)–(1.A.22) and define HpU (t) =
´ t
0
MpU1 (θ)dθ and
mq(t) =
´ t
0
M˜2(q(θ))dθ, we have that for almost every t ∈ [0, 1],
u(t) = K if pq(0) +mq(t) > H
pU (t), (1.A.24)
u(t) ∈ [0, K] if pq(0) +mq(t) + µ[0, t) = H
pU (t), (1.A.25)
u(t) = 0 if pq(0) +mq(t) + µ[0, t) < H
pU (t). (1.A.26)
Lemma 1.A.7 (Reid (1968)). Suppose pq(0) +mq(t) = H
pU (t) for t ∈ {t, t}, t < t
and q(t) < 1 for t < t. Let α, β ∈ R and l(t) = α + βt. If l(t) ≤ HpU (t) for all
t ∈ [t, t], then pq(0) +mq(t) ≥ l(t) for all t ∈ [t, t].
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Proof. Suppose that mq(s) + pq(0) < l(s) for some s ∈ (t, t). Then there exists
ε > 0 and t < t1 < t2 < t such that mq(t) + pq(0) < l(t) − ε for t ∈ (t1, t2),
mq(t1)+ pq(0) = l(t1)− ε, and pq(0)+mq(t2) = l(t2)− ε. This implies that m
′
q(t) =
M˜2(q(t)) cannot be constant on (t1, t2). On the other hand, mq(t)+pq(0)+µ[0, t) =
mq(t)+pq(0) < l(t)−ε < H(t) and hence u(t) = 0 for t ∈ (t1, t2) which implies that
m′q(t) is constant, a contradiction. 
An immediate implication of the Lemma is that pq(0) +mq(t) ≥ H¯
pU
[t,t]
(t), where
H¯pU
[t,t]
(t) denotes the convex hull of HpU restricted to [t, t], i.e. the greatest convex
function G : [t, t]→ R such that G(t) < HpU (t) for all t ∈ [t, t]. Furthermore, pq(0)+
mq(t) is convex because q and M˜2 are non-decreasing. This yields the following
Corollary 1.A.8. Suppose pq(0)+mq(t) ≤ H
pU (t) for all t ∈ [t, t], with equality at
the endpoints of the interval and q(t) < 1 for t < t. Then pq(0) +mq(t) = H¯
pU
[t,t]
(t),
for all t ∈ [t, t].
If MpU1 is non-decreasing on [t, t], then H
pU (t) = H¯pU
[t,t]
(t). Differentiating pq(0)+
mq(t) = H¯
pU
[t,t]
yields MpU1 = M˜2(q(t)) for t ∈ [t, t].
If, however, MpU1 is not monotonic on [t, t], differentiating yields M¯
pU
[t,t]
(t) =
M˜2(q(t)), where M¯
pU
[t,t]
=
dH¯
pU
[t,t]
(t)
dt
is non-decreasing. Hence, Reid’s Lemma provides
a control theoretic technique to show that Myerson’s ironing procedure can be used
to solve irregular instances of mechanism design problems.
Now we establish some properties of the optimal solution. Define
xpU (t) =


0, if MpU1 (t) < M2(0),
M−12 (M
pU
1 (t)), if M
pU
1 (t) ∈ [M2(0), v]
1, if MpU1 (t) > v,
,
and x[t,t]pU (t) =


0, if M¯pU
[t,t]
(t) < M2(0),
M−12 (M¯
pU
[t,t]
(t)), if M¯pU
[t,t]
(t) ∈ [M2(0), v]
1, if M¯pU
[t,t]
(t) > v.
,
The derivative of xpU is given by
x′pU (t) =
M ′1(t) + pUv
′′(t)
M ′2(xpU (t))
.
The assumptions on fi and Fi guarantee that x
′
pU
(t) is continuous on [0, 1]. Let
KpU := maxt∈[0,1] x
′
pU
(t). Then xpU ∈ L
KpU . In what follows, we write H¯pU for H¯pU[0,1]
and M¯pU1 for M¯
pU
[0,1].
Lemma 1.A.9 (interior solution). Suppose u(t) ∈ (0, K) for a.e. t ∈ [t, t], t < t.
Then for all t ∈ [t, t],
(i) q(t) = xpU (t) if q(t) ≥ t
0
2,
(ii) MpU1 (t) = 0 if q(t) < t
0
2.
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Proof. If u(t) > 0, we must have µ[0, t) = 0. (1.A.24) – (1.A.26) imply that
pq(0) +mq(t) = H
pU (t) for allt ∈ (t, t). Differentiating this w.r.t. t yields
M˜2(q(t)) = M
pU
1 (t).
If q(t) ≥ t02, M˜2(q(t)) = M2(q(t)) and hence that q(t) = xpU (t). If q(t) < t
0
2,
M˜2(q(t)) = 0 and hence M
pU
1 (t) = 0. By continuity, the results extend to t and
t. 
Next, we derive necessary conditions for intervals where u(t) is in {0, K}.
Lemma 1.A.10 (constant q). Suppose q(t) = a ∈ [0, 1] on [t, t], t < t, and let [t, t]
be chosen maximally. Then
pq(t) + tM˜2(q(t)) = 0,
pq(0) +mq(t) = H
pU (t),
for t = t if t > 0 and for t = t if t < 1, and furthermore
MpU1 (t) ≥ M˜2(a), if t > 0, (1.A.27)
and MpU1 (t) ≤ M˜2(a), if t < 1. (1.A.28)
Proof. If q(t) is constant, then for almost every t ∈ (t, t), u(t) = 0 and therefore
pq(t) + tM˜2(q(t)) + µ[0, t) ≤ 0 and pq(0) +mq(t) + µ[0, t) ≤ H
pU (t). As µ ≥ 0 and
by continuity, pq(t) + tM˜2(q(t)) ≤ 0 and pq(0) +mq(t) ≤ H
pU (t) for t ∈ {t, t}.
Suppose t > 0 and let S− := {0 < t < t | u(t) > 0}. Since q(t) < a for
t < t, and q is absolutely continuous, S− ∩ [t − δ, t] has positive measure for every
δ > 0. Hence, there exists a sequence tn ր t with pq(tn) + tnM˜2(q(tn)) ≥ 0 and
pq(0) + mp(tn) ≥ H
pU (tn) for all n. By continuity, the first two equalities in the
Lemma follow for t > 0. For t < 1 set S+ := {t < t < 1 | u(t) > 0}. S+ ∩ [t, t + δ]
has positive measure for every δ > 0. Hence, there exists a sequence tn ց t with
pq(tn) + tnM˜2(q(tn)) ≥ 0 and pq(0) +mp(tn) ≥ H
pU (tn) for all n. By continuity, the
first two equations in the Lemma follow for t < 1.
To show (1.A.27), note that for almost every t ∈ S−, pq(t) + tM˜2(q(t)) ≥ 0.
(1.A.23) yields
pq(t) = pq(t)−
ˆ t
t
MpU1 (θ)− M˜2(q(θ))dθ − tM˜2(q(t)) + tM˜2(q(t)).
With pq(t) = −tM˜2(q(t)) and pq(t) + tM˜2(q(t)) ≥ 0 this impliesˆ t
t
MpU1 (θ)− M˜2(q(θ))dθ ≥ 0,
for almost every t ∈ S−. If this inequality is fulfilled, there must be a t
′ ∈ [t, t] with
MpU1 (t
′)− M˜2(q(t
′)) ≥ 0.
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As S− ∩ [t− δ, t] has positive measure for every δ > 0, t and hence t
′ can be chosen
arbitrarily close to t. By continuity this implies
MpU1 (t)− M˜2(q(t)) ≥ 0.
To show (1.A.28), note that for almost every t ∈ S+, pq(t) + tM˜2(q(t)) ≥ 0.
(1.A.23) yields
pq(t) = pq(t)−
ˆ t
t
MpU1 (θ)− M˜2(q(θ))dθ − tM˜2(q(t)) + tM˜2(q(t)).
With pq(t) = −tM˜2(q(t)) and pq(t) + tM˜2(q(t)) ≥ 0 this impliesˆ t
t
MpU1 (θ)− M˜2(q(θ))dθ ≤ 0,
for almost every t ∈ S+. As above there exists t
′ ∈ [t, t] such that the integrand
is non-positive at t′. t and t′ can be chosen arbitrarily close to t. Therefore, by
continuity
MpU1 (t)− M˜2(q(t)) ≤ 0.

Lemma 1.A.10 implies that there cannot be an interval where q is constant and
q ∈ (0, 1) if xpU is strictly increasing.
Lemma 1.A.11. Suppose u(t) = K for almost every t ∈ (t, t), t < t. Let (t, t) be
chosen maximally. Then for t = t and for t = t if t < 1,
pq(t) + tM˜2(q(t)) = 0,
for t = t if t > 0 and for t = t if t < 1
pq(0) +mq(t) = H
pU (t).
Furthermore,
MpU1 (t) ≤ M˜2(q(t)), if t > 0, (1.A.29)
and MpU1 (t) ≥ M˜2(q(t)), if t ∈ [0, 1]. (1.A.30)
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of the preceding Lemma. To show the
first equality for t = 0, the transversality condition can be used to obtain pq(0) ≤ 0.
For t = 1, (1.A.30) follows from MpU1 (1) ≥ v and M˜2(q(t)) ≤ v. 
Setting q(t) = x0(t) for t ≥ t
0
1 and q(t) = 0 otherwise, yields the optimal solution
of Myerson (1981). This is not surprising because pU would be zero if the incentive
compatibility constraint for the deadline were ignored. The following Lemma, which
does not depend on the maximum principle, excludes solutions that have lower
winning probabilities than the undistorted solution x0.
Lemma 1.A.12. For K > K0, let b ≥ t01 be the unique solution to (b− t
0
1)K = x0(b).
If q(t) ≤ x0(t) for all t ∈ [t
0
1, 1] and q(t) < x0(t) for some t ∈ [b, 1], then q is not
optimal.
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Proof. Suppose by contradiction that q is an optimal solution with the properties
stated in the Lemma. Let b′ ∈ [0, b] be the unique solution to q(t01) + (b
′ − t01)K =
x0(b
′). Define
q˜(t) =


q(t), if t < t01,
q(t01) + (t− t
0
1)K, if t ∈ [t
0
1, b
′],
x0(t), if t > b
′.
Obviously, q˜ ∈ LK and U˜(1) ≥ U¯ . Since x0 is the optimal solution absent con-
straints, q˜ yields higher revenue than q. This contradicts the optimality of q. 
Lemma 1.A.13. If U¯ < v, then pU ≤ p¯U := 1 + maxt∈[0,1]
v−v1(t)
v′1(t)
<∞.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that, pU > p¯U . Then M
pU
1 (t) > M˜2(1) = v for all
t ∈ [0, 1]. By Lemma 1.A.9.ii, this implies q(t) ≥ t02 if u(t) ∈ (0, K) on a maximal
interval [t, t]. By Lemma 1.A.9.i, this implies q(t) = xpU (t), for all t ∈ [t, t], but this
contradicts u(t) > 0 if MpU1 (t) > v. Hence we have u(t) ∈ {0, K} for all t ∈ [0, 1].
Suppose u(t) = 0 on a maximal interval [t, t]. By Lemma 1.A.10, this implies
t = 1. If u(t) = K on a maximal interval [t, t], Lemma 1.A.11 implies t = 0.
Therefore, there exists a ∈ [0, 1] such that u(t) = K for t < a and u(t) = 0 for t > a.
Suppose a > 0. Lemma 1.A.11 implies pq(0) = 0 if a > 0. As M
pU
1 (t) > M˜2(q(t))
for all t, we have pq(t) +mq(t) < H
pU (t) for all t > 0. Hence, u(t) = 0 for all t > 0
and a = 0.
If q(t) = q is constant, Lemma 1.A.12 implies that q > t02. Therefore, pq(0) = 0
by the transversality condition. Using (1.A.23), we get pq(1) = −
´ 1
0
MpU1 (t)dt < 0.
The transversality condition and pU > 0 imply U(1) = U¯ . This yields q =
U¯
v
. If
q < 1, then µ[0, 1] = 0, and hence, pq(1) = −M˜2(q(1)) > −
´ 1
0
MpU1 (t)dt by the
transversality condition. So we must have q = 1 and hence U¯ = v which is ruled
out by assumption. 
Note that |x′pU (t)| ≤
M ′1(t)+pU |v
′
1(t)|
minx∈[0,1] |M
′
2(x)|
. Defining K := maxt∈[0,1]
M ′1(t)+p¯U |v
′
1(t)|
minx∈[0,1] |M
′
2(x)|
we
have xpU ∈ L
K for all pU ≤ p¯U .
Lemma 1.A.14. Let (t, t) be a maximal interval such that u(t) = K for all t ∈ (t, t)
and K > K. Then q(t) < max{t02, xpU (t)} for all t ∈ [t, t). If t > 0, then q(t) < t
0
2.
Furthermore t < 1.
Proof. If q(t) ≥ max{t02, xpU (t)}, then q(t) > max{t
0
2, xpU (t)} because K > K.
Hence M˜2(q(t)) > M
pU
1 (t), a contradiction by Lemma 1.A.11. If t > 0, q(t) < t
0
2
because otherwise (1.A.29) and K > K would imply q(t) ≥ max{t02, xpU (t)}, which
is a contradiction. Finally, t = 1 would imply q(t) < x0(t) for all t ∈ [t
0
1, 1). This is
also a contradiction by Lemma 1.A.12. 
Lemma 1.A.15. For K > K0, q(1) = 1.
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Proof. Suppose q(1) < 1. By Lemma 1.A.12, q(1) > t02. By the transversality
condition, pq(1) = −M˜2(q(1)). Differentiating pq(t) + tM˜2(q(t)), we get
d
dt
(pq(t) +
tM˜2(q(t))) = p
′
q(t)+M˜2(q(t))+tM˜
′
2(q(t))q
′(t) = M˜2(q(t))−M
pU
1 (t). As q(1) < xpU (1)
we have d
dt
(pq(t)+tM˜2(q(t))) < 0, and thus p(t)+tM˜2(q(t)) > 0 for t sufficiently close
to one. Hence u(t) = K on a maximal interval [t, 1]. As K > K0, t > 0 and hence
q(t) < t02 by Lemma 1.A.14. This contradicts optimality by Lemma 1.A.12. 
Define c := min{t | q(t) = 1}. By the preceding Lemma, this is well defined for
K > K0.
Lemma 1.A.16. For K > K,
pq(0) +mq(c) = H
pU (c),
pq(c) + cM˜2(q(c)) = 0,
MpU1 (c) = M˜2(1).
Proof. If c < 1 the first two equations are implied by Lemma 1.A.10. If c = 1,
u(t) /∈ {0, K} for a set of types with positive measure, arbitrarily close to one.
(u(t) = 0 is ruled out by c = 1, u(t) 6= K follows from the same argument as in
the proof of Lemma 1.A.15). Hence, the first two equalities hold for t close to c
and by Lemma 1.A.9 also the third equality holds for t close to c. By continuity
the equalities also hold for c. If c < 1, MpU1 (c) ≥ M˜2(q(c)) by Lemma 1.A.10. For
K > K , u(t) = K for a maximal interval [t, c] is not possible as Lemma 1.A.11
requires MpU1 (t) ≤ M˜2(q(t)). Hence u(t) /∈ {0, K} for a set of types with positive
measure, arbitrarily close to c. By Lemma 1.A.9 and continuity, the third equality
follows for c. 
Lemma 1.A.17. Let (U, q, u) be an optimal solution to PKC for K > K.
(i) Let b = min{q(t) ≥ t02}. Then there exists b ∈ [b, c] such that u(t) = K for t ∈
[b, b], and M˜2(q(t)) = M¯
pU
[b,1]
(t) for t ∈ [b, c]. Furthermore, c = min{t|M¯pU
[b,1]
(t) =
v}.
(ii) Let t
0
1 := max{t | M¯
pU
1 (t) ≤ 0} and t
0
1 = 0 if M¯
pU
1 (0) > 0 . Then b → t
0
1 and
b→ t
0
1 as K →∞.
(iii) For almost every t < b,
u(t)


= 0, if pq(0) < H
pU (t),
∈ [0, K], if pq(0) = H
pU (t),
= K, if pq(0) > H
pU (t).
Proof. (iii) follows directly from (1.A.24)–(1.A.26) as q(t) ≤ t02 for t < b and hence
mq(t) = 0.
If pq(0) < H
pU (t) for all t ∈ [0, 1], then pq(0) < 0 and therefore q(0) = 0 by
the transversality condition. Hence pq(0) +mq(t) < H
pU (t), and q(t) = 0 for all t,
contradicting Lemma 1.A.12. Therefore pq(0) ≥ mintH
pU (t).
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To show (i), we first show that M˜2(q(t)) = M¯
pU
[b,c]
(t) for all t ∈ [b, c]. Three cases
have to be considered. To do this we need the following definitions:
p
q
:=
{
min{pq | λ{H
pU (t) ≤ pq}K ≥ t
0
2}, if λ{H
pU (t) ≤ 0}K ≥ t02,
0, otherwise,
bmax := max{b | p
q
≥ HpU (b)},
where λ denotes the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1].
Case 1 : HpU (t) > 0 for all t > 0. (⇒ p
q
= 0, bmax = 0)
In this case, q(0) ≥ t02. Otherwise pq(0) +mq(t) < H
pU (t) for all t > 0. This would
imply q(1) = q(0) < 1, a contradiction. Suppose u(t) = K for a maximal interval
[t, t]. By Lemma 1.A.14, t > 0 would imply q(t) < t02. Hence t = 0. Also by
Lemma 1.A.14, q(t) ≤ xpU (t) for all t ∈ [t, t] and hence q(0) < xpU (0). This implies
pq(0) +mq(t) < H
pU (t) for t close to zero, contradicting u(t) = K. Hence u(t) < K
for all t ∈ [0, 1]. This requires pq(0) +mq(t) ≤ H(t) for all t by (1.A.24)–(1.A.26),
and by Reid’s Lemma, we have M˜2(q(t)) =M
pU
[0,c](t) for all t ∈ [0, c].With b = b = 0,
this shows M˜2(q(t)) = M¯
pU
[b,c]
(t) for all t ∈ [b, c] in case 1.
Case 2 : HpU (t) ≤ 0 for some t > 0 and MpU1 (b
max) = 0.
In this case, q(bmax) = t02. Suppose to the contrary that q(b
max) < t02. This im-
plies pq(0) ≤ pq. Hence pq(0) + mq(t) ≤ pq < H
pU (t) for all t > bmax. This
is a contradiction to optimality. Next, suppose that q(bmax) > t02. This implies
pq(0) ≥ pq and therefore pq(0) + mq(b
max) > HpU (bmax). Therefore bmax is con-
tained in an interval [t, t] where u(t) = K. By Lemma 1.A.14, this is a contra-
diction. Therefore q(bmax) = t02. By (iii) we must have pq(0) = pq and hence
pq(0) +mq(b
max) = p
q
= HpU (bmax). Set b = b = bmax. Lemma 1.A.14 also implies
that pq(0) + mq(t) ≤ H
pU (t) for all t ∈ [bmax, c]. Reid’s Lemma then implies that
M˜2(q(t)) = M¯
pU
[b,c]
(t) for all t ∈ [b, c] for case 2.
Case 3 : HpU (t) ≤ 0 for some t > 0 and MpU1 (b
max) > 0.
In this case, q(bmax) > t02 because otherwise q(1) = q(b
max) < 1, which is a contra-
diction. This implies b < bmax and pq(0) ≥ pq. Since pq(0) ≥ pq, pq(0) +mq(b
max) >
H(bmax) = p
q
. Hence bmax is in the interior of a maximal interval [t, t] such that
u(t) = K for all t ∈ [t, t]. By Lemma 1.A.14, q(t) < t02. This implies that
b ∈ (t, bmax). By Lemma 1.A.11, pq(0) + mq(t) = H(t) and by Lemma 1.A.14,
pq(0) +mq(t) ≤ H(t), for t ∈ [t, c]. Hence, we can set b = t and have thus shown
M˜2(q(t)) = M¯
pU
[b,c]
(t) for all t ∈ [b, c] for case 3.
Claim: M˜2(q(t)) = M¯
pU
[b,1]
(t) for all t ∈ [b, c].
Note that M¯pU
[b,1]
(c) ≤ M¯pU
[b,c]
(c). To show the converse, note that as q is constant on
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[c, 1], pq(0) +mq(t) + µ[0, t) ≤ H
pU (t) for a.e. t ≥ c. This implies
pq(0) +mq(c) + (t− c)v + µ[c, t) ≤ H
pU (c) +
ˆ t
c
MpU1 (s)ds,
⇔
ˆ t
c
MpU1 (s)ds ≥ v(t− c) + µ[c, t). (1.A.31)
If M¯pU
[b,1]
(c) < v, then
´ t
c
MpU1 (s)ds = H
pU (t)−HpU (c) ≤ HpU (t)− H¯pU (c) < (t− c)v
for some t > c. This would contradict (1.A.31) so we must have M¯pU
[b,1]
(c) ≥ v =
M¯pU
[b,c]
(c). If M¯pU
[b,c]
(c) = M¯pU
[b,1]
(c) we must have M¯pU
[b,c]
(t) = M¯pU
[b,1]
(t) for all t ∈ [b, c].
This proves the claim and c = min{t | M¯pU
[b,1]
(t) = v} follows immediately. Hence we
have shown (i).
It remains to show (ii): p
q
→ mint∈[0,1]H
pU (t) as K → ∞. This implies that
bmax → t
0
1. Furthermore b ≥ b
max ≥ b and b − b < 1
K
. Hence b → t
0
1 and b → t
0
1 as
K →∞. 
Now we can turn to the limiting solution as K →∞.
Proof of Theorem 1.6.5. The reduced form of x¯i as defined in (1.6.3) is
q¯1(v1, 2) =


0, if J¯pU1 (v1) < 0
x01F2(v
0
2), if J¯
pU
1 (v1) = 0
F2(J
−1
2 (J¯
pU
1 (v1)), if 0 < J¯
pU
1 (v1) ≤ v,
1, otherwise,
q¯2(v2, 1) =
{
0, if J2(v2) < 0,
F1((J¯
pU
1 )
−1(J2(v2))), otherwise.
Changing variables, we have
q¯1(t) =


0, if t < t01,
x01t
0
2, if t ∈ [t
0
1,t
0
1],
M−12 (M¯
pU
1 (t)), if 0 < M¯
pU
1 (t) ≤ v,
1, otherwise,
q¯2(t) =
{
0, if M2(t) < 0,
(M¯pU1 )
−1(M2(t)), otherwise,
where t01 = min{t|M¯
pU
1 (t) ≥ 0}.
Obviously, q¯2(t) = q¯
−1
1 (t) if t ≥ t
0
2 and q¯2(t) = 0 otherwise. Therefore, by Lemma
1.A.2, we only have to show optimality of q¯1. Let (q
n
1 , q
n
2 ) be a sequence of optimal
solutions of PKn2 where K < Kn → ∞ as n → ∞. Denote the adjoint variables in
these solutions by pnU and p
n
q , respectively, and let (q1, q2) be the a.e.-limit of the
sequence. By Theorem 1.A.4, (q1, q2) is an optimal solution. We will show that
(q¯1, q¯2) yields the same expected revenue as the limit of any such sequence. Since
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M¯pU
[t
0
1,1]
(t) = M¯pU1 (t) for all t ∈ [t
0
1, 1], Lemma 1.A.17 implies that q1(t) = q¯1(t) for
t > t
0
1 where pU = limn→∞ p
n
U .
Next we consider the limiting solution for t < t
0
1. If t
1
0 > 0, then q1(0) = 0 and
u(t) = 0 for t ≤ t01 as for q¯1. Now suppose that t
0
1 < t
0
1.
Claim: If q1(t) is not constant at t ∈ [t
0
1, t
0
1], then H
pU (t) = minθH
pU (θ).
Suppose to the contrary that HpU (t) > minθH
pU (θ). Then there exist ε > 0 and
δ > 0 such that HpU (τ) > minθH
pU (θ) + δ for all τ ∈ (t − ε, t+ ε). Since pnq (0)→
minθH
pU (θ) for n→∞, there exists N > 0 and ε′ ∈ (0, ε) such that for all n > N ,
pnq (0) < H
pn
U (τ) for all τ ∈ (t − ε′, t + ε′). This implies that qn1 is constant on
(t − ε′, t + ε′) for n > N and hence q1 is constant on (t − ε
′, t + ε′) which is a
contradiction. This proves the claim.
Now set q0
1
=
[
(v1(t
0
1)− v1(t
0
1))
]−1 ´ t¯01
t01
q1(s)v
′
1(s)ds and let [t, t] be the interval
where q1(t) = q
0
1
(if q1(t) 6= q
0
1
for all t, set t = t such that q1(t) < q
0
1
if t < t and
q1(t) > q
0
1
if t > t). With this definition, q1(t) < q
0
1
for t < t and q1(t) > q
0
1
for t > t,
and q1 is not constant at t and t. The claim implies that [t
0
1, t] and [t, t
0
1] are unions
of intervals [a, b] such that either MpU1 (t) = 0 for all t ∈ [a, b], or q1 is constant on
[a, b] and
´ b
a
MpU1 (t)dt = 0. Hence, setting q1(t) = q
0
1
does not change the value of
the objective and by definition of q0
1
, U1(1) is left unchanged. Since, q
0
1
= x01t
0
2, the
(q1, q2) yields the same expected revenue as (q¯1, q¯2). Uniqueness of pU and x
0
1 are
obvious.
For the proof of (ii) and (iii) note that π2 can be written as
π2(U¯) =
ˆ 1
0
[
x¯pU¯ (t)M1(t) +
ˆ 1
x¯p
U¯
(t)
M˜2(q)dq
]
dt.
We first show that π2(U¯) is Lipschitz. For U¯
′ > U¯ ,
∣∣π2(U¯ ′)− π2(U¯)∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
ˆ 1
0
ˆ x¯p
U¯′
(t)
x¯p
U¯
(t)
M1(t)− M˜2(q)dqdt
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
≤
ˆ 1
0
∣∣∣∣∣
ˆ x¯p
U¯′
(t)
x¯p
U¯
(t)
M1(t)− M˜2(q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
|.|≤M<∞
dq
∣∣∣∣∣dt,
≤M
ˆ 1
0
x¯pU¯′ (t)− x¯pU¯ (t)dt,
≤
M
v′1
(U¯ ′ − U¯),
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where v′1 = mint∈[0,1] v
′
1(t) > 0 by our assumptions on the type distributions. Next
we show that π′2(U¯) = −pU . for almost every U¯ . For h > 0,
1
h
(π2(U¯ + h)− π2(U¯)) =
1
h
ˆ 1
0
ˆ x¯p
U¯+h
(t)
x¯p
U¯
(t)
M1(t)− M˜2(q)dqdt,
=
1
h
ˆ c(U¯)
t01(U¯+h)
ˆ x¯p
U¯+h
(t)
x¯p
U¯
(t)
M1(t)− M˜2(q)dqdt,
= −pU¯
1
h
ˆ c(U¯)
t01(U¯+h)
ˆ x¯p
U¯+h
(t)
x¯p
U¯
(t)
v′1(t)dqdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=h
+
+
ˆ c(U¯)
t01(U¯+h)
1
h
ˆ x¯p
U¯+h
(t)
x¯p
U¯
(t)
MpU1 (t)− M˜2(q)dqdt.
A similar expression can be derived for h < 0. t01 and c are are continuous in U¯
for almost every U¯ (for all U¯ if MpU1 is strictly increasing). Hence, by the Lebesgue
differentiation theorem and dominated convergence, for almost every U¯ (every U¯ if
MpU1 is strictly increasing),
π′2(U¯) = lim
h→0
1
h
(π2(U¯ + h)− π2(U¯)) = −pU¯ +
ˆ c
t01
MpU1 (t)− M˜2(x¯pU¯ (t))dt,
= −pU¯ +
ˆ c
t01
M¯pU1 (t)− M˜2(x¯pU¯ (t))dt,
= −pU¯ .
Since π2(U¯) is Lipschitz continuous it is absolutely continuous and π2(U¯) = π2(0)−´ U¯
0
pU(s)ds. Therefore, as pU(U¯) is non-decreasing, π2 is weakly concave. If {t|M¯
pU
1 (t)
= 0} is a singleton pU(U¯) is strictly increasing an hence π2 strictly concave. 
1.B. Other Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.3.1. xˆ is derived from x as follows. Whenever a buyer is
alloted a unit before his deadline is reached, this allotment is postponed to the
deadline. Whenever a buyer is alloted unit after his deadline has elapsed, the unit
is withheld under the new allocation rule. In all other cases, the new allocation rule
is the same as the old one.
This implies that buyers who report their deadline truthfully enjoy the same
expected payoff in both mechanisms:
∀a ∈ {1, . . . T}, d ∈ {a, . . . T}, ∀v ∈ [0, v] :
d∑
τ=a
qˆa(v, d) =
d∑
τ=a
qa(v, d).
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On the other hand, for d′ 6= d, we have
d∑
τ=a
qˆa(v, d
′) ≤
d∑
τ=a
qa(v, d
′).
Hence,
Uˆa(v, d) = Ua(v, d) ≥ Ua(v, d, v
′, d′) ≥ Uˆa(v, d, v
′, d′).

Proof of Lemma 1.5.1. The result will be shown separately for the two cases
K = 1 and T = 2.
Case 1 (K = 1): To simplify notation, define cτa := maxj∈{i∈Ia|di=τ} Ja(vj |τ) and
cτ≤a := max{c
τ
1, . . . , c
τ
a}. For fixed i ∈ I≤τ define c
τ,−i
a := maxj∈{l∈Ia\{i}|dl=τ} Ja(vj |τ)
and cτ,−i≤a := max{c
τ,−i
1 , . . . , c
τ,−i
a }. The results from Chapter 3 (see the remark at the
end of Section 3.3) imply that for each state st in which the object is still available,
there is a unique period θt ≥ t, in which the object will be allocated if it is allocated
to a buyer i ∈ I≤t. θt is determined by
cτ≤t ≤ Esτ+1 [Vτ+1(sτ+1)|sτ = st, kτ+1 = 1] ∀τ < θt,
and cθt≤t > Esθt+1 [Vθt+1(sθt+1)|sθt = st, kθt+1 = 1] .
Furthermore, there is a unique tentative winner i∗t ∈ I≤t in state st. i
∗
t has deadline
di∗t = θt, and virtual valuation Jai∗t
(vi∗t |di∗t ) = c
θt
≤t. For all other buyers in I≤t, the
winning probability conditional on st is zero. Hence, in order to compute the value
function in state st, Ht can be replaced (θt, c
θt
≤t) :
VT (sT ) = 1{kT=1}max{0, Jai∗
T
(vi∗t |T )}
= 1{kT=1}max{0, c
T
≤T} =: VT ((θT , c
T
≤T )),
and Vt(st) =
{
Jai∗
t
(vi∗t |t), if di∗t = t and kt = 1,
Est+1 [Vt+1(st+1)|st] , otherwise.
=
{
cθt≤t if θi = t and kt = 1,
Est+1
[
Vt+1(st+1)|(θt, c
θt
≤t), kt+1 = 1
]
, otherwise.
=: Vt((θt, c
θt
≤t)),
In order to compute the critical virtual valuation of the winning buyer, of course,
more information is needed. Suppose buyer i arrives in period ai and kai = 1. Then,
he wins in period di, if and only if
∀t ∈ {ai, . . . , di} c
t
≤t ≤ Vt((di, Jai(vi|di)), kt = 1),
and Jai(vi|di) > Esdi+1 [Vdi+1(sdi+1)|sdi , kdi+1 = 1] ,
where we define the expected value in the last line as zero if di = T . To give an
expression for the critical virtual valuation, we define
zdt (c
t
≤t) = min
{
z ≥ 0
∣∣ct≤t = Est+1 [Vt+1(st+1)|(d, z), kt+1 = 1]}
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where here and in the following, Est+1[. . . |(d, z), kt+1 = 1] = Est+1[. . . |(θt, c
θt
≤θt
) =
(d, z), kt+1 = 1]. With this definition we have
ζ iai,di(Hdi, 1) = max
{
zdiai (c
ai,−i
≤ai
), . . . , zdidi−1(c
di−1,−i
≤di−1
), cdi,−i≤di ,
Esdi+1 [Vdi+1(sdi+1)|Hdi,−i, kdi+1 = 1]
}
.
Claim 1.B.1. zdt (c
t
≤t) = z
d
d−1(z
d−1
t (c
t
≤t)).
Proof of Claim 1.B.1. If zdt (c
t
≤t) = 0 then also z
d−1
t (c
t
≤t) = 0 and therefore
zdd−1(z
d−1
t (c
t
≤t)) = 0. Suppose z
d
t (c
t
≤t) > 0 and z
d−1
t (c
t
≤t) > 0. This implies
ct≤t = Est+1
[
Vt+1(st+1)
∣∣(d− 1, zd−1t (ct≤t)), kt+1 = 1]
= Est+1
[
Vt+1(st+1)
∣∣(d, zdt (ct≤t)), kt+1 = 1]
The second equation is equivalent to
Est+1
[
max
{
ct+1t+1, Est+2 [ . . . (1.B.1)
Esd−1
[
1{kd−1=1}max
{
cd−1≤d−1, z
d−1
t (c
t
≤t), Esd [Vs(sd)|Hd−1, kd = 1]
}∣∣sd−2]
. . .
∣∣st+1]}∣∣I≤t = ∅, kt+1 = 1]
=Est+1
[
max
{
ct+1t+1, Est+2 [ . . .
Es−1
[
1{kd−1=1}max
{
cd−1≤d−1, Esd
[
Vs(sd)
∣∣(d, zdt (ct≤t)), kd = 1] ,
Esd [Vs(sd)|Hd−1, kd = 1]}
∣∣sd−2] . . . ∣∣st+1]}∣∣I≤t = ∅, kt+1 = 1]
Now suppose by contradiction that zdt (c
t
≤t) > z
d
d−1(z
d−1
t (c
t
≤t)). This implies
Esd
[
Vd(sd)
∣∣(d, zdt (ct≤t)), kd = 1] > zd−1t (ct≤t).
Conditional on I≤t = ∅, with positive probability the realization of sd−1 is such that
kd−1 = 1 and
Esd
[
Vd(sd)
∣∣(d, zdt (ct≤t)), kd = 1] > max{cd−1≤d−1, Esd [Vd(sd)|Hd−1, kd = 1]}
> zd−1t (c
t
≤t).
But this contradicts (1.B.1). Similarly, zdt (c
t
≤t) < z
d
d−1(z
d−1
t (c
t
≤t)) leads to a contra-
diction. This proves the claim. 
Now, consider the critical virtual valuation for deadline di − 1:
ζ iai,di−1(Hdi−1, 1) = max
{
zdi−1ai (c
ai,−i
≤ai
), . . . , zdi−1di−2(c
di−2,−i
≤di−2
), cdi−1,−i≤di−1 ,
Esdi [Vdi(sdi)|Hdi−1,−i, kdi = 1]
}
.
Claim 1.B.1 allows us to replace the cutoff values zdi−1τ . ∀τ ∈ {ai, . . . , di − 2} :
xdi−1τ (c
τ,−i
≤τ ) = Esdi
[
Vdi(sdi)
∣∣(di, zdidi−1(zdi−1τ (cτ,−i≤τ ))), kdi = 1] ,
= Esdi
[
Vdi(sdi)
∣∣(di, zdiτ (cτ,−i≤τ )), kdi = 1] .
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Hence,
ζ iai,di−1(Hdi−1, 1) =
=max
{
Esdi
[
Vdi(sdi)
∣∣(di, zdiai (cai,−i≤ai )), kdi = 1] , . . .
. . . , Esdi
[
Vdi(sdi)
∣∣∣(di, zdidi−1(cdi−1,−i≤di−1 )), kdi = 1] , Esdi [Vdi(sdi)|Hdi−1,−i, kdi = 1]}
=Esdi
[
max
{
zdiai (c
ai,−i
≤ai
), . . . , zdidi−1(c
di−1,−i
≤di−1
),
cdi≤di, Esdi+1 [Vdi+1(sdi+1)|Hdi,−i, kdi+1 = 1]
}∣∣∣Hdi−1]
=EHdi [ζ
i
ai,di
(Hdi, 1)|Hdi−1].
As ζ iai,di−1(Hdi−1, 1)|Hdi−1 is deterministic for each Hdi−1,
ζ iai,di−1(Hdi−1, 1)|Hdi−1 ≻SSD ζ
i
ai,di
(Hdi , 1)|Hdi−1
and the lemma follows.
Case 2 (T = 2): Now we revert to the notation from the main text and use ct(K).
Let ct,−i(k) denote the k
th highest virtual valuation among the buyers with deadline t
in I≤t\{i}. Fix any state s1 = (H1, K). Let K1 denote the number of units that are
allocated in period one in state (H1,−i, K − 1). We distinguish two sub-cases.
Case A—In state (H1,−i, K), K1 units are allocated in the first period: If, in state
((H1,−i, (1, vi, 1)), K), buyer i gets a unit in the first period, then the remainingK−1
units are allocated as in state (H1,−i, K−1). This means that K1 units are allocated
to buyers other than i in period one and K −K1 − 1 units are retained. Hence, i’s
virtual valuation must exceed the option value of retaining the K −Kst1 unit. We
have
ζ i1,1(H1, K) = Es2 [V2(s2)|H1,−i, k2 = K −K1]−Es2 [V2(s2)|H1,−i, k2 = K −K1 − 1] ,
= Es2
[
max
{
0, c2,−i(K−K1)
}∣∣∣H1] .
In state ((H1,−i, (1, vi, 2)), K), the number of units that are allocated in the first
period must also be K1. It is obvious that the arrival of buyer i with di = 2 cannot
increase the number of units allocated in the first period. On the other hand, suppose
that in state ((H1,−i, (1, vi, 2)), K), only K1−1 units are allocated in the first period.
Then
c1,−i(K1) ≤ Es2
[
max
{
0, c2(K−K1+1)
}∣∣(H1,−i, (1, vi, 2))] ,
≤ Es2
[
max
{
0, c2(K−K1+1)
}∣∣(H1,−i, (1, v, 2))] ,
= Es2
[
max
{
0, c2(K−K1)
}∣∣H1,−i] ,
< c1,−i(K1),
where the last inequality follows from our assumption that in state (H1,−i, K − 1),
K1 units are allocated in the first period. This is a contradiction. But if K1 objects
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are allocated in the first period, then
ζ i1,2(H2, K) = max
{
0, c2,−i(K−K1)
}
.
Hence, in case A, Es2[ζ
i
1,2(H2, K)|H1] = ζ
i
1,1(H1, K) and ζ
i
1,1(H1, K)|H1 ≻SSD
ζ i1,2(H2, K)|H1.
Case B—In state (H1,−i, K), K1 + 1 objects are allocated in the first period:
Again, if in state ((H1,−i, (1, vi, 1)), K), buyer i gets an object in the first period,
then the remaining K − 1 objects are allocated as in state (H1,−i, K − 1). Hence, in
case B we have
ζ i1,1(H1, K) = c
1,−i
(K1+1)
.
In state ((H1,−i, (1, vi, 2)), K), it depends on vi, how many objects are retained
for the second period. Define z by
c1,−i(K1+1) = Es2
[
max
{
0, c2(K−K1)
}∣∣(H1,−i, (1, J−11 (z|2), 2))] .
If J1(vi|2) ≥ z, then K−K1 objects are retained, otherwise only K−K1−1 objects
are retained. Hence, we have
ζ i1,2(H2, K) =


c2,−i(K−K1), if z < c
2,−i
(K−K1)
,
z if c2,−i(K−K1) ≤ z < c
2,−i
(K−K1−1)
,
c2,−i(K−K1−1) if c
2,−i
(K−K1−1)
≤ z.
Note that for H1 = (H1,−i, (1, J
−1
1 (z|2), 2)) this equals max
{
0, c2(K−K1)
}
. There-
fore, also in case B, Es2[ζ
i
1,2(H2, K)|H1] = ζ
i
1,1(H1, K) and ζ
i
1,1(H1, K)|H1 ≻SSD
ζ i1,2(H2, K)|H1. 
Proof of Theorem 1.5.2. Consider a buyer i with type (a, v, d), where a < d ≤
T and let d′ ∈ {1, . . . , d− 1}. Fix the state in the arrival period sa, and let
G(ζ) = Prob
{
ζ ia,d(Hd, ka) ≤ ζ
∣∣sa} ,
and G′(ζ) = Prob
{
ζ ia,d′(Hd′, ka) ≤ ζ
∣∣sa} .
Lemma 1.5.1 implies that G and G′ have the same mean and G′ ≻SSD G.
(i) Suppose v = v, Ja(v|d
′) is strictly concave and Ja(v|d
′) ≥ Ja(v|d) for all v ∈
[v0a|d
′, v]. Conditional on sa the expected payoff of i is given by
Ua(v, d) =
ˆ v
0
(v − J−1a (ζ |d))dG(ζ),
≤
ˆ v
0
(v − J−1a (ζ |d
′))dG(ζ),
<
ˆ v
0
(v − J−1a (ζ |d
′)dG′(ζ) = Ua(v, d
′).
In the second line we have used that J−1a (ζ |d
′) ≤ J−1a (ζ |d) for ζ > 0. In the
third line we have used strict convexity of J−1a (ζ |d
′) as a function of ζ . A similar
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argument can be made if Ja(v|d) is strictly concave. If Ja(v|d
′) > Ja(v|d) for all
v < v, the first inequality becomes strict and strict concavity can be replaced
by weak concavity.
(ii) Suppose Ja(v|d
′) is convex and Ja(v|d) ≥ Ja(v|d
′) for all v ∈ [v0a|d, v]. Condi-
tional on sa we have
Ua(v, d) =
ˆ Ja(v|d)
0
(v − J−1a (ζ |d))dG(ζ),
≥
ˆ Ja(v|d′)
0
(v − J−1a (ζ |d
′))dG(ζ),
= J−1a (0|d
′)G(0) +
ˆ Ja(v|d′)
0
d
dζ
J−1a (v|d
′)G(ζ)dζ,
≥ J−1a (0|d
′)G′(0) +
ˆ Ja(v|d′)
0
d
dζ
J−1a (v|d
′)G′(ζ)dζ = Ua(v, d
′)
The last line follows because d
dζ
J−1a (v|d
′) is non-negative and non-increasing
and for all non-negative and non-increasing functions φ : [0, v] → [0, v], we
have
∀x ∈ [0, v] :
ˆ x
0
φ(s)G′(s)ds ≤
ˆ x
0
φ(s)G(s)ds.
For φ(s) = 1{s≤x} this follows directly from SSD and since any non-increasing
function φ : [0, v] → [0, v] can be uniformly approximated by non-increasing
step functions the result follows.
A similar argument can be made if Ja(v|d) is convex.

Proof of Theorem 1.6.2. Substituting V opt2 into the objective function we get
π1(U) = max
q1(.,1)
V opt2 +
ˆ v
0
q1(v, 1)
(
J1(v|1)− V
opt
2
)
f1(v|1)dv, (1.B.2)
Subject to q1(v, 1) ∈ [0, 1], ∀v ∈ [0, v]. (M1), (PE1) and (ICD
d
U). This is a control
problem with state U1(v) = U1(v, 1) and measurable control q1(.) = q1(v, 1). The
law of motion for the state is U ′1(v) = q1(v). We account for q1(v, 1) ∈ [0, 1] and
(ICDdU) by imposing the state constraint U1(v) ≤ U(v), requiring the state to start at
zero, U1(0) = 0, and the control to take values between zero and one, q1(v) ∈ [0, 1].
(M) will be neglected for the moment.
The Hamiltonian of this problem is
H(U1, q1, p, v) = pq1 + q1
(
J1(v|1)− V
opt
2
)
f1(v|1)
where p is the adjoint variable of the state U1. Let (U1, q1) be an optimal solution.
By the Pontryagin maximum principle (c.f. Clarke (1983, pp. 211-212)) we have
that p(v) = p is constant and p + µ[0, v] = 0, where µ is a non-negative measure
supported on the set {v | U1(v) = U(v)}. Furthermore, for almost every v, q1(v)
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maximizes H(U1(t), q1, p+ µ[0, v), v). This implies that for almost every v,
q1(v) = 1, if p+ µ[0, v) + (J1(v|1)− V
opt
2 )f1(v|1) > 0,
q1(v) ∈ [0, 1], if p+ µ[0, v) + (J1(v|1)− V
opt
2 )f1(v|1) = 0,
and q1(v) = 0, if p+ µ[0, v) + (J1(v|1)− V
opt
2 )f1(v|1) < 0.
Since p + µ[0, v) ≤ 0, q1(v) = 0 if J1(v|1) < V
opt
2 . But if J1(v|1) ≥ V
opt
2 ,
1.6.1 implies that (J1(v|1)− V
opt
2 )f1(v|1) is strictly increasing. Since µ[0, v) is non-
decreasing, p+ µ[0, v)+ (J1(v|1)− V
opt
2 )f1(v|1) = 0 implies p+µ[0, v
′)+ (J1(v
′|1)−
V opt2 )f1(v
′|1) > 0 for all v′ > v. Therefore there is a unique value r1 such that
q1(v1) =
{
0, if v1 < r1
1, if v1 > r1.
Obviously, any such solution satisfies (M). r1 can be determined without resort-
ing to optimal control theory. As the mechanism is deterministic, it is the lowest
value such that J1(r1) ≥ V
opt
2 and U1(v, 1) = v− r1 ≤ U(v). This yields the solution
stated in the Theorem.
If we set r1 = max{J
−1
1 (V
opt
2 |1), v − U¯} and insert the optimal solution in the
objective function we obtain
π1(U¯) =
ˆ v
r1
J1(v|1)f1(v|1)dv + V
opt
2 F1(r1|1).
π′1(U¯) =
{
(J1(v − U¯ |1)− V
opt
2 )f1(v − U¯ |1), if J1(v − U¯ |1) > V
opt
2 ,
0 otherwise.
For U¯ → v − J−11 (V
opt
2 |1) we have π
′
1(U¯) → 0 since f1 is bounded. Hence, π
′
1(U¯) is
continuous. Using Assumption 1.6.1, we conclude that π′1(U¯) is strictly decreasing
if J1(v − U¯ |1) > V
opt
2 and hence π1 is strictly concave. 
1.C. Reduced Forms
The interim winning probability for period t of a buyer with type (ai, vi, di) is
given by:
qtai(vi, di) =
∑
(N1,...,Nt)∈{0,...,N¯}t

 Naiνai,Nai∑N¯
r=1 rνai,r
∏
a∈{1,...,t}\ai
νa,Na



 T∑
d1=a1
. . .
T∑
di−1=ai−1
T∑
di+1=ai+1
. . .
T∑
dN≤t=aN≤t

 ∏
j∈I≤t\i
ρaj ,dj

 ˙
v1...vi−1
˙
vi+1...vN≤t

 ∑
ξ1∈Φ1(s1)
x1(ξ1|s1)
. . .
∑
ξt∈Φt(st)
xt(ξt|st)ξt,i

 ∏
j∈I≤t\i
faj (vj |dj)dvj

 .
56 1. OPTIMAL DYNAMIC MECHANISM DESIGN WITH DEADLINES
The interim expected payment of a buyer with type (ai, vi, di) is given by:
pai(vi, di) =
∑
(N1,...,Nt)∈{0,...,N¯}t

 Naiνai,Nai∑N¯
r=1 rνai,r
∏
a∈{1,...,t}\ai
νa,Na



 T∑
d1=a1
. . .
T∑
di−1=ai−1
T∑
di+1=ai+1
. . .
T∑
dN≤t=aN≤t

 ∏
j∈I≤t\i
ρaj ,dj

 ˙
v1...vi−1
˙
vi+1...vN≤t

 ∑
ξ1∈Φ1(s1)
x1(ξ1|s1)
. . .
∑
ξai∈Φai (sai)
xai(ξai|sai)

yai,i(sai, ξai) + ∑
ξai+1∈Φai+1(sai+1)
xai+1(ξai+1|sai+1)

 . . .
∑
ξT∈ΦT (sT )
xT (ξT |sT )yT,i(sT , ξT )





 ∏
j∈I≤t\i
faj (vj |dj)dvj

 .
CHAPTER 2
Asymmetric Reduced Form Auctions
2.1. Introduction
An auction is a mechanism to sell (or buy) an object to (from) one of several
bidders. An asymmetric auction has the special feature that its rules treat different
bidders or groups of bidders differently. For example in a procurement auction
the buyer may want to grant bidders different bonuses according to his monetary
assessment of non-price attributes of the bidders’ products. In dynamic settings, the
auctioneer may want to treat bidders differently if they arrive in different periods.
If the auctioneer knows that different (groups of) bidders have different outside
options, or budget constraints, he may also want to treat them differently.
Formally, an auction consists of a set of admissible bids for each bidder, an al-
location rule and a payment rule. Depending on the profile of submitted bids, the
allocation and payment rules determine who will get the object and the payments of
each participant. An auction implements a certain social choice function (i.e. allo-
cation and payment rule) if there is an equilibrium in which the outcome coincides
with the outcome of the social choice function. By the revelation principle, a social
choice function is implementable if and only if the direct mechanism defined by the
social choice function has a truth-telling equilibrium. The design problem of finding
an optimal auction therefore amounts to the optimal choice of a social choice func-
tion subject to (a) incentive compatibility constraints and (b) a feasibility constraint
that requires that for each profile of types, the object is allocated only once.
The reduced form of an allocation rule is given by the interim winning probabil-
ities, i.e. the probabilities that an agent wins, conditional on his own type, provided
that all other bidders tell the truth. If the desired solution concept is Bayes-Nash-
Equilibrium, standard payoff equivalence results characterize incentive compatibility
as a condition on the reduced form allocation and payment rules. The feasibility
constraint, on the other hand, is a condition on the allocation rule (rather than the
reduced form). In order to incorporate both constraints in the mechanism design
problem, a condition is needed, that characterizes reduced forms which are imple-
mentable by a feasible allocation rule.1
1In the classic optimal auction problem, this problem does not arise. Incentive compatibility con-
straints can be used to attach a virtual valuation to each type of a buyer. The optimal mechanism
can then be derived by point-wise maximization. This admits a direct application of the feasibility
constraint (Myerson, 1981).
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For the case of symmetric allocation rules, Border (1991) gives a characterization
of implementable reduced forms.2 A reduced form is shown to be implementable if
and only if for all measurable subsets A of the type-space,3 the probability that
a bidder with type in A wins the object is less than or equal to the probability
that there is a bidder with type in A. Following Border (2007), this condition
shall be called the Maskin-Riley-Matthews (MRM) condition. Border also shows
that it suffices to check the MRM condition for a one-dimensional family of subsets,
viz. the upper contour sets of the reduced form allocation rule. Bayes-Nash incentive
compatibility requires monotonicity of the reduced form, and therefore the upper
contour sets take the form of intervals if types are one-dimensional. Border (2007)
generalizes the first result to asymmetric auctions for the case of finite type-spaces.
In this characterization, the MRM condition must be satisfied for all sets of type
profiles. The second result, i.e. a reduction of the condition to a low-dimensional
family of sets has not been generalized to the asymmetric case, so far.
In this note, asymmetric reduced form auctions are studied with general type-
spaces and the second result is generalized.4 In the asymmetric case, bidders may
have different type spaces and their types need not be identically distributed. There
may be groups of bidders that are treated identically by the allocation rule. Bidders
in the same group are assumed to be symmetric, i.e. all bidders in the same group
have identical type spaces and identically distributed types. The number of groups
is denoted by L and hence there are L (possibly) different type spaces.
We show that the MRM condition is necessary and sufficient for feasibility if
it is imposed for sets of the form A1 × . . . × AL, where each Al is a measurable
subset of the type-space of group l. This family of sets is a proper subset of the
family considered in Border (2007). Second, we show that for each group l the
family of sets Al can be further restricted to the upper contour sets of group l’s
reduced form winning probability. For each component of A1 × . . . × Al, there is
only a one-dimensional family of sets. Hence, it is necessary and sufficient that the
MRM condition is satisfied for an L-dimensional family of sets. Again, together
with incentive compatibility, this yields a tractable characterization of feasibility.5
In the next section, the formal model is introduced and the results are stated.
Section 2.3 contains the proofs. The general approach to prove the results is the
same as in Border (1991). Some generalizations are necessary to incorporate the
2Maskin and Riley (1984) use a special case of this result to study the optimal auction problem
with risk-aversion. Matthews (1984) conjectured the result proven by Border and proved a partial
result. See also (Chen, 1986).
3In the symmetric case, all bidders have the same type space and their types are identically dis-
tributed.
4Daniele Condorelli, Yoen-Koo Che and Jinwoo Kim (private communication) independently de-
rived a similar result.
5In Chapter 1, we use this characterization to solve a dynamic mechanism design problem. Pai and
Vohra (2008a) use Border’s symmetric characterization to analyze optimal auctions with budget
constraints.
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more complicated asymmetric structure (Lemmas 2.3.4 and 2.3.6). Furthermore
some parts are (slightly) simplified by treating the set of feasible allocation rules
and the set of feasible reduced forms as subsets of L2 rather than L∞.
2.2. Definitions and Results
There are N bidders. Each bidder belongs to one of L ≤ N groups. The
function γ : {1, . . . , N} → {1, . . . , L} associates with each bidder i his group γ(i).
γ−1(l) denotes the set of bidders in group l and N l = |γ−1(l)| denotes the number
of bidders in group l. (The sets γ−1(1), . . . , γ−1(L) partition the set of bidders
{1, . . . , N}. Hence
∑L
l=1N
l = N .) For each group l, there is a probability space
(T l, T l, µl). The type of a bidder i is denoted ti ∈ T l where l = γ(i). The types of all
bidders that belong to group l are identically distributed according to the probability
measure µl. The space of all type profiles t = (t1, . . . , tN) is the product space of all
type-spaces and is denoted by (T, T , µ) = (T γ(1)×T γ(2)× . . .×T γ(N), T γ(1)⊗T γ(2)⊗
. . . ⊗ T γ(N), µ =
∏N
i=1 µ
γ(i)). As usual, a type profile where the type of bidder i is
excluded, is denoted by t−i with probability space (T−i, T −i, µ−i). θ = (θ1, . . . , θL)
denotes a profile of L types, one for each group. The associated probability space is
(Tˆ , Tˆ , µˆ) = (T 1 × . . .× TL, T 1 ⊗ . . .⊗ T L,
∏L
l=1 µ
l).
Definition 2.2.1. (a) An allocation rule is a measurable function q : T → [0, 1]N
that satisfies the following feasibility condition for all t ∈ T .
N∑
i=1
qi(t) ≤ 1. (F)
(b) An allocation rule is group symmetric if for all l ∈ {1, . . . , L}, i, j ∈ γ−1(l) and
t ∈ T
qi(t) = qj(σi,j(t)),
where σi,j interchanges the ith with the jth component of its argument.
qi(t) is the probability that bidder i gets the object if the profile of types is t.
The feasibility condition (F) ensures that the object is allocated at most once. The
set of all group symmetric allocation rules is denoted by Q0. The (group) reduced
form Qˆ : Tˆ → [0, 1]L of a group symmetric allocation rule q is given by the interim
winning probabilities
Qˆl(θl) :=
ˆ
T−i
qi(θl, t−i)dµ−i(t−i), where γ(i) = l.
The lth component of Qˆ(θ) is the probability that a bidder from group l gets the
object when his type is θl. Note that Qˆl is a function of θl rather than θ. In
what follows, a function with this property shall be called diagonal. A measurable
diagonal function Qˆ : Tˆ → [0, 1]L is implementable by a group symmetric allocation
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rule if it is the group reduced form of some q ∈ Q0.
6 The set of all such functions is
denoted by Qˆ.
Let F denote the set of L-tuples of measurable subsets of the individual type-
spaces
F :=
{
(A1, . . . , AL)
∣∣ ∀l : Al ∈ T l} .
For each A ∈ F , A1 × . . .×AL is a subset of Tˆ . The converse, however, is not true.
This is the difference to the approach taken by Border (2007) who considers general
subsets of Tˆ .7
A ∈ F is called empty if for all l = 1, . . . , L, Al = ∅. Two elements A,B ∈ F
are called F -disjoint (denoted A ∩F B = ∅) if for all l = 1, . . . , L: A
l ∩ Bl = ∅.
We can now state the generalization of Theorem 3.1 in Border (1991) for asym-
metric allocation rules.
Theorem 2.2.2. Let Qˆ : Tˆ → [0, 1]L be measurable and diagonal. Then Qˆ ∈ Qˆ if
and only if for each A ∈ F ,
L∑
l=1
N l
ˆ
Al
Qˆl(tl)dµl(tl) ≤ 1−
L∏
l=1
(
1− µl(Al)
)N l
. (2.2.1)
As in the symmetric case, the family of sets A ∈ F for which (2.2.1) must be
checked can be reduced. In the symmetric case it suffices to check a one dimensional
family. In the group symmetric case, this family has dimension L.
Theorem 2.2.3. Let Qˆ : Tˆ → [0, 1]L be measurable and diagonal. For each α ∈
[0, 1]L define Eα = (E
1
α, . . . , E
L
α ) by E
l
α := {t
l ∈ T l | Qˆl(tl) ≥ αl}.
Then Qˆ ∈ Qˆ if and only if for each α ∈ [0, 1]L,
L∑
l=1
N l
ˆ
Elα
Qˆl(tl)dµl(tl) ≤ 1−
L∏
i=1
(
1− µl(Elα)
)N l
.
2.3. Proofs
For applications it is convenient to work with group reduced forms but for the
proofs, the bidder reduced form is more convenient. The bidder reduced form Q :
T → [0, 1]N of a feasible group-symmetric allocation rule q is defined as
Qi(ti) =
ˆ
T−i
qi(ti, t−i)dµ−i(t−i).
The set of bidder reduced forms of feasible and group symmetric allocation rules is
denoted by Q. Note that each Q ∈ Q is diagonal and group-symmetric (Qi(t) =
Qj(t) for all t ∈ T if i ∈ γ(j)). Hence, each Q ∈ Q has a representation Qˆ ∈ Qˆ that
satisfies Qˆl = Qi if l = γ(i).
6Implementability is not to be confused with usual meaning in the mechanism design literature.
7In that paper L = N and therefore Tˆ = T .
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As in Border (1991), hierarchical allocation rules are an important tool in the
proofs. This notion has to be generalized to fit the asymmetric case.
Definition 2.3.1. Let A1, . . . , AK ∈ F be a family of pairwise F -disjoint sets. The
hierarchical allocation rule qA1,...,AK generated by A1, . . . , AK is defined as
qiA1,...,AK(t) :=


1
|{j: tj∈A
γ(j)
k
}|
if ti ∈ A
γ(i)
k and ∄j : t
j ∈ A
γ(j)
1 ∪ . . . ∪A
γ(j)
k−1
0 otherwise.
The sets A1, . . . , AK define a hierarchy of types. A
l
k is the set of types of bidders
in group l that are at the kth level of the hierarchy. The hierarchical allocation
rule qA1,...,AK works as follows. If there are bidders with types at the first level,
the object is given to one of these bidders with equal probability. Otherwise the
auctioneer checks whether there are bidders with types at the second level, and in
this case, allocates the object with equal probability to one of them. The auctioneer
continues until either he has allocated the object or he has checked for bidders at
all levels of the hierarchy. In the latter case the object is not sold.
2.3.1. Proof of Theorem 2.2.2. The general approach is the same as in Border
(1991). Since µ is a finite measure, Q0 and Q are subsets of the Hilbert space
L2(T, µ,RN). For Q, f ∈ L2(T, µ,RN) the scalar product is given by 〈Q, f〉 =´
T
(Q(t), f(t))dµ(t), where (., .) is the Euclidean scalar product in RN . To simplify
notation L2(T, µ,R
N) will be abbreviated as LN2 , and L2(T, µ,R) as L2.
The feasibility condition (2.2.1) can be written as a condition on 〈Q, f〉 for
certain functions f ∈ LN2 . To do this write the vector of indicator functions
for (A1, . . . , AL) = A ∈ F , as χA(t) := (χAγ(1)(t
1), . . . , χAγ(N)(t
N )) so that χA :
T → {0, 1}N . Clearly, χA ∈ L
N
2 if A ∈ F . Furthermore define B(A) := 1 −∏L
l=1
(
1− µl(Al)
)N l
. If Qˆ is diagonal and a representation of Q, (2.2.1) can be
rewritten as
〈Q,χA〉 ≤ B(A).
With this notation, Lemmas 5.1 and 5.3 from Border (1991) can be reproduced
for the asymmetric case.
Lemma 2.3.2 (cf. Lemma 5.1, Border (1991)). For all A ∈ F and all Q ∈ Q,
〈Q,χA〉 ≤ B(A).
Lemma 2.3.3 (cf. Lemma 5.3, Border (1991)). Let Q : T → [0, 1]N be measur-
able and suppose that the function f =
∑M
j=1 αjχAj with α1, . . . , αM ∈ R and
A1, . . . , AM ∈ F separates Q from Q. That is, for all Q˜ ∈ Q:〈
Q,
M∑
j=1
αjχAj
〉
>
〈
Q˜,
M∑
j=1
αjχAj
〉
.
Then for some set A ∈ F , 〈Q,χA〉 > B(A).
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In Lemma 2.3.3, the simple function f =
∑M
j=1 αjχAj is diagonal and group
symmetric. The following Lemma implies that whenever a function f˜ ∈ LN2 separates
Q from Q and Q is diagonal and group symmetric, then there exists a diagonal group
symmetric function f ∈ LN2 that separates Q from Q.
Lemma 2.3.4. For every f˜ ∈ LN2 , there exist a diagonal and group symmetric f ∈ L
N
2
such that
〈
Q, f˜
〉
= 〈Q, f〉 for all diagonal and group symmetric Q ∈ LN2 .
Proof. Let Q ∈ LN2 be diagonal and group symmetric with representation Qˆ : Tˆ →
[0, 1]L. Then,〈
Q, f˜
〉
=
ˆ
T
N∑
i=1
f˜ i(t)Qi(t)µ(t),
=
N∑
i=1
ˆ
T i
(ˆ
T−i
f˜ i(ti, t−i)Qi(ti, t−i)dµ−i(t−i)
)
dµγ(i)(ti),
=
N∑
i=1
ˆ
T i
(ˆ
T−i
f˜ i(ti, t−i)dµ−i(t−i)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ξi(ti)
Qi(ti)dµγ(i)(ti),
=
N∑
i=1
ˆ
T i
ξi(ti)Qi(ti)dµγ(i)(ti),
=
L∑
l=1
∑
i∈γ−1(l)
ˆ
T l
ξi(tl)Qˆl(tl)dµl(tl),
=
L∑
l=1
ˆ
T l

 ∑
i∈γ−1(l)
ξi(tl)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:N lfˆ l(tl)
Qˆl(tl)dµl(tl),
=
N∑
i=1
ˆ
T i
f i(ti)Qi(ti)dµγ(i)(ti) = 〈Q, f〉 .
ξ : T → [0, 1]N is diagonal by definition and therefore fˆ : Tˆ → [0, 1]L is also
diagonal. With f : T → [0, 1]N defined as f i(t) = fˆγ(i)(ti) = 1
Nγ(i)
∑
j:γ(j)=γ(i) ξ
j(ti),
the desired diagonal and group symmetric function is obtained. 
Lemma 2.3.5. Q0 and Q are weakly compact subsets of L
N
2 .
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 5.4 in Border (1991).
Since we work with the Hilbert-Space LN2 and Q0 is bounded, we have that every
sequence (qn) in Q0 has a weakly convergent subsequence (with limit in L
N
2 ). Fol-
lowing Border, it can be shown that Q0 is weakly closed and hence weakly compact.
Furthermore, the mapping Λ, that associates an allocation rule with its reduced
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form is weakly continuous. As Q is the image of a compact set under Λ, it is also
weakly compact. 
Proof of Theorem 2.2.2. Let Qˆ : Tˆ → [0, 1]L be diagonal. Then it is the repre-
sentation of a diagonal and group symmetric function Q : T → [0, 1]N .
Lemma 2.3.2 shows that condition (2.2.1) is necessary for feasibility. Conversely
suppose Q /∈ Q. Q is a convex and weakly compact subset of LN2 . By a stan-
dard separation theorem,8 there exists a function f ∈ LN2 such that 〈Q, f〉 >
max
{〈
Q˜, f
〉∣∣∣Q˜ ∈ Q}. By Lemma 2.3.4, f can be chosen to be diagonal and group
symmetric. Furthermore, as the simple functions are dense in L2, we can take each
component f i to be a simple function. Hence f satisfies the conditions of Lemma
2.3.3 and there exists A ∈ F such that (2.2.1) is violated. It remains to be shown
that for every Q ∈ Q there exists a q∗ ∈ Q0 such that Λ(q
∗)(t) = Q(t) for every
t ∈ T (so far this has been shown for almost every t ∈ T ). The proof can be found
in Border (1991) and is omitted here. 
2.3.2. Proof of Theorem 2.2.3. As in the symmetric case, the proof of Theorem
2.2.3 starts by showing the result for simple functions which requires a bit more
work than the proof for symmetric auctions. For A ∈ F and χA : T → [0, 1]
N as
above, let χˆA : Tˆ → [0, 1]
L denote the representation of χA.
Lemma 2.3.6. Let Qˆ : Tˆ → [0, 1]L be a diagonal simple function with Qˆ =
∑K
k=1 αkχˆAk
where α1 > α2 > . . . > αK ≥ 0, the Ak ∈ F are pairwise F-disjoint and A
l
1 ∪ . . . ∪
AlK = T
l for all l. For l = 1, . . . , L and k = 1, . . . , K set Elk := A
l
1 ∪ . . . ∪ A
l
k and
set El0 := ∅.
If for each (k1, . . . , kL) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , K}
L:
L∑
l=1
N l
ˆ
El
kl
Qˆ(tl)dµl(tl) ≤ B(E1k1, . . . , E
L
kL
), (2.3.1)
then Qˆ ∈ Qˆ.
Proof. Define f : [0, 1]L → [0, 1] as f(x) := 1−
∏L
m=1(1− x
m)N
m
. This implies
∂2l f(x) = −N
l(N l − 1)(1− xl)N
l−2
∏
m6=l
(1− xm)N
m
≤ 0, (2.3.2)
and B(A) = f(µ1(A1), . . . , µL(AL)), for A ∈ F . (2.3.3)
To simplify notation define clk := µ
l(Elk). In order to bound the left hand side of
(2.2.1), define g : [0, 1]L → [0, 1] as a continuous and piecewise linear function with
g(0) = 0. For x ∈ (c1k1−1, c
1
k1
)× . . .× (cLkL−1, c
L
kL
), let the gradient of g be given by
∇g(x) =

N
1αk1
...
NLαkL

 .
8cf. Theorem 3.4 in Rudin (1973)
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With this definition, g(x) ≤ f(x) on the grid of points G0 := {(c
1
k1
, . . . , cLkL) | ki ∈
{0, 1, . . . , L}}:
∀x ∈ G0 : g(x) =
L∑
l=1
N l
kl∑
k=1
αkµ
l(Alk)
=
L∑
l=1
N l
ˆ
El
kl
Ql(tl)µl(tl)
≤ f(µl(E1k1), . . . , µ
L(ELkL)) = f(x).
The second equality follows from the definition of Q and the inequality follows from
(2.3.1) and (2.3.3).
Now it is shown inductively, that g(x) ≤ f(x) on the sets
Gn :=
{
x ∈ [0, 1]L
∣∣∣ L− n ≤ |{j | ∃kj : xj = cjkj}|} ,
for n = 1, . . . , L.9 Observe that GL = [0, 1]
L. Suppose that g(x) ≤ f(x) for all x ∈
Gn−1. Let x ∈ Gn. Then there exist l and kl such that x = (x
1, . . . , xl−1, clkl−1, x
l+1,
. . . , xL) and x = (x1, . . . , xl−1, clkl, x
l+1, . . . , xL) are in Gn−1 and x = x(δ) = (1 −
δ)x + δx for some δ ∈ [0, 1]. As x and x differ only in the lth coordinate, f(x(δ))
is weakly concave as a function of δ by (2.3.2). Furthermore, as the gradient of g
is constant on sets of the form (c1k1−1, c
1
k1
)× . . .× (cLkL−1, c
L
kL
), g(x(δ)) is linear as a
function of δ. By the induction hypothesis, g(x) ≤ f(x) and g(x) ≤ f(x). Therefore
also g(x) ≤ f(x).
Now, for A ∈ F define h : [0, µ1(A1)]× . . .× [0, µL(AL)]→ [0, 1] as a continuous
and piecewise linear function with h(0) = 0. For x ∈ (µ1(A1∩E1k1−1), µ
1(A1∩E1k1))×
. . .× (µL(AL ∩ ELkL−1), µ
L(AL ∩ ELkL)) let the gradient of h be given by
∇h(x) =

N
1αk1
...
NLαkL

 .
With this definition,
h(A) =
L∑
l=1
N l
ˆ
Al
Qˆl(tl)dµl(tl).
Furthermore for all x and all l: ∇lh(x) ≤ ∇lg(x). Therefore h(x) ≤ g(x) ≤ f(x)
which implies (2.2.1) for all sets A ∈ F and therefore Qˆ ∈ Qˆ by proposition 2.2.2. 
Proof of Theorem 2.2.3. The proof works as the proof of proposition 3.2 in
Border (1991). For the asymmetric case Qˆ is approximated by the sequence of
simple functions Qˆn : Tˆ → RL which is constructed such that Qˆln(t) =
k
2n
on
{t | k
2n
≤ Qˆl(t) < k+1
2n
}. 
9In the case L = 3 and K = 1, G0 are the vertices of the cuboid [0, 1]
3, G1 are the edges, G2 are
the surfaces and G3 is the cuboid itself.
CHAPTER 3
The Dynamic Vickrey Auction
Summary. We construct a simple payment rule that implements the efficient alloca-
tion rule for a single indivisible object over T time periods. Buyers arrive randomly
over time. Private information is multidimensional because valuations depend on
the time at which the object is sold. It is shown that each type has a unique po-
tential winning period and only the valuation for this period is important for the
allocation decision. Therefore, types can be reduced to essentially one dimension
and there is a natural order on the type space by which buyers can be compared.
These properties allow to define a simple payment rule in which only the winner
has non-zero transfers, transfers are ex-post individually rational and can be made
online. The payment rule is a generalization of the static Vickrey auction in which
the winner pays the lowest valuation for the winning period that would suffice to
win. Losers pay nothing.
Furthermore, in each period, there is only one buyer who has a chance to win the
object in the future, all other buyers can be dismissed and will never be recalled.
This allows to define a generalized ascending auction that implements the efficient
allocation rule and the same payment rule as the dynamic Vickrey auction. Both the
dynamic Vickrey auction and the generalized ascending auction are periodic ex-post
incentive compatible.
3.1. Introduction
Standard auction models usually assume that all potential buyers are available
at the same time, and that the valuations of buyers do not depend on the time of
the allocation. In many allocation problems, however, time is an important factor.
In online auctions, buyers typically arrive over time and since auctions usually last
several days, some buyers may not be willing to wait until the end of the auction
(for example think of buying a last-minute birthday present). Internet platforms like
eBay offer a feature that allows to end the auction immediately for a predetermined
price. One explanation why this feature is used, is that buyers are impatient and
willing to pay a high price for closing a deal immediately (Mathews, 2004; Gallien and
Gupta, 2007).1 Time preferences of buyers as well as dynamic arrival are important
in many other markets. For example, in the housing market, and in the markets for
airline tickets or hotel reservations, a long time elapses between the start and the
1Another explanation is risk-aversion (Budish and Takeyama, 2001; Hidve´gi, Wang, and Whinston,
2006; Reynolds and Wooders, 2006).
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end of the selling mechanism, potential buyers arrive over time, and they may have
privately known preferences about the time of purchase.
In this chapter, we study the dynamic allocation of a single object over a fi-
nite time horizon. The model generalizes the standard independent private values
framework. Potential buyers arrive randomly over time, they are long-lived, and the
valuation they derive from getting the object may depend on the time of allocation in
an arbitrary way. We show that the efficient allocation rule can be implemented by
a mechanism with a simple payment rule that generalizes the static Vickrey auction
(Vickrey, 1961).
The implementability of the efficient allocation rule has already been demon-
strated in great generality by Parkes and Singh (2003), Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki
(2010) and Athey and Segal (2007). To ensure incentive compatibility, expected pay-
ments of each buyer have to be equal to the expected change in the welfare enjoyed
by the other agents due to the report of the buyer. This is an application of the
famous Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to the dynamic framework (Vick-
rey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973). Thus, incentive compatibility pins down the
expected payments conditional on all information available at the time when agents
observe their private information (i.e. at their arrival time in this chapter). There
are many ways, however, in which ex-post payments can be distributed over different
states of the world, while maintaining the VCG-property of the expected payments.
The central question of this chapter is whether simple payment rules can be
defined to implement the efficient allocation rule. By simplicity we mean that,
(A) only the winner makes a payment,
(B) payments are ex-post individually rational,
(C) the mechanism never transfers money to any buyer, and
(D) payments are made online, i.e. all information that is needed to determine the
payment must be available at the time of allocation.
Note that properties (A)–(C) are fulfilled by standard static auction formats.
Moreover, if we leave the ideal world of the abstract mechanism design model,
properties (A)–(D) are obviously desirable. Property (A) minimizes the number
of transactions. This is important if the buyers or the seller incur transaction costs
for financial transactions. Property (B) is important because ex-post individually
rational payments are easier to enforce. A winner who has to pay more than his
value may feel a strong desire to renege on his bid. Property (C) is convenient
because payments to buyers may encourage persons who are not interested in the
object, to speculate on getting such subsidies and trying to renege on their bids
in the case they are selected as the winner. While it may be possible to prevent
such abuse by strict enforcement of the mechanism’s rules, this will certainly involve
additional costs. The last property (D) seems indispensable. If payments cannot be
determined online, this means that additional information has to be collected from
future buyers after the winner has already been determined. Incentives for reporting
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such information are weak. Furthermore, online payments allow to match payments
with delivery, which makes it easier to enforce payments.
There are examples of mechanisms in the literature, which fulfill properties (A)–
(D).2 As systematic analysis of implementability by simple payments rules, however,
seems to be missing. Only the requirement of online has been posited explicitly in
the literature on dynamic mechanism design (Parkes and Singh, 2003).3
The Dynamic Vickrey Auction proposed in this chapter yields expected payments
that ensure incentive compatibility. At the same time, payments are distributed
over different states of the world such that properties (A)–(D) are satisfied. Con-
sequently, the payment of an agent corresponds neither to the expected change in
the other agents’ welfare as in the online VCG mechanisms proposed by Parkes and
Singh (2003), nor to the sum of flow marginal contributions as in the dynamic pivot
mechanism proposed by Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2010). Instead, payments satisfy
another property of the static Vickrey (or second-price) auction. The payment of the
winner is equal to the lowest valuation for the winning period with which she could
have won the object. This valuation is called the critical type of the winning buyer.
In a static model, the critical type is equal to the second highest valuation. In the
dynamic model, however, valuations for getting the object in one period (e.g. today)
cannot be compared directly to a valuation for another period (e.g. tomorrow). In-
stead, valuations for tomorrow are compared to current valuations in terms of the
option value of retaining the object until tomorrow. Loosely speaking, the critical
type is determined by transforming all valuations using the option value function to
make them comparable with valuations for the winning period. The second highest
of these transformed valuations is the critical type of the winner. Because of the
transformation, in general, the payment differs from the second highest (untrans-
formed) valuation. Since the critical type determines the allocation decision, it can
only depend on information that is available in the winning period. Therefore, the
payment is not delayed beyond the time of allocation of the object; it can be made
online.
There is difficulty in the definition of a critical type because the model has a
multi-dimensional type-space. Types are multi-dimensional because buyers can have
different valuations for different periods. The central result of this chapter is that
the information about a buyer’s type, that is relevant for determining the efficient
allocation, is essentially one-dimensional. For each type, there is a unique period in
which she can possibly win the object. Therefore, only the valuation for this period
matters for the efficient allocation rule. This reduction to one dimension allows to
2For example, sequences of posted prices as in Gershkov and Moldovanu (2008); Gallien (2006)
and many other papers lead to simple payment rules. The dynamic pivot mechanism proposed by
Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2010) also yields a simple payment rule if it is applied to a scheduling
problem.
3(Gershkov and Moldovanu, 2009a) demonstrate that the requirement of online payments can
destroy the implementability of the efficient allocation rule if a buyer’s type is informative about
future buyers’ types.
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consider a lowest type in a well-defined way. As a corollary of this result, it is shown
that at each point in time, there is only one bidder who has a positive chance of
winning the object. All other bidders can be dismissed immediately and will never
be recalled. In other words, the efficient allocation rule only needs a queue of bidders
of length one. These properties also allow to design a generalized ascending auction
that implements the efficient allocation rule in periodic ex-post equilibrium.
The chapter is structured as follows: In Section 3.2, the formal model is intro-
duced, the efficient allocation rule is defined, and the mechanisms proposed by Parkes
and Singh (2003) and Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2010) are discussed. In Section 3.3,
it is proven that for each type, there is a unique potential winning period. In Section
3.4, the payment rule of the dynamic Vickrey auction is constructed. Section 3.5
describes the generalized ascending auction. Section 3.6 concludes with a discussion
of possible generalizations and relationships of the results to revenue-maximizing
auctions.
3.2. The Model
3.2.1. Setup and Notation. A seller wants to sell a single indivisible object
within T time periods. In each period t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, a random number of buyers
nt arrives. The numbers nt are independent random variables and the probability
that nt = k is denoted by ρ
t
k ≥ 0, with
∑∞
k=0 ρ
t
k = 1. Nt :=
∑t
τ=1 nτ denotes the
number of buyers that have arrived in or before period t. Buyers are indexed in the
order of arrival. Within periods, indexing is random. It = {1, . . . , Nt} denotes the
set of buyers that arrive in or before period t.
A typical buyer j who arrives in period t, attaches a monetary value of vτj ∈ [0, v]
to the object if she gets it in period τ ≥ t, where v > 0. Each buyer is completely
characterized by her vector of valuations starting with her arrival period. Her type is
thus vj = (v
t
j, . . . , v
T
j ). Buyers’ types are independent random variables with distri-
bution functions Φt : [0, v]
T−t+1 → [0, 1] and strictly positive densities on [0, v]T−t+1,
where t is the arrival period of the respective buyer. We allow for dependencies
between the components of a buyer’s type. (ρtk)t=1,...T,k∈N and (Φt)t=1,...,T are com-
monly known by the buyers and the seller. Realizations of type and arrival period
are private information of each buyer, and we assume that she knows her complete
type in the arrival period. The valuation for the object can depend on the time
of allocation as described by the type-vector, but this relationship is completely
determined when the buyer arrives.
Prior to the arrival period, the type of a buyer is not known to anybody. To
emphasize this informational constraint, we distinguish the type of a buyer who
arrives in period t: (vtj , . . . , v
T
j ) ∈ [0, v¯]
T−t+1 from the type of a buyer who arrives in
period τ < t and has the same valuations for periods t, . . . , T but valuations of zero
for periods before t: (0, . . . , 0, vtj, . . . , v
T
j ) ∈ [0, v¯]
T−τ+1.
Buyers are risk-neutral. If a buyer j has to make a total expected payment of
pj, and qτ is the probability of getting the object in period τ , then her expected
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utility is given by
∑T
τ=t v
τ
j qτ −pj . The seller’s valuation for the object is normalized
to zero.
For τ ≥ t, let ητ (It) := maxi∈It{v
τ
i } be the highest valuation for getting the
object in period τ among all buyers in It and define η(It) := (ηt(It), . . . , ηT (It)) and
η := (η(I1), . . . , η(IT )).
3.2.2. The Efficient Allocation Rule under Complete Information. In pe-
riod t, allocation decisions can only depend on the types of buyers that have already
arrived. The value of the object, on the other hand, depends on the time when a
buyer gets it. Consequently, the ex-post efficient allocation rule is not feasible. It is
not always possible to identify the identity of the buyer with the ex-post highest val-
uation with certainty, in the period where this valuation can be realized. Instead, we
consider the ex-ante efficient allocation rule, i.e. the allocation rule that maximizes
the expected value of the utility enjoyed by the buyers, subject to the informational
constraint that information about future types cannot be used. This allocation rule
is the optimal policy for the following dynamic program.
The state (ht, at) at time t, consists of the history of types of all buyers in It,
denoted ht, and the availability of the object, denoted at ∈ {0, 1}. at equals zero
if the object has already been allocated, and one if the object is still available in
period t.
The set of feasible decisions xt, in state (ht, at) is
X(ht, at) =
{
{0, 1, . . . , Nt(ht)}, if at = 1,
{0}, if at = 0,
where xt = 0 means that the object is not allocated in period t and xt ∈ {1, . . . , Nt}
means that the object is allocated to buyer xt.
4 A policy is a family of decision
rules x = (xt(., .))
T
t=1 where xt(ht, at) ∈ X(ht, at). The total value (or welfare) in
period T at history hT after decisions x = (x1, . . . , xT ) is given by
∑T
t=1 v
t
xt
(define
vt0 := 0, ∀t). The efficient allocation rule is the optimal policy x
∗, for the dynamic
program P:
max
(xτ (.,.))Tτ=1
E
[
T∑
τ=1
vτxt(ht,at)
]
. (P)
The value function is given by V ∗T+1(hT+1, aT+1) = 0 and
V ∗t (ht, at) = max
(xτ (.,.))Tτ=t
E
[
T∑
τ=t
vτxτ (hτ ,aτ )
]
= vtx∗t (ht,at) + E
[
V ∗t+1(ht+1, at+1)
∣∣ ht, at, x∗t (ht, at)] .
The efficient allocation rule always allocates to a buyer who has the highest
valuation for the selling period. Hence, the value function can be considered as a
4Without loss of efficiency we can restrict the decision space to deterministic decisions.
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function of η(It) instead of ht.
V ∗t (ht, at) = V
∗
t (η(It), at).
The option value of retaining the object in period t is a function of the highest
valuations for all future periods vˆt : [0, v]
T−t+1 → R, defined by5
vˆt(η(It)) := E
[
V ∗t+1(η(It+1), 1)
∣∣ η(It)] . (3.2.1)
It is efficient to allocate the object in period t, if the option value is below the
highest valuation in period t. Hence, the object is allocated in the first period for
which
ηt(It) > vˆt(η(It)). (3.2.2)
In this period, the object is awarded to a buyer with valuation ηt(It). If there is a
tie, the buyer with the lowest index is chosen.6
3.2.3. Incentive Compatibility. A direct mechanism is a tuple (S, x, π). S =
(St)t∈{1,...,T} is the sequence of signal spaces, where St = [0, v]
T−t+1 is the signal
space for period t. In each period, buyers can only report a complete type of a
buyer that arrived in the same period. A buyer can make a report in any period
after her arrival. Without loss of generality we can assume that each buyer makes at
most one report. The allocation rule x is a policy as defined in the last section. We
will only use the efficient policy x∗. π : hT 7→ (πi)i=1,...,NT ∈ R
Nt is the payment rule.
πj(hT ) specifies the payment of buyer j at the terminal history hT . A mechanism
does not explicitly specify the time at which payments have to be made. Payments
may depend on all reports until the last period. If, however, in period t, and for
some ht, πj(hT ) is independent of all reports after period t, then the payments of
buyer j can already be made in period t.
Now consider a buyer j, who arrives in period t and plans to make a report v′ ∈ Sr
in period r ≥ t. Denote the history of reports of all buyers in It \ {j}, by ht,−j .
For given ht,−j and assuming that all other buyers report truthfully, the winning
probability of buyer j for period τ ≥ r conditional on all information available in the
arrival period is given by
qrτ (v
′, ht,−j) := Prob [x
∗
τ (hτ ) = j | ht,−j, vj = v
′] .
We omit at as an argument of the winning probability because q
r
τ (ht,−j, v
′) will only
be used when at = 1. The expected payment is given by
pr(v′, ht,−j) := E [πj(hT ) | ht,−j , vj = v
′] .
5For simplicity, ηt(It) is included in the arguments although vˆt does not depend on ηt(It).
6This implies a random selection among buyers with the same arrival period because indices are
assigned randomly. Furthermore, there is preference for buyers that arrived earlier. In this chapter,
the efficient allocation rule always refers to the allocation rule that has just been described. There
are other allocation rules which achieve the same total expected welfare. For example, the allocation
rule that allocates in the first period for which ηt(It) ≥ vˆt(η(It)), is also efficient. Also, other tie-
breaking rules could be used.
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With these definitions, the expected utility from participating in the mechanism
with a reported type v′ ∈ Sr and true type v ∈ St is
U(v, v′, ht,−j) :=
T∑
τ=r
vτqrτ (v
′, ht,−j)− p
r(v′, ht,−j).
The expected utility from truth-telling is abbreviated U(v, ht,−j) := U(v, v, ht,−j).
A mechanism is periodic ex-post incentive compatible if for all t, r ∈ {1, . . . , T}
with r ≥ t, all v ∈ St, v
′ ∈ Sr, and all possible histories of reports ht,−j ,
U(v, ht,−j) ≥ U(v, v
′, ht,−j). (3.2.3)
Periodic ex-post incentive compatibility requires that a truthful report at the ar-
rival period must be optimal for all possible histories, under the assumption that all
buyers (past, current and future arrivals) report their types truthfully at their re-
spective arrival periods. Periodic ex-post incentive compatibility is a hybrid concept
that reflects the informational constraint of the dynamic model. Expectations are
taken with respect to the types of future buyers. In this sense, it resembles Bayes-
Nash incentive compatibility. With respect to past and current buyers, incentive
compatibility constraints must hold for every profile of types. Therefore, ex-post
incentive compatibility is required only for information that is already realized at
the time when a buyer makes a report.7
Incentive compatibility of the efficient allocation rule has been shown by Parkes
and Singh (2003) for discrete type-spaces8 and by Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2010)
for continuous type-spaces.9
Adapted to the model of this chapter, the online VCG mechanism of Parkes and
Singh (2003) uses the following payment rule. The payment of j, when she makes a
report v′ ∈ Sr, is defined as
πoVCGj (hT,−j, v
′) =
T∑
τ=r
v′τ1{x∗τ (hτ,−j ,v′)=j} − [V
∗
r ((hr,−j, v
′), ar)− V
∗
r (hr,−j, ar)] .
(3.2.4)
7Note that (3.2.3) also rules out profitable deviations in which a buyer delays her report and reports
different types in later periods, conditional on the valuations of buyers who have arrived in the
meantime. For period T , (3.2.3) ensures that it is optimal to report vTj truthfully, for every history
hT,−j . This applies to buyers who arrived in period T as well as to buyers who delayed their
report because the mechanism cannot distinguish between them. In period T − 1, (3.2.3) rules out
that a delayed but truthful report of vTj is a profitable deviation. Therefore in period T − 1, it is
optimal to report (vT−1j , v
T
j ) truthfully and without delay. Working backwards in time it follows
inductively, that (3.2.3) rules out all feasible reporting strategies except a truthful report in the
arrival period.
8These authors use a very similar equilibrium concept. In their concept, ex-post incentive compat-
ibility is required with respect to information of buyers with lower index. This excludes the types
of buyers who arrive simultaneously but were assigned a higher index.
9Athey and Segal (2007) also show implementability of the efficient allocation rule, but the proposed
mechanism requires all agents to be available in all periods.
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The first term is equal to the private utility j enjoys according to her reported type.
If j wins the object in period τ , this is equal to v′τ . If she does not win the object in
any period, it is zero. The term in parentheses is the change in expected total welfare
due to the report of buyer j given the information available in period r. As in the
standard static VCG mechanism, the payment replaces the private surplus of each
buyer by the (expected) change in total welfare due to her report. The allocation
rule maximizes welfare subject to the informational constraint that future types are
not known. Therefore, it is optimal for j to report her true type, because she faces
the same informational constraint.
Theorem 3.2.1 (Parkes and Singh (2003)). The mechanism (S, x∗, πoVCG) is peri-
odic ex-post incentive compatible.
πpVCG is not the only payment rule that implements the efficient allocation. The
dynamic pivot mechanism of Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2010) does not aggregate
payments over periods. The payment of a buyer j in period s ≥ r is defined as
πDPj (hs,−j, v
′) = vx∗s(hs,−j) + E
[
V ∗s+1(hs+1,−j)
∣∣hs,−j, x∗s(hs,−j)]
−
(
vx∗s(hs,−j ,v′) + E
[
V ∗s+1(hs+1,−j)
∣∣hs,−j, x∗s(hs,−j, v′)])
None of the mechanisms fulfills all properties (A)–(C). In the truth-telling equilib-
rium of the online VCG mechanism, j always receives a payoff given by
V ∗t (ht, at)− V
∗
t (ht,−j , at). (3.2.5)
The payoff is independent of the event that she wins the object. In particular, this
implies that the mechanism must transfer a positive amount of money to every buyer
who has a positive chance of winning at the time of arrival, if that buyer does not
win the object. This violates property (C).
The dynamic pivot mechanism requires payments from buyers who are pivotal
for postponing the allocation even if they do not win the object. To see this consider
the following example. Let T = 2, I1 = {1, 2} with v1 = (v
1
1, 0) and v2 = (0, v
2
2),
and assume that ρ21 = 1 so that I2 = {1, 2, 3}. Furthermore, assume that v
1
1 =
5
8
,
v22 =
3
4
and v23 ∼ U [0, 1]. In this case, it is efficient not to allocate in the first period
because v11 =
5
8
< E
[
max
{
3
4
, v23
}]
= 25
32
. Buyer two is pivotal for the allocation
decision; without her, the object would be allocated to buyer one in the first period.
Her payment in period one is therefore given by π12 = v1−E[v3] =
1
8
. If the realized
valuation v23 exceeds v
2
2 , then buyer two does not receive the object and his payment
in the second period is π22 = 0. Hence, her total payment is
1
8
which violates property
(A) and ex-post individual rationality.10
10This does not contradict the individual rationality result of Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2010)
because the authors consider periodic ex-post individual rationality. Indeed, the expected payoff
of buyer two in the first period is 34 (
3
4 −
3
8 )−
1
8 =
5
32 > 0.
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3.3. Properties of the Efficient Allocation Rule
The efficient allocation rule allocates the object in the first period where ηt(It) >
vˆt(η(It)). We show below that if we apply this condition to the type vj of buyer j,
then we get the unique period in which this type can win.
Definition 3.3.1. For t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, the potential winning period θj of buyer j
with type vj ∈ St, is the earliest period θ ≥ t for which v
θ
j > vˆθ(vj), i.e.,
vτj ≤ vˆτ (vj), for τ ∈ {t, . . . , θj − 1},
and v
θj
j > vˆθj (vj).
(3.3.1)
Definition 3.3.1 partitions the type-space. Hence, there is a unique potential
winning period for each type. The potential winning period θj only depends on the
type of buyer j and the structure of the allocation problem, i.e. the arrival process
and the distributions from which valuations are drawn. It does not depend on the
realized types of the other buyers or the realized numbers of buyers.
Examples:
(1) A buyer with constant valuation vj = (v, v, . . . , v) has potential winning
period T .
(2) A buyer with vτj = v for some τ and v
t
j = 0 for t 6= τ , has potential winning
period T if vτj ≤ vˆτ (0, . . . , 0), otherwise she has potential winning period τ .
The following theorem states that under the efficient allocation rule, a buyer can
win the object only in her potential winning period.
Theorem 3.3.2. Fix a buyer j with type vj ∈ St. If x
∗
s(hs, as) = j for some s ≥ t,
and some hs, then s = θj.
Proof. See Appendix 3.A. 
To get an intuition for the result, consider the case T = 2. Suppose buyer j
arrives in period one and has type vj = (v
1
j , v
2
j ). The theorem states that she can
either win in period one or in period two, but not in both periods. Of course, it
depends on the types of the other buyers whether she wins at all.
First, suppose that for some profile of types, it is efficient that j gets the object
in period two. In this case, the highest valuation for the first period η1(I1), must
not be greater than the option value of retaining the object:
η1(I1) ≤ vˆ1(η(I1)).
If j wins in the second period, she must have the highest valuation for period two
among the buyers from period one: v2j = η2(I1). Hence, the option value of retaining
the object only depends on her valuation: vˆ1(η(I1)) = vˆ1(v
2
j ). On the other hand,
her valuation for the first period cannot be greater than η1(I1). We conclude that
v1j ≤ vˆ1(v
2
j ).
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Loosely speaking, if j had a higher valuation for period one, she would overbid the
option value defined by her own valuation for period two. But this must not be the
case if j wins in the second period.
Second, suppose that for some other profile of types it is efficient to allocate the
object to j in period one. Then, v1j = η1(I1) and hence
v1j > vˆ1(η(I1)) ≥ vˆ1(v
2
j ).
Loosely speaking, j’s valuation for period one must overbid the option value of
retaining the object. Especially, j must overbid her own valuation for period two
(transformed by the option value function). The conditions on vj for winning in the
first and in the second period, cannot be fulfilled simultaneously. Hence, it is not
possible that j wins in different periods for different profiles of the other buyers’
types.
Theorem 3.3.2 greatly reduces the dimension of the signal space that is necessary
to implement the value-maximizing allocation rule. The type of each buyer j can
be summarized by θj and v
θj
j . In addition, once the winning period θj is fixed, the
notion of the lowest type that can win the auction for a particular state of the world
becomes well defined. This property will be used to define the dynamic Vickrey
auction.
Theorem 3.3.2 has two important implications that are useful to define auction
rules. First, in each period t, there is a unique buyer j∗t among those who have
already arrived, who has a chance of winning. This buyer is called the tentative
winner in period t. Furthermore, if we partition the set of buyers in period t into
two subsets A and B, two tentative winners can be determined under the assumption
that only the buyers in A or B, respectively, have arrived. The tentative winner for
the set of all buyers (A ∪ B), must be one of the two tentative winners determined
for the subsets A and B. Formally, we have:
Corollary 3.3.3. (i) For each period t and every state (ht, at) with at = 1, there
exists a unique buyer j∗t ∈ It such that x
∗
τ (hτ , aτ ) /∈ It\j
∗
t for all τ ≥ t and all
future states (hτ , aτ ) that can occur after (ht, at).
(ii) Suppose It = A ∪ B with A,B 6= ∅. Let a ∈ A be the tentative winner if the
set of buyers is I ′t = A, and let b ∈ B be the tentative winner if I
′
t = B. Then
j∗t ∈ {a, b}.
Proof. (i) For t ∈ {1, . . . , T} consider a hypothetical buyer k with valuations
vk = η(It). By Theorem 3.3.2, this buyer has a unique potential winning
period θk. The stopping rule of the efficient allocation only depends on the
highest valuation for each period (cf. condition (3.2.2)). Therefore, the time
at which the object is allocated with It, is the same as with I
′
t = {k} and
vk = η(It). Hence, buyers in It can only win in period θk. If a buyer from
It wins, it must be j
∗
t = min
(
argmaxi∈It{v
θk
i }
)
. (If there are ties, the tie-
breaking rule described in Section 3.2.2 eventually selects the buyer with the
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lowest index. As the indices of the buyers in It are already known in period t,
the identity of the tentative winner is unique in period t.)
(ii) Without loss of generality we can assume that j∗t ∈ A. But then j
∗
t must also
be the tentative winner for I ′t = A because with any other tentative winner,
the expected value of the allocation for I ′t = A must be weakly smaller than
the expected value with j∗t as tentative winner.

An immediate implication of Corollary 3.3.3 is that a buyer who was not tentative
winner in period t, cannot become tentative winner in period t+ 1.
Corollary 3.3.4. For t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, let j∗t and j
∗
t+1 be the tentative winners
in t and t+ 1, respectively. Then j∗t+1 ∈ (It+1\It) ∪ {j
∗
t }.
These properties of the efficient allocation rule imply that it can be implemented
as follows: In each period t, new buyers are asked to report complete types to the
auctioneer.11 If it is efficient to allocate immediately, the object is sold and the
auction ends. If it is efficient to retain the object for the next period, the auctioneer
declares a tentative winner which is either the tentative winner from the previous
period or a new buyer who has made a report in period t. All other buyers are
informed that they cannot win the auction and will never be recalled.
Remarks:
(1) The properties of the efficient allocation rule carry over to optimal policies
of any dynamic program that has a similar structure as P. For example,
one could consider quasi-efficient allocation rules that maximize excepted
welfare after valuations have been transformed by strictly increasing func-
tions:
Jt(vj) = (J
t
t (v
t
j), . . . , J
T
t (v
T
j )),
where each Jτt is strictly increasing.
(2) Note also that the assumption of full support of the type distribution has
not been used in this section. Therefore, the results carry over to a model
with constant valuations and deadlines. In this model, the types of all
buyer have the form (vi, . . . , vi, 0, . . . , 0) where the valuation vi is repeated
from the arrival time to the deadline di. Theorem 3.3.2 is trivial in this
case because θi = di for all types, but the less obvious Corollary 3.3.3 also
carries over to the model with deadlines.
3.4. Payments
In this section, a simple payment rule is constructed, that generalizes the static
Vickrey auction. To highlight the similarity, we briefly review the payment rule of
the static Vickrey auction.
11Alternatively, they could be asked to report their potential winning period and the valuation for
that period.
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3.4.1. The Static Vickrey Auction. Consider the standard independent private
values model with N bidders. Valuations are drawn from Θ = [a, b] with distribution
function F . Let q be the probability of winning the object in the second-price auction
without reserve price.
By payoff-equivalence, the expected payoff of bidder 1 with valuation v1 ∈ Θ in
the second-price auction is given by
U(v1) =
ˆ v1
a
q(v)dv. (3.4.1)
Writing the winning probability explicitly,
U(v1) =
ˆ v1
a
ˆ
ΘN−1
1{v≥max{v2,...,vN}}dF (v2) . . . dF (vN)dv.
Writing v(1) = max{v2, . . . , vN} and changing the order of integration yields:
U(v1) =
ˆ
Θ
ˆ v1
a
1{v≥v(1)}dvdF
N−1(v(1))
=
ˆ
Θ
(v1 − v(1))1{v1≥v(1)}dF
N−1(v(1))
=
ˆ
Θ
v11{v1≥v(1)}dF
N−1(v(1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
v1·q(v1)
−
ˆ
Θ
v(1)1{v1≥v(1)}dF
N−1(v(1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
p(v1)
This shows, that the payment of any bidder can be defined as zero if she does not
win and as the highest valuation of the other bidders if she wins.
3.4.2. Construction of Payments for the Dynamic Vickrey Auction. The
construction of payments in the dynamic setting follows the same logic. First, the di-
mension reduction of the type-space, incentive compatibility and payoff-equivalence
for multi-dimensional mechanisms are used to derive a formula similar to (3.4.1).
The result is (3.4.3) below. Second, as in the one-dimensional case, the winning
probability is written explicitly and the order of integration is changed. Instead
of the second-highest valuation, we will then obtain a critical type vt(θj , η−j) that
depends on the arrival period t, the potential winning period θi, and the profile of
the other bidders’ highest valuations η−j = (ηs(Iτ\{j}))τ=1,...,T,s=τ,...,T . This is used
to define payments for the winning bidder.
Consider a bidder j with type vj who arrives in period t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. Proposi-
tion 1 in Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti (1999) implies that the expected payoff
for j, from participating in an incentive compatible mechanism which implements
the efficient allocation rule, is given by
U t(vj) = U
t(0) +
ˆ 1
0
〈
qt(γ(s)), γ′(s)
〉
ds (3.4.2)
where qt(v) := (qtt(v, ht,−j), . . . , q
t
T (v, ht,−j)), γ : [0, 1] → [0, v]
T−t+1 parameterizes
a piecewise smooth curve that connects the origin with vj, and 〈., .〉 denotes the
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standard scalar product on RT−t+1. The argument ht,−j is suppressed in the func-
tions U and q, in order to simplify notation. Incentive compatibility of the efficient
allocation rule implies that qt is a conservative vector field (Jehiel, Moldovanu, and
Stacchetti, 1999). Therefore, γ can be chosen such that it is composed of three
straight lines. Let the first line connect the origin with w1j := (0, . . . , vˆθj (0), 0, . . .).
(This implies that the first line reduces to a point for θj = T.) Let the second line
connect w1j with w
2
j := (0, . . . , v
θj
j , 0, . . .). Let the third line connect w
2
j with vj.
If θj 6= T , for each v = γ(s) on the first line, q
t
τ (v) = 0 for τ 6= T by Theorem
3.3.2 (see the example after Definition 3.3.1), and γ′T (s) = 0 by the choice of γ.
Hence, the path of integration is perpendicular to the vector-field and the integrand
in (3.4.2) vanishes. For each v = γ(s) on the third line segment, qtτ (v) = 0 for τ 6= θj ,
and γ′θj(s) = 0. Hence, the integrand vanishes as well. On the second line segment,
only the θthj components of q
t and γ′ are non-zero. Therefore, with a simple change
of variables, (3.4.2) can be simplified to
U t(vj) = U
t(0) +
ˆ vθjj
vˆθj (0)
qtθj (0, . . . , v, 0, . . .)dv. (3.4.3)
For given v ∈ [0, v¯], qtθj(0, . . . , v, 0, . . .) is equal to the probability conditional on
ht,−j, that η−j belongs to the set
Ωtθj (v) :=
{
η˜−j
∣∣ η˜t(It,−j) ≤ vˆt(η˜t(It,−j), . . . ,max{η˜θj(It,−j), v}, . . . , η˜T (It,−j)),
. . .
η˜θj−1(Iθj−1,−j) ≤ vˆθj−1(η˜θj−1(Iθj−1,−j),max{η˜θj (Iθj−1,−j), v}, . . .
. . . , η˜T (Iθj−1,−j)),
v > η˜θj(Iθj ,−j),
v > vˆθj(η˜(Iθj ,−j))
}
,
= {η˜−j | η˜t(It,−j) ≤ vˆt(0, . . . , v, . . . , 0),
. . .
η˜θj−1(Iθj−1,−j) ≤ vˆθj−1(0, v, 0 . . . , 0), (3.4.4)
v > η˜θj(Iθj ,−j),
v > vˆθj(η˜(Iθj ,−j))
}
,
where Iτ,−j = Iτ\{j}. The second equality follows because j must be the tentative
winner in all periods t, . . . , θj, if he gets the object in period θj . In (3.4.4), the
conditions on η˜(It,−j), . . . , η˜(Iθj−1,−j), ensure that it is efficient to retain the object
until period θj . The second last line ensures that j has the highest valuation in
period θj among all bidders. The last condition ensures that it is not efficient to
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retain the object in period θj . With this definition, (3.4.3) becomes
U t(vj) = U
t(0) +
ˆ vθjj
vˆθj (0)
ˆ
Ωt
θj
(v)
dGt(η−j | ht,−j)dv,
where Gt( . |ht,−j) shall denote the distribution function of η−j , conditional on ht,−j .
The inequalities defining Ωtθj (v) in (3.4.4) are lower bounds for v. Therefore,
Ωtθj (v
′) ⊇ Ωtθj (v) if v
′ ≥ v. We can rewrite the expected payoff and use Fubini as
follows:
U t(vj) = U
t(0) +
ˆ vθj
j
vˆθj (0)
ˆ
Ωt
θj
(v
θj
j )
1{η−j∈Ωtθj (v)}
dGt(η−j | ht,−j) dv,
= U t(0) +
ˆ
Ωt
θj
(v
θj
j )
ˆ vθjj
vˆθj (0)
1{η−j∈Ωtθj (v)}
dv dGt(η−j | ht,−j).
Finally, we define
vτ (θj , η−j) := inf
{
v
∣∣∣ η−j ∈ Ωτθj (v)} . (3.4.5)
vτ (θj, η−j) is the critical type of the winning bidder, i.e. the valuation v
θj
j , for which
j ties with η−j . Using this, we can rewrite the expected payoff to get
U t(vj) = U
t(0) +
ˆ
Ωt
θj
(v
θj
j )
v
θj
j − v
t(θj , η−j) dG
t(η−j | ht,−j) (3.4.6)
= U t(0) +
ˆ
Ωt
θj
(v
θj
j )
v
θj
j dG
t(η−j | ht,−j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
v
θj
j · qθj (vj )
−
ˆ
Ωt
θj
(v
θj
j )
vt(θj , η−j) dG
t(η−j | ht,−j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pt(vj)
The last line shows that the expected payment is the integral over the critical
type. The domain of integration is restricted to the set of profiles for which j wins
the object. Therefore, a payment rule that requires no payment from losing bidders
and a payment equal to the critical type from the winner, implements the efficient
allocation rule in periodic ex-post equilibrium. Obviously, with this definition, it
is ensured that buyer j has to pay a positive amount only if she gets the object.
Furthermore, the payoff of bidder j is non-negative because her valuation v
θj
j is
greater than or equal to the critical value if she wins the auction. As the inequalities
in (3.4.4) only depend on information available in period θj , the payment can be
determined at the same time as the allocation. To summarize, we can state
Theorem 3.4.1. Let π be a payment rule that defines the payment for bidder j,
when she reports type vj in period t, and the history of reports is hT , as
πj(hT ) :=
{
vt(θj , η−j) if η−j ∈ Ω
t
θj
(v
θj
j )
0 if η−j /∈ Ω
t
θj
(v
θj
j )
. (3.4.7)
Then,
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(i) the mechanism (S, x∗, π) is periodic ex-post incentive compatible,
(ii) payments are non-negative for the winning bidder and zero for all other bidders,
(iii) payments are completely determined in the period when the object is allocated,
(iv) and the mechanism is ex-post individually rational.
Remarks:
(1) With these payments, U t(0) = 0.
(2) The critical type vt(θj , η−j), can be computed by setting the inequalities in
the definition of Ωtθ(v) equal (see (3.4.4)) and solving each equality for v.
The critical value is the maximum of these solutions. There is at least one
equality that is fulfilled at this maximum. If the last equality is fulfilled we
have vt(θj , η−j) = vˆθj(η(Iθj ,−j)): j has to pay the option value of retaining
the object to period θj + 1. If the penultimate equality is fulfilled we have
vt(θj , η−j) = ηθj (Iθj ,−j): j has to pay the second highest valuation for period
θj . If one of the other equalities is fulfilled, the auction would have ended
earlier than θj if j had not made her report. Suppose for example, that the
equality for η˜t′ for some t
′ ∈ {t, . . . , θj − 1} is fulfilled. Then, without j’s
report, the auction would have stopped in period t′. Solving η˜t′(It′,−j) =
vˆt′(0, . . . , v, 0, . . . , 0) for v yields v
t(θj , η−j). The solution is lower than the
highest valuation in period t′. Hence, in this case, the winner has to pay
less that the valuation of the bidder who would have won without j.
(3) As in the static Vickrey auction, payments of bidder j do not depend di-
rectly on her report.
(4) Payments are defined as a function of the history hT in the final period. We
know from Corollary 3.3.3, that in each period only the tentative winner
has a positive probability to win the object in the future. This implies, that
for all bidders except the tentative winner, payments are determined as zero
immediately after they have made their reports. For a tentative winner, the
payment is determined if she wins the object or if another bidder becomes
tentative winner. In the latter case, the payment is zero, in the former case,
it can be made at the same time as the allocation of the object. Therefore,
all payments can be made online.
3.5. A Generalized Ascending Auction
Theorem 3.4.1 defines a direct mechanism that generalizes the static second price
auction. The ascending auction can also be generalized to the dynamic setting. In
this construction, one property of the efficient allocation rule is crucial. We can
define an order on the type-space such that efficient allocation rule always selects
the bidder that ranks highest in this order as tentative winner, and allocates to her
if her potential winning period is reached.
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For bidder j with arrival period t, type vj ∈ St and potential winning period θj ,
we define the comparison price πTj by
πTj := min
{
π ≥ 0
∣∣∣vθjj ≤ vˆθj (0, . . . , 0, π)} .
Since dismissed buyers are never recalled, we have that vˆτ (0, . . . , 0, v
θj
j , 0, . . . , 0) =
vˆτ (0, . . . , 0, π
T
j ) for all vj such that π
T
j > 0 and τ < θj . This implies that j wins
against another bidder i with potential winning period θi = T , if and only if v
T
i < π
T
j .
More generally, if bidder i has type vi, potential winning period θi and comparison
price πTi , then j wins against i only if π
T
j ≥ π
T
i .
12 If θi = θj this is obvious.
Otherwise, suppose without loss of generality that θj < θi. Then we have π
T
j ≥ π
T
i
if and only if
v
θj
j = vˆθj (0, . . . , 0, π
T
j ) ≥ vˆθj (0, . . . , 0, π
T
i ) = vˆθj (0, . . . , 0, v
θi
i , 0, . . . , 0).
We will now use the order of types defined by their comparison price, to define
a dynamic ascending auction. In each period t, there are T − t+1 price clocks that
show prices πt, . . . , πT for buying the object in periods t, . . . , T . All prices πτ , τ < T
are linked to πT by
πτ = vˆτ (0, . . . , 0, π
T ). (3.5.1)
In the first period, πT starts at zero. In all periods t > 1, πT starts at the value
where it stopped in period t − 1. The other prices are set such that they satisfy
(3.5.1). In each period, the auction has two phases, the clock phase and the buying
phase. Before the clock phase, buyers can chose to become active. In the clock
phase, πT is raised continuously and the other prices are updated such that (3.5.1)
is satisfied. Bidders are free to drop out at any time. A bidder who has dropped
out cannot become active again. If all bidders but one have dropped out, or if all
remaining bidders decide to drop out at the same time, the clock stops immediately.
The remaining bidder, or a random bidder from the group of drop-outs if all bidders
dropped out simultaneously, enters the buying phase.13 In the buying phase, she
can either buy immediately for the current price πt, or she can wait. In the former
case, the auction ends with a sale, in the latter case, the auction proceeds to the
next period and she remains active.
A bidder j is said to bid truthfully in the dynamic ascending auction if she uses
the following strategy:
• Before the clock phase of any period τ : become active if and only if ∃s ≥
τ : vsj > π
s.
• In the clock phase of any period τ : drop out if and only if vsj ≤ π
s for all
s ≥ τ .
• In the buying phase of any period τ : Buy if and only if τ = θj .
12We ignore ties in this discussion.
13Here, for simplicity, we use a different tie-breaking rule than in the dynamic Vickrey auction.
The probability that this affects the outcome is zero.
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Theorem 3.5.1. (i) If all bidders bid truthfully, the outcome of the dynamic as-
cending auction coincides with the outcome of the dynamic Vickrey auction
with probability one.
(ii) Truthful bidding is a periodic ex-post equilibrium in the dynamic ascending
auction.
Proof. See Appendix 3.A. 
The main steps of the proof are as follows. Under truthful bidding, the ascending
auction selects the buyer with the highest comparison price and allocates the object
to him in his potential winning period. Hence, ignoring ties, the allocation rule is
the same as in the dynamic Vickrey auction. Next, we show that the price for the
winning period, at which the last competing bidder drops out is equal to the winner’s
critical type. Therefore, the payment rule implemented under truthful bidding is
also identical to the payment rule in the dynamic Vickrey auction.
To show that truth-telling is an equilibrium we rule out several deviations that
lead to non-positive expected payoffs and show that the remaining strategies yield
the same expected payoffs as certain reports in the dynamic Vickrey auction. Truth-
ful bidding corresponds to a truthful report in the dynamic Vickrey auction. Incen-
tive compatibility of the latter therefore implies that truthful bidding is a periodic
ex-post equilibrium of the dynamic ascending auction.
3.6. Conclusion
This chapter shows how the payments in a dynamic mechanism can be dis-
tributed over different states of the world such that (i) expected payments ensure
incentive compatibility and (ii) the payment rule is simple in the sense that non-
winning bidders do not make or receive a transaction, ex-post participation con-
straints are satisfied and payments can be made online. The result is the dynamic
Vickrey auction in which the winning bidder pays her critical type, i.e., she pays
the lowest valuation for the winning period that would suffice to win against the
other bids. The crucial step in the construction of the payment rule was to show
that for each type, there is a unique potential winning period. This reduces types
to essentially one dimension. Furthermore, it was shown that the efficient allocation
rule allows to define a tentative winner in each period. There is an order of the
type-space and the tentative winner is the highest bidder in that order. The results
have been used to generalize the ascending clock auction to the dynamic framework.
The model is restrictive in at least two ways. Firstly, the allocation of a single
object is studied. The case of multiple objects is left for future research. How-
ever, if more than one object is at sale, it is possible to construct simple examples
where bidders can win in different periods for different profiles of competing bidders’
types. Therefore, future research will have to concentrate on the generalization of
the weaker result of corollaries 3.3.3 and 3.3.4.
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Secondly, more general allocation problems could be studied. In this case, as in
the case of multiple objects, a reduction of types to essentially one dimension may
not be possible. It should be noted, however, that Theorem 3.3.2 provides much
more structure than is needed for the construction of payments in Section 3.4. It
would suffice that for each type vj , there exists a path from the origin to vj such that
the allocation to bidder j is monotonic along this path for all profiles of the other
bidder’s types. Depending on the choice of these paths, the payment rule may look
significantly different from Vickrey payments, but nevertheless it would be possible
to define payment rules that require transfers only from winning bidders.
Dynamic revenue maximization is an important question that has not been stud-
ied extensively in models with private information about time preferences.14 The
results of the present chapter do not characterize the allocation rule that maximizes
revenue. They can, however, be generalized to other allocation rules that are the
solution to a recursive dynamic program in which valuations are replaced by some
increasing function of valuations. Given the dynamic structure of the model, it is
possible that the revenue-maximizing allocation rule belongs to this class. In this
case, the expected payments fixed by the allocation rule (via payoff equivalence),
could be distributed over different states in the same way as in this chapter.
3.A. Omitted Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.3.2. The result is proven by induction. For T = 1 the
result is trivial. Assume that the theorem is true for allocation problems with T − 1
periods. The statement for T is shown in four steps.
Step 1: If a buyer j ∈ I1 gets the object in period one, v
1
j > vˆ1(η(I1)) ≥ vˆ1(vj).
Therefore θj = 1.
Step 2: If it is not efficient to allocate in period one, we can consider the allocation
of the retained object in periods {2, . . . , T} as a new allocation problem with T − 1
periods. We only have to relabel I˜1 = I2, . . . , I˜T−1 = IT and delete the first elements
from the type vectors of bidders in I1. The decisions in periods {2, . . . , T} of the
original problem only depend on the buyers that are present in these periods and
their valuations. Therefore the identity of the winning buyer is the same in the new
problem and the original problem. The time of allocation is shifted by one. This
implies, that buyer j with potential winning period θnewj ∈ {1, . . . , T −1} in the new
problem, can only win in period one or period θ′j = θ
new
j +1 of the original problem.
Furthermore, as θnewj is characterized by condition (3.3.1) with τ ∈ {1, . . . , θ
new
j −1},
θ′j is characterized by (3.3.1) with τ ∈ {2, . . . , θ
′
j − 1}. It therefore remains to show
that v1j ≤ vˆ1(vj), if j wins in θ
′
j in the original problem.
Step 3: There is only one buyer from I1 that can win the object in the original
problem if it is retained for period two. To see this, consider again the new problem
with T −1 periods. Define A = I1 and B = I˜1\I1. Then I˜1 = A∪B. Assume B 6= ∅.
14See Pai and Vohra (2008b) and Chapter 1 for exceptions. In most other papers, buyers are either
short-lived, or long-lived with a common, public discount factor and a fixed valuation.
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By Corollary 3.3.3.ii, there are elements a ∈ A and b ∈ B such that the tentative
winner in period one of the new problem is in {a, b}. Hence, buyer a ∈ A = I1 is
the only buyer in I1 that can win the object in the original problem if it is retained
for period two. If B = ∅ the argument is trivial.
Step 4: If j ∈ I1 gets the object in θ
′
j 6= 1, we must have η1(I1) ≤ vˆ1(η(I1)). By
step 3 we know that j is the only bidder in I1 that can win in periods {2, . . . , T}.
Therefore the option value of retaining the object only depends on her valuation:
vˆ1(η(I1)) = vˆ1(vj). As v
1
j ≤ η1(I1) we have v
1
j ≤ vˆ1(vj) as desired. 
Proof of Theorem 3.5.1. (i) If all bidders bid truthfully, a bidder j drops out
if πT = πTj . Therefore, in each period, a buyer with the highest comparison price
enters the buying phase. As buyers buy in their potential winning periods, and
only in this period, if they bid truthfully, the allocation coincides with the efficient
allocation rule of the dynamic Vickrey auction, except for the case of ties, that occur
with zero probability.
Now suppose that bidder j arrives in period t and wins the object in period θj .
We show that the price πθj at which the last competing bidder dropped out equals
the critical type of bidder j. For each i ∈ Iθj , define π
θj
i := vˆθj (0, . . . , 0, π
T
i ). Then,
j has to pay
max
i∈Iθj
π
θj
i = max
{
max
i∈Iθj ,θi<θj
π
θj
i , max
i∈Iθj ,θi=θj
π
θj
i , max
i∈Iθj ,θi>θj
π
θj
i
}
.
If θi < θj , then for all τ < θj , vˆτ (0, . . . , 0, π
θj
i , 0, . . . , 0) = vˆτ (0, . . . , 0, π
T
i ) ≥ v
τ
i .
Hence,
max
i∈Iθj ,θi<θj
π
θj
i = max
{
vθj
∣∣vθj = 0 or ∃τ ∈ {t, . . . , θj − 1}, i ∈ Iτ : θi < θj (3.A.1)
and vτi = vˆτ (0, . . . , 0, v
θj , 0, . . . , 0)
}
.
If θj = θi, then π
θj
i = vˆθj (0, . . . , 0, π
T
i ) = vˆθi(0, . . . , 0, π
T
i ) = v
θi
i = v
θj
i . Hence
max
i∈Iθj ,θi=θj
π
θj
i = max
i∈Iθj ,θi=θj
v
θj
i . (3.A.2)
Finally if θi > θj , then π
θj
i = vˆθj (0, . . . , 0, π
T
i ) ≥ vˆθj (0, . . . , 0, v
θi
i , 0, . . . , 0). Hence
max
i∈Iθj ,θi>θj
π
θj
i = max
i∈Iθj ,θi>θj
vˆθj(v
θj
i , . . . , v
T
i ). (3.A.3)
We now compare (3.A.1)–(3.A.3) to the values defining the critical type of bidder
j from (3.4.4). Define ξ1 as the minimal value of v that satisfies all but the last two
inequalities in (3.4.4), ξ2 as the infimal value of v that satisfies the second-last
inequality in (3.4.4), and ξ3 as the infimal value of v that satisfies the last inequality
in (3.4.4). In general ξ1 is greater or equal than (3.A.1), ξ2 is greater or equal than
(3.A.2) and ξ3 is greater or equal than (3.A.3) as the maximizations in (3.A.1)–
(3.A.3) are restricted to the sets of bidders with θi < θj , θi = θj and θi > θj ,
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respectively. Now suppose that the last bidder i who dropped out before j won the
auction has θi < θj . Then the price clock for period θi stopped at π
θi = vθii . Let π
θj
be the value at which the price clock for period θj stopped. As i is the last drop-out,
vθii = ηθi(Iθi,−j) = vˆθi(0, . . . , 0, π
θj , 0, . . . , 0) and ητ (Iτ,−j) ≤ vˆτ (0, . . . , 0, π
θi, 0, . . . 0)
for all τ = t, . . . , θj − 1. Therefore, ξ1 satisfies
vθii = vˆθi(0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
t,...,θj−1
, ξ1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
θj+1,...,T
) = vˆθi(0, . . . , 0, π
θi, 0, . . . , 0).
This implies ξ1 = π
θj
i . If θi = θj , then i dropped out at π
θj = v
θj
i . This im-
plies ξ2 = π
θj
i . If θi > θj , then i dropped out at π
θi = vθii . Therefore π
θj
i =
vˆθj(0, . . . , 0, v
θi
i , 0, . . . , 0) = ξ3. Finally, if no buyer except j arrives, the clock for
period θj remains at its initial value πj = vˆθj (0) and we have ξ3 = vˆθj (0), ξ1 = 0 and
ξ2 = 0. In summary this implies maxi∈Iθj π
θi
i = v
t(θj , η−j).
(ii) Suppose that for a dynamic ascending auction of length T−1, truthful bidding
is an ex-post equilibrium. For length one this is trivial. We show by induction that
the claim is also true for T periods.
Consider bidder j ∈ I1 and suppose that all other bidders bid truthfully. If the
auction reaches period two, and bidder j has not dropped out in the first period,
truthful bidding is optimal for j by hypothesis.
If j enters the buying phase in period one, we have to distinguish two cases.
Case 1: πT ≥ πTj . In this case, v
t
j ≤ π
t for all t = 1, . . . , T . Therefore j’s expected
utility is non-positive regardless of the continuation strategy.
Case 2: πT < πTj . In this case, (i) implies that buying immediately yields a payoff
equal to U(vj , (v
1
j , 0, . . . , 0), h˜1,−j) and not buying followed by truthful bidding yields
a payoff equal to U(vj , (0, v
2
j , . . . , v
T
j ), h˜1,−j). h˜1,−j = h1,−j ∪ {(π
1, . . . , πT )} denotes
the history of types of the other bidders with the addition of an artificial bidder
that has valuations equal to the prices at which the clock stopped when j entered
the buying phase. U(v, v′, h) denotes the expected payoff from participating in the
dynamic Vickrey auction. If θj = 1
U(vj , (v
1
j , 0, . . . , 0), h˜1,−j) = U(vj , h˜1,−j) ≥ U(vj , (0, v
2
j , . . . , v
T
j ), h˜1,−j),
where the inequality follows from periodic ex-post incentive compatibility of the
dynamic Vickrey auction. Similarly, if θj > 1
U(vj , (0, v
2
j , . . . , v
T
j ), h˜1,−j) = U(vj , h˜1,−j) ≥ U(vj , (v
1
j , 0, . . . , 0), h˜1,−j).
This show that it is optimal to buy according to the truthful bidding strategy.
Finally, consider the clock phase. If πT ≥ πTj , remaining active yields a payoff
of at most zero as shown before, therefore it is optimal to drop out immediately. If
πT < πTj , continuing by truthful bidding yields U(v, h˜1,−j) ≥ 0. Hence it is optimal
to bid truthfully in the first period. 
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